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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE ST.A.TE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plainti.ff a!nd Responde1lf, 
vs. 
E. B. ERWIN, HARR.Y FINCH and 
R. 0. PEAR.CE. 
Defenda·n,fs and AppeU(uzts. 
CASE 
NO. 6200 
Brief of Appellants R. 0. Pearce and Harrg Finch 
I~""TRODUCTORY STATEMENT 
Thi~ statement will be based upon the oosumpti0111, 
not admitted, that the pleadings here are sufficient. 
Three defendants were convicted, Mr. Erwin, former 
mayor, Harry Finch, former Chief of Police, and R. 
0. Pearce, attorney. The offense charged is that an 
agreemoot was entered. into between the said three ap-
pellants ~and one Ben Harmon, dooeased, and Frank A. 
Thacker, ·ooqnitted, to ''allow, as·s.ist, and enable house·s 
of ill fame, * '*' * lotteries, dioo games, slot machines, 
book-making and other gambling devices and games of 
ch3JILCe to be kept, maintained and operated at * * * 
Salt Lake City." * J1: * 
This case is unique in that it ·does not charge· an 
agreement between officers and operators! of any of 
these things to operBJte or to pr:otoot their operation, as 
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has been -charged in other eases com1ng before the 
courts. No one im this ·ea.s:e was ·engaged in thH opera-
tion of any of the:se things in any manner. This is an 
important element to be· kept in mirod in applying the 
law, as wen as the t~e·stimony here. App;ellants are not 
charged with operating nor .agreeing to op·emte. ·They 
are not -charged with an agre·ement to collect money 
n·or with -colle.etimg money from .any of these ope·r:ations. 
More important, they 1are not eharged, either as 
officials or otherwi'S·e, with the offensie of ~suffering or 
all·owing .any of these things to oper~ate. 
As:suming that it may he a ·crime to operate ~thes·e 
things or a crim·e to permit them to he oper.ated by per-
·sons having authority to .stop· them, this is n:ot the 
·charge. It wrus. irn this (~onnection that there wa.s 1a s.eri-
ous misapprehension on the part of the prosecutors and 
rthe oe~ourt in this eas~e. 
A good deal of irrelevant testimony was int•roduced 
to show that the,se things. op·e-rat·ed, on the appa.re.nt 
theory that if this were shown it might be presumed 
that the app'eHants kfnew that they were being ope·rruted. 
This wa:s irrele"\nant beoause under the law ·even knowl-
edge that a eons.pir;acy exists .and is being ·carried out 
does not charge a person with guilt of participation, 
and se·eondly, as already stated, the op·eflati,on or the 
allowance of an opeDation was not the offense charged 
here. 
Incidentally, there was no :evi1dence as to ~slot ma-
chines or dice games at. all. It is ·comon knowledge thal 
prostitution, lotteries, hook-making and gambling with 
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cards. al,vay~ operate in n1etropolitan sootions to son1e 
extent. Card room~, ·and 8ome ot.h~r g·~unbtling d~t\\riet~s, 
were licensed here. It \Yas est.ablis.hed by plaintiff'·s evi-
dence that t~hese thing·s except sl()t n1nchines aJld dice 
games operated at the •times alleged, and also that they 
had operated substantially the same before this time 
as well as subsequently. It appear'S to be conceded on 
all sides that gambling frequently aooompanies card 
playing and that an officer, even though he ma.y watch 
the game being played. cannot tell whether it is being 
played fQr money or for fun. 
So that. while we ha'e abolished common Law con-
spiracies by statute and have limited the criminal ones 
to an agreement to collliirit ".an act" injurious to pub-
lic morals or for the perversi(}n of justice, we have here 
charged an agreement not to commit ''an act'' but to 
allQw, assist and enable things to operate. Which thing.s 
not only cnSJtomarily operate in spite of law or the or-
dinary, or even extraordinary efforts at law ·enforce-
m~nt, but which cl-early may and continuously do oper-
ate without any agreement whatsoever evem as between 
officers and operSJtors ; and which obviously operate with-
out such agreement between officers and laymen not 
connected with the operation of any of these things. 
This brings us to two very basic propositions in 
this case to which we were never able to get the law 
applied on the trial : 
(1) First, evidence that prostitution, lotteries 
book-making, rand gambling ooouiTed was no evidence 
at all of an agreement between the parties charged. Par-
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ticul~a.rly is this true \vhere the defendants \Vere ~never 
conne·cted with ·each other in any way or at any time or 
place· in as!Sist[ng -or permitting ·anything of ·this kind, so 
that this ·evidence had no connection whatsoever with 
·any relationship hetw•Hen the defendants. It is not a 
case of conspiracy to commit a orime sur;h as to rob 
a bank or the oommi:s.sion of the ·crime· of arson, where 
people meet at ·certain time and place, each contribut-
ing tools or ·equipmernt to commit the offense and all 
joining in its commission. Admittedly the· bringing of 
tools to -commit robbe.ry or infLamable materials to com-
mit arson and the entry into the commis1sion of the act 
i·s evid·ence of a previous agree·ment or unde~rstanding 
to commit the· offens·e. Here no substtan:tive offense wws 
charged. The agree·ment constituted the conspiracy and 
the offense, charged. 
It is true .the ·statute· required in addition that an 
'' ove·rt'' act he alleged and proved to complete the of-
£e·nse. This should not he confus:ed, howev.er, with the 
agreement which was the gist of ·the off,ense. On this 
f:eature of the oa!S·e it w;as not neceS'sary 'to provH that 
anything was done afterward to carry out the agree-
ment if the tagreement were -e'Stablished. Anything thJa.t 
was done .aflter to he material to this must be some-
thing that tended to prove the existence of the agree--
:ment. Under the rule of law with rel·ation t·o circum-
·stant.ial evidoo:ce· it would not he admiS'sible to prove 
the agreement unless i.t. were eonsist\ent only with the 
existence of the 'agreement .and inco:nJS.i~stent with every 
hyp·othesis of inoeence of the agreement. Clearly, there-
fore, the fact that gambling did occur was no evi-
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dence of an a.greem~nt bet,veem. the parti~~ e-ha.rg(ld. 
(2) 1The second basic ma,t~ter, 'vhich i~ related to 
the first, is that any insinuations of 'vr·ong doi111g or 
n-eglect of duty, or e~n evidence of such, 'vas no.t only 
wholly immaterial but 'Yas prejudicial to the defend-
ants. unless, again, it had the legal probative force 
required ~as proof of the agreement. Such alleged aets 
of irregular conduct were not admissibl·e unless they 
tended t.o prove th-e existence of the agreement and 
were oonsistent only therewith, or in other words, could 
not ha\e been e:xpeoted to be done except as a result 
of the agreement alleged, between the defendants 
charged. 
The danger of ignoring these basic propositions 
is that the jury from insinuations or gossip or pi"oof 
of alleged irregular acts, though they were not charged 
and ~though they were not competent or material or 
relevant proof of the offense charged, would never-
theless feel called. upan to convict. They 'vere in -effect 
so instructed. So t!hat, as we ·see it ihere, what might 
have been expected t'O happen from a violation of these 
rules laid down oo a guarantee of a fair trial, did hap-
pen and convictions resulted as a result of the introduc-
tion of evidence of irregular conduct w~hich was not ma-
terial to the charge. 
Before attempting a cl~s·er clarificaJtion ·of .the ·evi-
dence and the assigments of error, some general state-
ments 'Of fact will be helpful. 
There is no evidence here that the defendants eVrer 
met t'Ogether. There is noQ evidaooe that any person 
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charged ever dis-cussed ·the matter of permitting or aid-
i·ng the operation of pros;titution or gambling with 
any other defendant or with 1any ofue,r person. There 
is. no :evidence that the defendarrllts discussed any mat-
ter :velating to rbhe things alleged to have been agreed 
to be .aided or permitted. There is some evid;ence that 
Mr. Harmon may have talked with Mr. Finch and that 
Mr. Thacker did talk with Mr. Harmon on different 
occasions but mot in rel·ation ·to these matters. M[". Har-
mon's place operated under a be·er li·eense and operated 
li.cens~ed marble games and had a licensed card room. 
Thes'e wel'le op·erations which w·ere cheeked up by Mr. 
Thackerr not only rhn his place but in other places where 
the·y ope,r,ated. 
There is no evidence that the subject of or .any 
agreement that prostitution or gambling be permitted 
or aided in oper.ation were ever discuss,ed between any 
two defendants or by allly one of them with any oper-
ator. There is no evidence that Mr. Erwin knew Mr. 
Ha.rmon. H~e did not know Mr. Finch until about the 
tim·e they went into o.ffiee. 'The evidence showed t1hat 
Mr. P·earce had examin.1,ed1 1ir. Erwin as a witness in 
a eivil Clase that arose in 1934 but not as his attoi'II1ey. 
T1he evidence is :that he met Mr. Finch only 'twice, once 
some years previously when he los1t an eye in a golf acci-
tdent 1at Nibley Park and once while ·Mr. Finch was in of-
fice he applie'd for a 1i~cemce for a ·client. So that the al-
11eged conspirators, upon the re-cord here, we.re· only 
casual 1acquaintances or stl"angers. They never did ~any 
act to ·assis.t each ot·her or to ''assist or enable'' any 
place of prostitution or gambling to op·eJ'Iate. None of 
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I 
the appellant~ "~a~ eYer illl any plaCIP \Vht:~rP tJ1(\~(\ op-
erations were claimed t.o hnYe ooourrPd, except that 
Mr. Fineh on one or t'vo 'OOOR~ions Yis·i.t.Pd ce1'11ain plaees 
where it "-as testified gambling snn1et.in1t'S took place. 
!Tthis was in his official duties. 'rthere was no .gambling 
at the .time of such Yisi ts. 
Xow as to dove·rt acts''. Our statute, as a recog-
nized protection ·against abuses in prosecuting for al-
leged conspiracy, limits such prosooutivns as stated 
above, ·and also requires separate allegation and proof 
of an overt act or acts. (See R. S. U. 103-11-3, als·o 105-
32-11). The oommon law ditl not so limit or require. 
Such an act, if and when the conspiracy is established, 
may be by any conspimtor shown to be oonnecteld; the-re-
with. It must, however, be in furtherance of the con-
spiracy, and with knowledge of the existen10e of the 
conspiracy alleged. 
The matter of the sufficiency of the allegations 
of these is discussed elsewhere. Four things were aJ-
leged as ''overt •acts'' : ( 1) That between March 
15, 1936, and January 1st, 1938, defendants permitted, 
allowed, assisted and enabled hous-es Df ill f·ame to be 
operated. That ( 2) !between the same dates they did 
likewise with lotteries, dioo games, slot machines, book-
making and 'Other games of chance.Thus it is first al-
leged that defendants agreed to do s:omething v.ery gen-
eral in its 1Jll8,ture and then it is alleged generally that 
th~y did what they agreed. We thus have in fiact no 
"overt act" as contemplruted by law or by the sta.tuie. 
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What we said. p~eviously as tto the conspiracy applies 
he~e because these things had .and "~ould tand did op-
erate without any •agreement as to :their ,aJlowance or 
as•sis1tanee., so that their op·er.rution is no proof of the 
corn1spi:vacy, nor is it proof of 3Jily overt act committed 
pursuant thereto. 
No'v we have (3), that. on the first of each month 
from June, 1937, tu J a.nua.ry, 1938, defendants collected 
and oa.used to be co1lec.ted ''money from operators of 
house~s of ill fame''; and ( 4) that at various· times be-
tween April, 1936, and January, 1938, defendmts col-
lecied money from op~erators of the s:ame: gambling 
g1a.mes named in (2) above. 
Bassing over the generality of ( 3) and ( 4) as al-
le~ati·ons of an "overt act", it may be admitted that 
an overt act may also be proved even though its proof 
tends to ·establish the ·conspira:cy a11erged. It may al-
so be admi,tted that in ·CeTtain ·cases, ta.s above illus!tr,ated 
by the bank rob he-ry and arson ins~tan .. ces, an overt act 
may be cogent proof of .an e·xisting ~conspir.acy. But 
sueh is not tthe ~situati.on here. No def·endant ever col-
lected any n1oney fro-m any opevator of any of the things 
alleged. Golden Holt did, by his own evitd.ence, collect 
from houses of prostitution from August, 1936, t.o Jan-
uary, 1937, and he s.aid he ~ave the money to Abie 
Rosenblum. This wa1s in 1936 and no defendant in :Uris 
ea.s~e was ·connected with that arrangeme,nt. or that col-
lection. Officer Holt 1a.lso testified that ~again from June 
1937 t~o January, 1938 he coll-ected money from the op-
erators of house's of prostitUttion ~and gav·e the money 
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to Ben Harmon. 'rhis appeared to ht' a separate ar-
rangement a.nd if it amounted to a conspiracy 'vas a 
separate conspiracy, and a point is 1nade of this in our 
assignments. 
There is no teostimony that a.ny oofeudant collected any 
money and no te8-timony that any defendant "caused" 
Holt to collect any. In ne"· of the money that he spent 
in automobile and mooor boSJt opera.tio111s, in living at 
the hotel and separately maintaining his family, and 
in mining stock speculation and operation, it is quite 
cer.taiJI1 that he didn't gi¥e all the money oollooted to 
Rosenblum in 1936 or Harmon in 1937. In any event, he 
testified he collected it himself alone. There is no dif-
ferent testimony on this. 
During the latter part of 1936 he was head of the 
anti-vice ·squad ; during the latter part of 1937 he was 
under Mr. Thacker, who was 'head -of the squad, and 
he w~ in charge of looking after the hoUJSes of pros-
titution from which he made the collections. 
Upon the trial, and in an effort to make these col-
lections overt acts of the defendants, the p:rosecutimg 
attorney asserted (R. 318) that Holt was one of the 
oonspinators. 'flhese oollections by a police officer are 
not proof of the agreement alleged here. They are ob-
vitQus1y typical police shakedowns of people subject to 
his coercion. Such collections required no agroomemJt 
as alleged and constitute no pvoof of .such. Neither did 
they constitute any proof of an oV'ert aci by defendants 
"to eff·oot the object" of the conspiracy alleged. This 
is not an ext-orti{)n case. 
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There is no evidence whatsoever that Mr. Holt was 
a party with the defendants or any of them to the 
~agre,ement all~eged. His -conversations, by his own testi-
mony, as to the co1leeti~ons in 1936 were with Rosffilr-
b.lum alone. He testified that again in 1a.bout the middle 
of 1937 he talked with Harmon about ~oollectioDB Md 
after he had made -collections talked with Mr. P·earoo. 
Harmon and P-earce were never mentiooed until about 
June, 1937. There Wias nothing in Hny of these conversa-
tions with relation to .as,sisting or p~ermitting or aiUow-
img houses. of p:vos.tiltution to op·erate. 1T,hey had oper-
ated for years before and still continue li:io operate. It 
·cert,ainly was no asisistance to them for Holt to col-
lect the income from t·heir ope:rrations. 
Mr. T·hacker :testified that although he was imme-
diwte,ly ~over Holt in the 1937 pe~riod he never knew 
that Holt -eo11eeted from the women, and Holt never 
cl,aimed or testified, lllior did any ~other witness testify, 
thwt he did. Holt, although practically ,admitting that he 
was tes·tifying to keep his job on the police force, which 
he ·did 1an!d does keep, and indicating a willingness to 
deny or ·explain away all previous eontrary statement's 
and ·to teffi::ify to anything to help the State's. ca;se, 
never testified to any agreement ~as alleged her-e to ''per~ 
mit, allow, assist ~or enable" these things to operate, 
with any defendant, or at 1aii. There was no ·such agree-
ment or understanding ever ifrutimated by or with him, 
~and so these ·collections. were not p·roof of the oon-
.spiracy alleged nor were they overt acts as required 
by the 1statute ( 103-11-3) ''~done to effect the ohj:e'ct there-
of by one or more of the parties to .such agreement.'' 
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It should be 1nentioned in pas.~i ng, since it is raised 
in the a~ignment~\ that ~1r. Pearel'\ and Mr. Erwin 
had been cha.rged with ~1r. HaJ·n1on in this m.rut:ter of 
extorting or collecting money from ~house·s of prostitu-
Jion knowing it to be the earni11gs of prostituh's, and 
had been tried on exactly the same testimony offered 
. here ·and. these defendtlJlts had been acquitted of this 
charge. 
·It should be mentioned also that clearly the dis-
trict attorney could not make the witness Holt a con-
spirator with the defendants by merely as-serting that 
he was such. He could and did admit that he was. an 
accomplice upon the State's theory of the case. It is 
our contention that his testimony was entirely without 
corroboration and that the trial court should have so 
instructed. However, he could not be made a f.ellow con-
spirator with the defendants except upon proof of .the 
existence of the agreement alleged and his and their 
connection therewith. 
He testified that he had been, off and on for more 
than five years, connected with 'the anti-vice squad, that 
such plooe-s of prostitution had oper·ated all during 
that period, and to ibis own knowledge had operated 
£or many years before, that the officers could not s.top 
prostitution. If ·they were to put an officer in any of 
these hous·es, the girls would go .somewhere else and 
that they could only drive them 0111 to the streets or into 
the more residential sections. It was also .shown that the 
law recognized this situation and 11lhe city ordinaJiree 
gave to the ·City Bo~rd of Health the supervision of 
prostitutes, ( Soo. 3o, R. ·444). 
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The only other collection .of money was that by 
Abe ~stuhHck, testified ~to by one witness, D.ar K·emp-
ne·r. (Ab. 40-64). It was te~s.tified by this witness that 
Stuheek ~colle-cted some money from two pool halls "in 
March, possibly April'', 1937. This is an alleged col-
le·ction by kbe Stubeck, who was never in any way or 
by any te1stimony connected with any agreement as 
alleged, or at all, ~or with .any of the defendamt.s in any 
manner, or at .all. The admissi•on of this testimony is 
assigned as e~rror, 'and of coulis;e it ·could not be any 
p.roof of the agreement here .alleged or any proof of 
an overt ·act. 
:The recor-d discloses thatt ·the de.f.endoots were 
not in fact tried for having agreed to allow or as-
sist these things to opel'!ate. The trial court did not 
follow the rule that .at le-as~t p·rima fiacie proof of the 
agree~ment .should be required be£ore the acts and state-
ments of one alle<ged ·Conspirator ·could be admitted as 
binding upon the others. T~he whole basis of the primr 
ciple of agency in this r·egar'd was ignored. 
So that in addition, as we shall contend, to the in-
sufficiency of the ·evidence to prove the ~charge alleged 
• 
and which alone the defen~dants wefle called upon to 
·defend against, we have here 1a mass of irrelevaJli, 
immaterial and incompetent assertions by the prose-
cutor and insinuations and intimations of irregular con-
duet or negle·cl .of duty and some p·~oof of things done 
with and without the knowledge ·of defendants. All of 
w;hich was not admissible .as evidence or circumstance-S 
to prove the cha.rge, hut which created a confused ap-
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pea.ranoo of some eYil or eYil conditions, arous1ug the 
jury to a feeling that. for them not to convict here 
would be in effoot -an a.pproval on their part of some 
·or all of the things intimated, insi£nuated or di.scuss'ed. 
TESTIMl1XY OLA8SIFIE'D 
A general classification of the evidence offered by 
the staft.e will be attempted. This may be classified un-
de-r four heads, as follows : 
( 1) 'Testimony as to the operation of houses of 
prostitution, card games, book-making and lotteries. A·s 
to this clr3JSS of testimony the court instructed (Ab. 266) 
itn instructi-on 9(b) : 
"That the operating of gambling, prostitu-
tion, lotteries, etc., either before or after or dur-
ing 1936 and 1937, in and of themselves can-
not be considered by you as evildlence of an agree-
ment or conspiracy between the defendants in 
this case. Such conditions may or may not ex-
ist by agreement and their :operation is consis-
tent with the absence of such agre,ement. '" 
This instruction, in -the absence of a cross appeal, 
has become the law of the oose. So that it is our posi-
tion that under the rule as to circumstantial evidence, 
as well as under the Law of this caJse, this evidence gives 
no support ·to the staJte 's case here. 
-( 2) In this classification is a substantial volume of 
testimony admitted upon the theory that it constituted 
admissions by the different and individual defendants. 
~his does not relate to the offense oharged or to guilt 
of this offense. This testimony is made up of long 
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statements by Fisher Harris rund other witnesses of 
what they had heard or discovered or found out and 
wa,s ,admitted on the ·Claim tthat they had SO .stated •at 
different time·s to various defendants here. The'Se· were 
almost entirely .after the conspiracy was alleged to 
have ·ended. It not only ,doe's not 'support the eonvic-
tti~om, here, but 'vas erroneously admitted. 
( 3) ·This ·clastsification include-s evidence of alleged 
wrongful tacts or irregular conduct or statements in-
volving irregular conduct of the individual def·endants 
thems•e1lves. It al~so involve·s s.ome evidence of knowl-
·e.dge on ·the part. of the defendantS' that some of the ·.op-
erations, alleged took place. It in no Wiay relates to the 
agreement alleged and for the most part was errone-
~ously admitted. 
( 4) In tthis claS's m~ay be included some alleged dec-
larations made by one defendant or a :third pe·rson with 
reference to another defendant. T,his testimony is quite 
limited. .s.ome of this was .a.ft.er the conspiracy was al-
leged to have ended; .all -of it was without .any founda-
~tion showing an agreement under which the state-ments· 
could have been admitted as binding upon the de:fen.dant 
mantioned in the statement in .any ea,se; and where made 
by third parties, of ·cours-e, wa.s erroneously .admitted. 
BRIEF AND ARGUMENT 
Before di~seUJssion of the evidence and, the sufficiency, 
it may be helpful :to inform the -court as to the theorie'S 
here alleged and pursued. 
Ses. 103-11-1 R. S. U., unde·r which the· charge is 
laid, ~says : 
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• · ... if t"·o or more persons eon:spire: ( ;) ) To 
oommit an act injurious to (a) public n1oral~, (b) 
for the perversion and obstruction of juBt.i<-.e, (e) 
the due a.dnlinistration of la.\Y.'' -
~This indictment incorporn.tes (a), (b) and (o). 
Th-e cases cited by respond€n:t in support of the in,. 
dictm.ent. are not cases in point, as we view the matter, 
but they were oases h{)lding that under the allegations 
involved a cause of action was stated under (b), .the 
obstruction of justiee. There appears to be no case 
holding that the theory at.tempted to be alleg~ here 
W()uld be under the other divisions of this statute. 
People v. Tenero1cicz, :253 ")."'. W. 296 (Mich. 1934), 
was the ease mainly relied upon in support of the in-
dictment. The indictment there charged the pub-
lic officers and - the operators of the houses to-
gether and 'alleged that they were eng.age\d :im. 
keeping, m-aintaining and operating the same, and 
then aMeges that they combined and conspired "to 
permit and allow the keeping, maintaining and operat-
ing {)f bonses of ill fame'', knowing that such operation 
was in violation of the law. The court .said that the lan-
guage ".to permit and ·allow" as used in the iooictmen t 
should be construed that the officers ''conspired to 
~ssist -~nd enable the other parties named- in the indict-
ment ~in maintaining and operating .such hous·es. of ill 
fa~e. '~ ~t held that the indictment .as so construed 
staJted a cause of .action, on the theory of .~ conspi!acy 
to obstruct justice. 
This case cited in ~support of its ·holding People vs. 
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McPhee, 146 Pac. 522, (Cal.). W(hich case al·so involved 
·an alleged conspira,cy between officers, gamblers and 
bunco men. It also 'held that .such a conspiracy as be-
tween officers and the operators. of gambling working 
together, oharged a ·conspiracy to "obstruct justice." 
It will be :at once noticed that thes·e ·Cases are distin-
guis:hable in that here we have no agreement with op-
eratorn whatsoever or with 1runy per:son connected with 
the ·Conduct of the various operwtions involved. 
Before leaving the M·cPhee ·Case on the question of 
ple,arding as ,s,howing the nature of ~the 'authorities re-
li·ed; upon •as to evidence, it is important. to point out the 
holding in that ·case with relation to the question of 
evidence a.s here invr.olved.. In that ·casH some of the 
ga.mblevs turn·ed S'ta:te 's witnes1s.es and testified freely 
as to the conspiracy and introduced a number of con-
ver:saJtions and actions in~olving the •appealing defend-
ants, which alctions and ·COIIl~eiisations took place in 1910 
and 1911. It appeared to be ·established thart the ap-
pealing defendants were allied with the conspiracy in 
1912. The testimony .appea]}ed to be 1ample that the 
officers and the gamblers were working togethe·r, the 
one protecting the other, rund dividing the "percentages 
of profit.'' 
The ·court fivst cirtes the la.w to the effect that if an 
individual is: shown to ha.ve be(~ome a member of a con-
:spir;acy after the ·conrspir.acy was formed, that he may 
adopt the whole ·conspiracy by knowingly identifying 
hims.elf with it and thus assume responsibility £or what 
has been done up to that time. The opinion recites that 
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the trial court so &t.<l.tet-1 the rule, a.nd under his state~ 
ment of it, and over repeated objections, introduced 
the line of testimony a.bove indioa.tPd. The o-pinion says: 
"The sta.tement of the foregoing principle 
of law, however, presupposes that before the acts 
or doolara.tions of one or more of the co-conspir-
ators, done or made at a time prior to the en-
tering into the conspiracy by the particular per-
son charged, can be used in evidence ag,&nst him, 
the fact ()f the existence of the conspim.cy a.t 
the time such acts were done or doolaratio111s 
made mu5-t iha\e been shown by some degree of 
proof .sufficient to justify the court in admitting 
the evidence of such prior acts or declaratio-ns ; 
and that such proof cann-ot consist merely in the 
acts and declmratifms of the alleged co-conspir-
ators~ but must be in. the nature of o;n independ-
ent showing as to the existence of the conspiracy 
at the very ti,1ne when the acts were done or dec-
larations made by which the persons alleged to 
have subsequently joined the consp~racy are 
sought to be bound." 
* * ~ * * * 
"It is indispensable, however, that, before 
this evidence could have been rightfully admitted, 
some degree of proof aliunde must have been 
preS"ented tending to prove rthe existence of the 
conspiracy ramong those then associated in it, 
and whose acts and declarations are ·SOu~ht to be 
so used.'' 
''In the entire rabsence of such proof aliunde 
tending to establish the existence of ·such con-
'spiracy, during these prior year;s, the action of 
the court in admitting in evidence the ·acts .and 
declarations of the alleged co-oons:pirators dur-
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ing those yea,rs agains~t thes-e de.fend1ants must be 
he,Jd vo be· prejudi~cia.l 'e·rror; '' 
The ease cited and mainly relied upon by re·spond-
ent in the .contention as to the ,admi~s~sibility or sufficiency 
of the evidenee WJas People vs. Luciano, 277 N. Y. 348, 
14 N. E. (2d) 433. 
·This. is .a rather famous rac~etee~r case. Luci;ano was 
indicted with other:s for ·eonspirilng to vioLate Sec. 2460 
of the New York Penal Code relating to compulsory 
prostitution of women. The opinion recites that the 
evidence js:howed the· exis,tenee of ,the ·conspiracy to con-
trol prosititution. It ·does nort recite the evidence to ;show 
this, but state's that it was sufficiently shown. ·The dis-
·CUSISion then turned mainly upon the ·connection of Lu-
~ciano. 'The opinion reciteS' the evidence showing a defi-
nite ~connection with the op-eration of prostitution. 
Among otheT things, i~t w.as shown that one Bendix ap-
plied as a eollootor for the ring amd Luciano offered him 
a job as collector. Luciano was with one Fredrico, shown 
to be the manager under Luciano ''the boss.''. Luciano 
told Bendix that he would tell 'another ·e~stablished mem-
ber of the ring to put B·endix to work at $40.00 per 
week. One Betillo, als'O ,aetive umder both Lu~iano and 
Fredrico, introduced a 'vom.an to Luciano, naming Lu-
eiano as his boss. Later, 'this woman wanted to marry 
a member of 'the ring and both wished to withdraw from 
it. Betillo refused ~nd the witness 'applied to Luciamo, 
who ,advised the woman that tili.is ·could not be done until 
her husband paid ove~ to ~the ring the money from his 
collections. Another .. witne,ss ~testifi·ed that twice during 
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the existence of the COtlSpiraey ~he ~a''" Luciano in con-
ference with Fredrioo <lnd PetmocJ1io, \\rho \\'"H~ treas-
urer of ~he ring, ·and ,,,. ohman, a c.ollootor, and in both 
conferences heard Luciano recei ,-e reports from the·se 
people ·and give them orders. Also that Lucialllo told .this 
witness that ·he would be better off to run the ring 
himself rather than to trust the management to Betillo, 
and that he was going to take over the houses of prosti-
tution and raise the prices and place the madams on a 
salary basis. 
Another witness testified that she saw Luciano and 
the other persons above named together with one Flo 
Brown, in conference on numerous ·oocasions and heard 
them di-scuss the management of the ring and heard 
Luciano give directions to Fredrico. Also this wi.tness 
testified ·that she heard Luciano on ~another occasion 
say that they hoo better cease operations pending a vice 
investigation amd that Luciano, after discussing the 
matter with Betillo, consented that the ring continue 
operating under certain instructions, which he then gave, 
as to the methods to be pursued. This opinion simply 
held that the evidence sufficiently connected Luciano 
with the alleged conspiracy. 
This case, so far aJS we can see, furnishes no ,sup· 
port for respondent in the case at bar. 
CONTROLLING PRINCIPLES OF LAW 
In oonsidering the numerous ooses which will be 
cited, .space will not permit a review of t·he difference 
in statutes under which the ·cases .are decided. Many 
of the :states and the Federal Government do not limit 
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conspi:r:acy ·eases as ·does our .statute ·cited. In juri,sdic-
tions following the common law overt act·s are not re-
quired. 
A gre1a,t many Federal ca,s:es will be eited. It may be 
stated :that these are generally more liberal in the mat-
ter of punishment of persons ·connHcted with aHeged 
conspiracies than are the state oases. One reason for 
rthis is se•t out in Marino vs. United States of America, 
91 Fed. (2d) 691, 113 .A. L. R. 975, where it is ·stated: 
''Although participation in the agreement 
must he had by the :accused before he ean be con-
victed under the statute, he may be punishable as 
a princip~al, without sueh participation, under 18 
U. S. C. A. Seo. 550, whi·ch prtorvidHs that: 'Who-
·ever directly commits any act constituting am. of-
fense defined in any 1aw of the United States, or 
aid's, abets, couns-els, .commands, induce:S, or pro-
·cures its eommiission, is a principal.' '' 
U111der this s,t,atute persons have been fined where 
the knowledge of the ·consp,iracy was not shown, as 
is generally required, but a partieipation in the sub-
IS·tantive offens·e which i·t is alleged the conspirators 
;agreed to commit ·has been s,hown. 
With t·hi's d~stilnction pointed out, we will cite Fed-
eral ·cases. without further general ·comment. We have 
·already pointed out that here there is no commission 
of a ·crime charged, in which it is alleged the conspir-
ators agr:eed to participate. Here the offensH is not the 
.accompli.shment of any unlawful d·esign, but i·s. the un-
J,awful confederation or agreement ·charged. See People 
vs. Billings, 24 N. E. (2d) 339. 'The off-ense here is the 
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agreement. This must be kept oonstantly im. n1ind in ap-
plying the rule as to ci.reums.tantial eYideHeP and in 
consid-ering th(} admissibility or eff~t of the evidence 
to be discussed .. 
As the evidenee is entirely eircumstruntial, there be-
ing no claim of any dire-ct evide11ce of agreement or con-
federation bet"-een the def~ndant s charged, "~e will cite 
a few cases upon limitations as to rhis character of 
evidence: 
State ·v. Cra,wford, 201 Pac. 1033 (Utah 1921): 
''The contention, however, i·s in line with cer-
tain rules of evidence generally recognized in 
this country as elementary amd fundamental. Lt 
is consistent with the rule that accords to a de-
fendant charged with an offense the benefit o.f 
every reasonable doubt. It is consistent with the 
rule applied, in cases dependent solely upon cir-
cumstantial evidence, as in the ease at bar, tlza.t 
the eircunzstances must be such as to exclude 
every reasonable hypothesis except that of the 
defendant's guilt of the offense charged that 
every circumstance constituting a necessary link 
m the chain of evidence must be consistent w·ith 
the defendamt' s guilt and inconsistent with his 
innocenee. '' 
Terry vs. United StUJtes, 7 Fed. (2d) 28, (9th C. C.): 
This is a lBading case on this point. Here the mat-
ter was presented directly by an instruction to the jury, 
which we desire to point out particularly, .amd a holding 
that the instruction given was erroneous. The instruc-
tion was aJS follows: 
''In this case, therefore, even though you 
may find that there was no op·en or expres:s dec-
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laratian of purpose on the part of these defend-
ants or the other parties1 ·concerned to unite in 
doing the, acts charged, yet if you find that the 
acts of the parties were committed or accom-
plished in a manner or under cireums.tances 
which by reason of their situ~ation at the time. 
1amd the eonditions ~surrounding them, gave rise 
to a reasonable and just inference that they were 
done as the result of a previous agree.ment then 
you are justified in finding that a conspiracy ex-
isted between the11~ to do those acts.'' 
·The italicized portion of the instruction does 
not contain a correct ~statement of the law. 
''It is also .true, in case·s of conspimcy, a.s 
in other criminal ·ca,s.es, that the: prisoner is pre-
~sumed to be innocent until thH contrary is shown 
by proof; and, where that proof is in whole or 
in par:t, cirrcums.tanti!al in its eharracter, the cir-
~cumstances relied upon by the prosecution must 
1so distinctly indicate the guilt of the aoous·ed as 
·to leave no reasonable .e-xpLanation: of them whieh 
i's consistent with the prisoner'·s. innocence." 
United State's. v. Lancaster (C. ·C.) 44 F. 896,904, 
10 L. R. A. 333. 
Shannabarger vs. United States, 99 Fed. (2d) 957, 
(8th C. C.): 
This -ca!se ·contains a good statement of the la.w 0111 
this point. 
'' lt is a s:ettled rule of law that 'In conspir-
~acy ~caS'es the unlawful combin·ation, confederacy, 
and agreement bHtween two or more persons, thlat 
is, :the conspi~acy itself, is. the· g~st of the action, 
~and is the corpus delicti .charged. ' ·The agreement 
must therefore, be established before a conviction 
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can be- sustained. Tingl~ Y. t:nitt~d ~tn.h's, S Cir., 
38 F. 2d 573, 575.'' 
T:his ''as a c.ase in "-hich the con11nission 'Of a sub-
sta11tive Qffense was chaxg·ed and the defendants 'V'ere 
charged with confed~rating to eommit it. H,o,vever, the 
court said: 
'~Where the government relies upon circum-
stantial evidence to establish the conspiracy, the 
circumstances must be such as to warrant -the 
jury in finding that the conspirator.s had some 
unity of purpose, some common design and un-
dertaking, som-e meeting of minds in an unlaw-
ful arrangement, and the d-oing of some overt 
act t.o affect its object. See Marx v. United ~States, 
8 Cir., 86 F 2d 2±5, 250, and cases there cited. 
Further, the circu·'ln.stances relied upon must be 
not only co·nsiste-nt zcith the guilt of defendants, 
but ·m.-u.st be inconsistent with their innocence. 
Spalitto v. L nited States, 8 Cir., 39 F. 2d 782; 
Salinger v. United States, 8 ·Cir., 23 F. 2d 48; 
Langer v. Lnited States, 8 Cir., 76 F. 2d 817." 
Because it mn be at once noticed from the evidence 
that an attempt wa.s made to show that Mr. Finch 
stated that he did not know of the payoff when the 
state contended that he did, that this was ad:rnis,sahle as 
a circumstance to prove the .agreement here, we cite by 
way of illustration the following cases : 
State vs. MMasco, 17 Pac. (2d) 919, (Utah 1933): 
Arson was ooarged. The building burned con-
tain·ed pel'isonal property of the defendant insured by 
him. The ·circumstances were suspicious. He fia1sely 
claimed to be in Salt Lake, when. In fact ·he was in 
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Carbon County where the- fire occurred and thereafter 
·employed a pers;on to drive him :to Salt Lake, and twice, 
once at the time .and once near the time of rthe trial, 
approa,ehed :this pevson 1and told him to deny that he 
had s·een him or had driven him. T'here was clearly ev-
idence of ~some kind of guilt. 1T'his cour,t held that the 
cir:cums.tances, however, did not show guil:t of the of-
fense ~charged. The case was reve:r.s~d, the court foUow-
Ing the rule as. to circumstantial Hvidence. 
T.he ~case decided also the points ~that when a per-
son W8JS eharged ·directly and tried on that theory, it 
.was improper for the ·court ;to instruct or for the jury 
to eonsider that they might .convict him for aiding or 
counseling and t.hus. try to eonvi~ct him ~as a principal. 
State vs. Judd, 279, Pac. 9,53: 
Thi's court, in pointing out ·that it was. not necessary 
that one circumstance alone conneet the defendant 
with the offen,SJe or be sufficient to -convict, said: 
'' The general rule is that the evidence i,s not 
relevant or ~admissible unless i:t re~sonably tends 
to ·e~st·aJblis.h the f.aot sought to be p~rov~ed. '' 
Stale vs. Dean. 254 Pac. 142, (Utah 1927): 
Laid ·down the rule which we desrire· to invoke in dis-
eUJssing the admissibility of the evidence along with the 
other point now under ,diJs,cussi.on. The opinion in that 
eaS:e ~s:aid : 
''Evidence to be re~leVianlt or materi'al of 
course, mus~t have ~some probative value, and in 
:some ·degre~e mus:t tend to p·rove what is claimed 
for it. Wherther proffered evidence tends to do 
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so or ha8 8uch probativ~ , .. ~uue, ·and thus is ad-
missible. is. in the first ins.t.anoe, a question for 
the court. '' 
TESTIM0~1 AS TO MR.. FINCH: 
We shall now refer to the eYidenoe offered as agtainst 
Mr. Finch. We contend that for tili.e most part, it was 
not relevant or mca.terial or competent .and was, there._ 
fore, not admi8sible: and, secondly, that in any event 
it does not point to the guilt of the defendant of the 
offense charged, excluding every re.3lsona.ble hypothesis 
of his innocence of sueh offense. 
JOHNS. EARLY {.A.b. 22-29) testified for the state, 
and when objection was made to an alleged conver.s,ation 
With Mr. Erwin in January, 1936, immediately upon 
their taking office, as to there then being a payoff, 
that -there was no foundation and that such could not 
be admitted as against the other defendants, the court 
over-ruled the objection anld said: 
' 'If there is some evidence introduced of an 
agreement to conspire, as stated in :the indict-
ment, then the Court, unless it becomes con-
vinced to the contrary, will probably take the 
view that statemoots of anybody, anywhere, are 
pertinent to the issues." (Ab. 23) 
The witness then testified that he knew Mr. Finch, 
.after :he took office as Chief in the middle of March, 
1936, and then told him that he bad heard rumor.s that 
there had been gvaft going on, and Mr. Finch ·sait<1 he 
hadn't heard anything about it. (Ab. 25) 
This witness then testified over obj~ootion that he 
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thad (~onver~s,ati~on~s with Mr. Browning, a Chinrunan 
named Wong, Cliff Jennings and Wm. Oayi:aJs, about 
their operations, and that Ben Harmon ·and A'be Rosen-
blum .called on him. The -eviden·ce ~show·ed that Brown-
ing was a.t times a book-maker, that Cliff Jennings had 
the rep·ut.ation of being a. gambler, and that Abe Rosen-
blum was a bondsman. The witnes1s testified that on 
one ooeasion Browning, ani(]; on one occasion Harmon 
went to the secretary's office, whi.oh "ras the anteroom 
to Mr. Finc;h':g, office, ·and that he didn't know whether 
the Chief was in or not. ·There was. no testimony that 
they ·contacted the ·Chief on these occasions. The witness 
testified that he ,afterwa:vds had a ·conver~s~ation with 
rbhe Chief but didn't remember mentioning any of the 
persons referred to. H·e :said he told the Chief he had 
heard rumors of a conside~able payoff and that Mr. 
Finch ~s:bated, '' Thos~e p·eople know their own business 
an!d would have to operate ~their own husines1s; that it 
was 1his duty to ope·r.ate the Police Department and he 
proposed to opel'late i,t. '' Obj·ections and motions to 
:strike were ~denied. (Ab. 27). 
~hi~s witness ~also te1stified that in. the f.all of 1937 
there were again rumors of a vice payoff and that he 
,talked with Mr. Erwin .about it and t~he mayor 6aid 
h·e hadn't heard anything about it rand there haJd been 
n.o repor1t!s. from the dep~artment. Asked the leading 
question, ''During any of these convel'isla,tions was it 
m·entioned by y.ou. whether the chief 1and the mayor 
were involved~'' t~e witnes:s answered no, and being 
croHs examined by t,he District Attorney ,said ''that 
there were 'such rumors around. It had ,slipped my 
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mind for the time being.'' He then testified that hoth 
the mayor and Mr. Finch disclaimed all knowledge of 
it. (Ab. 28) 
AU·STIN SMITH (Ab. 2~)-34), another state's wit-
ness, who ''as appointM .secretary to the mayor in J·an-
uary, 1936, and served for a time, testified. that ·he wenrt 
to Mr. Finch's home and w·as admitted bY Mrs. Finch 
"very -shortly after ~lr. Finch 'Yas appointed." 
''I asked how he liked his job, he made the 
remark it was ·alrig-ht. We discussed things gen-
erally pertaining to the department. 
Q. I direct your attention to the subject: 
Was anything said about graft payoff?'' Ohjoo-
ti.on was made and overruled. 
''I asked: Approximately what is the payoff 
existing at the time and t!he answer was approx-
imately $2000.00 a month. I asked who was get-
ting it, or who collected or what booame of it 
·and was told probably Abe Rosenblum would col-
lect it as he ·had had experience along .that line. '' 
(Ab. 29) 
Mr. Finch emphatically denied that there ever Wlas 
such or any conversation at his house, and testified that 
Mrs. Finch, who afterward died from her then sickness, 
was confined to her bed at the .time testified by the 
witness and did not admit anyone, nor was ·she in con-
dition of health to be where the witness could have seen 
her. This was not denied. 
ffihis witness also testified that in Jwne, 1936, he 
had .a conversation with a newspaperman and obtained 
a memorandum purporting to contain a list of supposed 
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payoffs in gambling houses and houses of prostitution. 
-That he left it on the mayor's desk but didn't see it 
in the mayor's poss,ession. That hH t·hen talked with Mr. 
Holt and Mr. Tag~art about this matter and later 
talked wit!h the mayor, but he refused to give the name 
of the fellow he had t·alked with. ~hat he then attended 
a conference at which he hruc1 Mr. Holt present and at 
which the .chief w~as present; that ifue mayor felt that 
he 1had talked with people .that he should not have talked 
to. T.hat M·r. Holt then said he had informed m·e of 1fue 
condition's dis·cuss,ed with the newspaperman because 
he thought the mayor should be given the information 
and ''that rumors were rampant'' that ther:e was a 
p1ayoff ~on houses of prostitution. That the whole state-
ment was. rather brief. 
That the witne~s~s then asked if there was any mis-
understanding or if they were satisfied with what had 
been jsaid, and that Mr. Finch made the remark that 
''We should not be washing our dirty linen in the 
enemy's camp." (A b. 33) Mr. Finch aft,erwa~ds testi-
fied that he had :had some personal disagreements with 
Mr. Taggar.t, 1an:d al~so mentioned that Mr. T·aggart's 
·daughter was employed in the department at the time 
that he went there. 
The Holt referred to wa1s the ·only person shown to 
have ·collect·ed from ,the house's of prostitution .at any 
time, and when question1ed by Mr. Finch denied that he 
.had ever ·colle-cted. If anyone was ·collecting he would 
have known it because he was head of the anti-vi~ce squaJ 
after April 1, in 1936, by hi~s. own .testimony. (Ab. 97) 
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D. L. HAYS ( .... \b. 37) "Ta.s the w·ihH~~~ who t.t:\~ti:fied 
t.o ,his various g1ambling; oper.ati{)ns oYt\r a long period 
'Of years 18Jld including 1936 and 1937, and prior and 
subsequent years. He testifil~l that he ask~lld the City 
Commission Qn February 20, 1939, "-thy thPy continued 
to license the card. rooms d".,hen. it "Tas "Tell known 
that gambling went on a.s l()ng ;<ls they were licensed.'' 
His only reference to any of the defendants "\vas to Mr. 
Finch. He testified that in about N·ovember, 1937, he 
said to Mr. Finch, ''You must know that gambling i~s 
going on in these places either under protection or with-
out regard to law." :l!r. Finch said, "Yes, I know that 
gambling is going on here.'' The witness then said he 
asked him what he WJaS going to do about it and he 
said he was not g<>ing to do anything about it antd, he 
gave me hi-s reason:S." (A.b. 37) 
A. H. ELLE'l'T (Ab. 75-79), sworn by the state 
(Ab. 75 ), te:Stified that :he was a judge in the police 
oonrt in 1936 and had a conveflsation with Mr. Finch in 
the middle of April, 1936, one month after he became 
chief. It appeared that some gambler-s ·had been brought 
into polioo court and charged there and that the wit-
ness refused to proceed with the oases and sugges.t~ed 
that they be sent down to the county attorney's office. 
(Ab. 79) That Mr. Finch called on the telephone and 
asked to come and talk with him about these g.amble:rs 
or gambling eases and that he saw Mr. Finch that aft-
ernoon between 5:30 and 6 o'clock in the Public Safety 
Building. That in the oourse of that conver:sation Mr. 
Finch said, ''Judge, why can't we get together on the 
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sentencing of these gamblers~ Let them pay the fine; 
let the ·city get the revenue." I s~aid the reason we can't 
do thi,s is because rny j1·iends tell me you are taking 
$2500.00 a month in your hand behind your book and 
I am not going to be a party to it and we can't get to-
gether on it.'' That after a minute or two the chief 
made some remark and. tlhe meeting broke up. 
He ·stated on ·cross examination that if Mr. Finch 
took office in M~arch that this was 1about a month after-
wafld. That the questi'On of felony charges against gam-
blers was in his mind. That it was the practice for the 
prose-cuting attorney to file complaints and that the 
clerk ~assisted the attorney in these cases and that all 
arrests were reported to the city attorney, and that he 
rej-eoted ~the eomplain.ts ~drawn by the city attorney and 
wouldn't sign them. Tbtat it was after he ·sent tJhe cases 
down to the county attorney that Mr. Finch talked with 
him. 
An important point to notice in this connection is 
that the testimony of the witness himself Wlas that he 
said to Mr. Finch ''My friends tell me you are taking 
$2500.00 a month in your hand behind your back.'' ·There 
was no admission, nor could Mr. Finch deny that his 
friends .had or had not told him thi1s. Obj~eetions and 
motions to strike were ·denied. 
BEN HUN~SAKER (A b. 79-92), te1stifying as to 
conversations with Mr. Erwin, none with Mr. Finch, 
statetdl t·hat in 1936 he had 1a converisation with Mr. Er-
win ·at the time Mr. Erwin paid ihim $200.00 in currency 
on a debt, in which conversation .the witness claimed it 
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was intimated that ~!r. Erwin receiY~i HlP monl\Y in-
volved from opera.tions such IRS are alleged, and in w·h ich 
this witness said Mr. Er,Yin ~aid, ··Finch is t.ht\ 1na n 
they will get, but I dou 't rhink they will be able to get 
Finch because he doesn't do the collooting himself. He 
has his men collecting for him.'' 
This witness also testified to another alleged con-
versation in the latter part of the summer of 1936, 
in which he said the mayor said that he thought the 
chief of police was taking in a lot of money and ihe 
didn't know if he was getting his right ~split; that he 
conldn 't go down to his office and watch him and tend 
his offiee at the same time s<> he had just got to take 
what was banded him. 
This was all there was with relation to Mr. Finch, 
except that in another conversation the witnes-s said 
Mr. Erwin said he had a chief of police in there that 
was bringing him in \ery good money but not ·enough. 
(Ab. 79-92) 
It should be mentioned in this connection that Mr. 
Finch testified that he lhad contributed, and that some 
collections fr<>m the men up there were made for Mr. Er-
win's campaign fund. That otherwise he had collected 
no money and paid no money. 
GOLDEN HODT {Ab. 97-124) testified that the 
fi]}st of April, 1936, he was appointed head of the anti-
vice ;squad. That in discussing his appointment- witJh 
Mr. Finch they talked over the vice situation and the 
chief said, ''I don't particularly- ·object to vice but I 
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don't want them to get the best of it, not let them run 
too openly.'' 
He also te·stified to the conversation with Austin 
Smith 'above referred to and with the mayor 1and chief 
in tlhe Public Safety Building in June, 1936, in which 
·Conver1sation he said he stated ''we :had hea.:r:d a payoff 
was going on. '' 
H·e testified :that he had another conversation 
with Mr. Finch the following day in whi·ch Mr. Finch 
toltd him to -close everything up. 'Tihat was in the Latter 
part of June, 1936. That he went around and notified 
them .to ·close, that is. the p·lace·s of prostitution and lot-
teries, and :said it ~appeared to him that they .then closed 
up. H·e te,stified -he had ·another ~convevsation the latter 
part of July, 1at whicJh time Mr. Finch "mentioned Mr. 
Rosenblum ·and told me to go see him. Nothing was 
said ,about the places of vice.'' (A b. 99) 
He testified he· talked again with Mr. Finch about 
the first of August antd Mr. Finch said ''he· thought 
the heat was off and to let them reop·en ~and not to let 
them run too openly. No specific place·s were mentioned. 
After tJhen I just let them run until the fir,st of January 
with the exception of the lotteries.'' (Ab. 100) 
He ·Siaid he had another conve:r:siation with Mr. 
Finch about the middle of January, 1937, and Mr. Finch 
told him to ~clos~e ·ev~erything up. ·That he was, going to 
give me another man on the -squad ~and to see that there 
was ,absolutely no more p·ayoff. H·e s·aid in February, 
1937, Mr. Finch "told me that he thought I wws the 
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one who w·as rnaking the tow·n too hot and that if he 
moved me things "~ould calm do,vn. I "~as removed the 
first of March and Record "~as put in my place. I was 
in the detective bureau for t'W'O ID()nths and ~then I 
went back on the vioo squad.'' (A b. 100) (It will be re-
membered that it was in the latter part of 1936 and 
the early part of 1937 that some of the women were 
making report.s to the newspapers of various vices. It 
will 13lsD be remembered that when Holt went back 
it was a.t the request of these same women, and he was 
prrt in under Thacker to look after the houses of prosti-
tuti{)n). 
This witness then testified to conversations with 
Hrumon, and in June with Mr. Paaree. He appear.s t'O 
have testified to no conversation whatsoever with Mr. 
Finch prior to his commencing collections fr'Om the 
houses ()f prostitution again in June of 1937. This 
witness testified that h'8 had made these collections 
alone. On cross examination he testified that it was the 
practice for them not to go alone in the discharge of their 
duties on the an-ti-vice sqUJad but it was necessary to go 
in pai:vs for their own protection, and that he traveled 
with Mr. Boyd and with Mr. Rogers. That they instruct-
ed the girls and saw that they appeared for examina-
tion and kept track ()f the houses to which they went. 
That it had been the practice in the past to book them 
at the police station once a month for the Board of 
Health. That after M·r. Finch came in he required, that 
they lbe booked and examined twice. That the practice 
was the same as it hwl been for yeam. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
34 
T!hat Abe Rosenblum \vas a bond,sman. That in 
19.36, (when he claimed he was collecting and turning 
the money over to Abe Rosenblum), ''we had complaints 
about what happened in ~.Rosenblunl ''s p1ace. '' This was 
over the Bailey F·eed ·Store. That ''Mr. Finch told me 
that they ·couldn't tolerate that p1ace and I was t·o put 
a. man there and keep him ther~ to .see that he didn't 
indulge in infractions of th·e law. * * * It was closed up 
around the first of July and later some time the latter 
part of August or September. It wasn '.t opened any 
more by Abe Rosenblum that I know of.'' The witness 
further te,stified that ''while Abe Ros:enblum was run-
ning it the ·chief gave me spe·ci,al o:vder.s to make every 
;effort to ·see .that no infractions of the law occurred. 
* * * It had the reputation of being a gambling place." 
This witnes·s was then ~asked if ·he hadn't been asked 
by the chief in the pres·ence of M-r. B·ower, the chief's 
:~ecretary, and In:sp~ctor Record and others, ''They sa.y 
there has been a p'ayoff in Salt Lake City. I want you 
to tell me before these witnesses if I ever asked you 
to favor any of the games, bookies, prostitutes, or any-
one ·els.e ~ * * * Have I_ ever asked you to coerce or in-
timitdate any of the1se people~'' H·e was asked if he 
didn't answer no to these questions 1and he ·said he 
wouldn't say either way. H·e was then ·asked if the 
chief hadn't said .to him at the •same time, "Have any 
-of these people ever pai~d me any money~'' and the wit-
ne,ss •an,swered, ''I don't recall ·everything * * * I would-
n·'t ·say I didn't make. that answer. I don't recall, I 
may have done." He· was then asked if the .chief had 
not ·said to him, ' 'Have I ever asked you to do any-
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thing· other than to enforce the ordinances u.nd laws T" 
and the witness ans"·~rt"\(_l that he oould11 't ~an~swer that 
either. (Ab. 108) It "-as proved by Mr. Finch .a.nd 0. 
B. Record (Ab. 169) that these questions were asked 
of him and tihat he gave negative ans,vers to Mr. 
Finch as above suggested. 
The witness also testi:fiOO. that in May ·or June 
of 1938 Mr. Hoagland, :anoth-er police officer, and Mr. 
Finch were in an automobile in front of Mr. Hoag-
land's home. That the witness dr{)v·e up from the rear 
and got out of his car and got into the ear with these 
two gentlemen and that the convers-ation there was to 
this effect: '• Mr. Finch said, 'I don't see what has been 
d'One that would cause this talk -about taking· money 
from the underworld and about the department being 
tied up to the underworld.' And I s~aid, 'I don't know 
how anyone could have anything on you. You don't need 
to worry. I don't know anything that in~olves· you in 
thls. '' (A b. 109) 
The following testimony indicating definitely the 
character of this witness was then given. This testimony 
relates to and follows the foregoing testimony: 
"Q. Was it true what you said 1_ 
A. Well, no. 
Q. You didn't even tell him then that you 
had been making collections, did you? 
A. I didn't; figurea he knew. 
Q. .B~t y{)u_ didn't. even tell· him, never 
speak to him about it? 
A. Only the time· Jhe told me to quit mak-
ing them; see they quit being mBkte. 
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Q. Now, just a moment. 
A. Yon asked for that. 
Q. Did he tell you to see to it no more col-
lections were made~ 
A. Yes, he did. 
Q. When was that 1 
A. In his office on around the middle of 
January, 1937. 
Q. 1937~ 
A. Ye;s. '' 
I don't remember a conversation with Mr. 
Finch in hi1s office tihe I~atter part of 1936 ·or early 
in 1937, when he said. he heard a rumor that I 
had been taking or accepting money from vari-
ous people and I said I have never taken a dol-
lar from anyone. I can go right out and arrest 
~anyone. No one has any strings on me. 
'' Q. Did you tell him you were making col-
le·ctions in 1937 1 
A. He told me to quit making them. 
Q. Didt you ·tell him you were making ool-
lections' 
A. I didn't tell him, never. 
Q. You ~didn't tell him anything? 
A. He told me in the office to ·see there was 
no more made." (Ab. 109-110) 
* * * * * * 
The time I said Mr. Finch told me to see no 
more collections were m-ade Wlas aflound the mid-
dle of January, 1937. That is the time that I tes-
tified that he told me to ·clos·e these places up. 
"Q. And at t!hat time you said Mr. Finch 
said to ·clos,e theise places up? 
A. If I recall, I said he· told me to see 
there was no more p~ayoff. '' 
I testified to this same conversation in case 
10785. 
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'' Q. And you s&d at tha.t tilne, did you 
not, that Mr. Fineh said to close the plaee·~ up 7 
A. I did.'' (Ab. 111) 
FISHER HARRIS (.A.b. 1~4-59), after te.stifying 
to conversations with Mr. Erwin in "'"hic.h he had ~stated 
that h~ had made an inYestigatian in the fall and 
winter of 1937 and found operation of houses of prosti-
tution, gambling in card rooms, lotteries a11d book-mak-
ing, and had also testified that he had talked with Cap-
tain Thacker and told him that his relationship with 
Ben Harmon and the payoff in Salt Lake City wws 
known to Attorney Harris and t·hen a.sked him f.or 
information, and had also stat-ed to Thaocker that Thacker 
knew there was a payoff in regard to vice and that 
Thacker said anybody would know that. (Ab. 133) This 
was denied by Thacker. The witness said he asked 
Thacker why he di®'t d-o something about it and 
Th:aclr-er said, "I can't because I act entirely on orders 
from the chief.'' He also testified that he asked, ' 'Why 
did you get in touch with Ben Harmon in the first 
plaoo T '' and Thacker said, ''Chief's order-s. Chief said 
that Ben Harmon knew all about underworld conditions 
and in the perf-ormance of my duty I was to take 
advice from him. I didn't take any advice and direc-
ti·ons from him.'' He also said that ·he stated to IThacker, 
''There must have been other occasions when you took 
directions from Harmon' ' and ·Thacker ·said, ' ' No there 
wasn't. The chief and Harmon would talk thingrs over.'' 
·The witnes·s also testified that he asked Thacker 
not.to say anything to Ohief Finch, but keep confiden-
tial their oonvel"Sation, and Thacker said tha:t was im-
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poS·sible because the chief knew he -came to see the 
attorney. 
Mr. Harriis said the chief telephone·d him about 
an hour !afterwards and said he understood that the wit-
ness had ~accused Thacker of all sort·s of crookedness. 
·That he and Mr. Finch then had a meeting. (Thi·s took 
place January 10, 1938). (Ab. 135 ). 
''Mr. Finch .said, 'I understand you have ae-
. cus-ed Mr. Thacker of all :sorts of crookedness.' 
I s1aid, 'I have stated to Mr. Thacker that there 
are all kinds of illegal activities in operation 
running in Salt Lake City in connivance with the 
Bolice Department', and I said 'I woulldn't have 
any argument with you on matters of judgment 
~as to how the town should be run. Nobody will 
claim that public officials s·hould personally prof-
it from illegal activities.' He said, 'Well, ·the last 
thirty yeavs. I have been hearing .stories 1albout 
p·ayoffs in Salt Lake City. How is one to prevent 
such stories~' I said, 'Maybe the least that any .. 
one ·can ·do ·or maybe the most is to see that the 
~stories are not true.; but in :this, oas~e the stories 
~are tru·e, and public officials ·are profiting from 
illegal .activities in ·Salt Lake City.' I went .on to 
enumerate them, and I enumerated dice games-
Q. Now, just a minute. At that time did you 
know who had ·collected this tribute~ 
(·Obj-ection to it as incompetent, irrelevant, 
imma:t·eri·al lealdd.ng ~and prejudi·cial, calling for a 
conclusion). 
1T'he witnessed answered: 'Oh yes.' 
The ans.wer was stri·cken. 
Q. Did Mr. Finch ask you at .that time who 
anyone was who was involved? 
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('Objecti'On to thi~ as contrary to t.he rule 
as to relating convers·ations. Overruled.) 
A. ~ o, he did not. 
Q. Did he at any time! 
( Objooted t.o on .all gen~ral grounds, without 
sufficient foundation, interrupting the witness in 
attempting to giYe a oonversati'On, and trying to 
put in any and eYery conversation in one ques-
tion. Overruled.) 
A. No, :Mr. Finch ha~s never asked me the 
name of any person involved or asked me to give 
bim. the name of any persQn involved. 
I went on to enum-erate to Mr. Finch the ac-
tivities, the illegal activities which were being 
oarried on in Salt Lake City and which had been 
carried on for a long time p:r:ior to our conver-
sation. 
(A mQtion was made to strike that state-
ment as a conclusion. Refused.) 
Tihe -witnessed then volunteered: 
A. Oh no, it isn't my conclusion. I know it 
to. be so. 
MR. MULLINER: Now, I ask that that go 
out. 
THE ·COURT: I think I ought to strike it. 
(No other order was made.) 
I went on to tell Mr. Finch that the activi-
ties I referred to were dice games, pool games, 
hous-es of prostitution book-making establish-
m-ents, Chinese lotteries. He said, I don't· see 
how :anything of that sort could be true. We have 
collected $2000.00 in. :fin·es from gamblers in Salt 
Lake City .during the . past year. I :sairc1, 'M·r. 
Finch,. one man pays graft protection money of 
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$3,600 a year, one man alone, and you talk 
about getting $2,000 from Salt Lake City. Here 
is one group of people who pay $6000 a year for 
prot!eetion money, and you talk about $2000 f:or 
S·alt L~ake City. Here is another group that pays 
$7200 ,a year to ·Salt Lake City.' I said, 'Here is 
card rooms-! hav·en 't figured it up ex,actly-but 
they pa.y thousands of .dolLars a year; and here 
are the pros~titutes p'aying thousands o.f dollar·s 
a year, and you talk about getting $2000 for Salt 
Lake City, when all this money i.s going into 
the hands of public officials and people interested 
in them, in :the underworld.' He .saild,, 'W·e11, I 
thought. :the town was run p·retty well', and that 
was albout all there was of .that eonvers.ation. I 
think that was on the lOth of J,anuary." 
(Motion was then made to strike out this 
testimony on ~all the- general grounds that it is 
not admissible .as an 1admis,sion. That there was. 
no sufficient foundation for it; that it was! after 
the alleged conspiracy had ended. Denied.) (Ab. 
135-136-137) . 
The witness stated that he had ~anothe-r conversa-
tion a.t the Alta Club at which Mr. Finch and Mr. Er-
win ·and ,some newspapermen were pre·S·ent on January 
20, 1938. That the parties present, other than the wit-
nes·s, ha1d taken lunch there and at the .end of the lunch 
he eame in. 'That J\!Ir. Fish, one of the newspapermen, 
~.aid he had heard rumors of an investigation in regard 
to underworld activities and official corruption re·Lating 
·to them an~d asked if I had made .such an investigation. 
I answered that I had and that I ha1d made· a re·port 
to Mr. Erwin in writing. He aJSke·d me if I knew what 
illegal a~ctivities were in op,eration ·and I :s·ai,d I did and I 
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enumerated them-as I haYe Pnumerated them before. 
I stated the a.m<>unt that eaoh kind <>f ac.tiv-ity paid 
and Mr. Fish .said, '~Do you kilo\\· \Vho gets this money 
and to "---hom it is finally distributed·?'' I said I did, 
and he said, '~\rho t '' and I sa.id, ''E. B. Erwin gets 
$750.00 a month; Harry Finch $500.00 per month, the 
amount collected.. Mr. Erwin and Mr. Finch were both 
at the table. Neither one of them said anything at that 
t·ime. Mr. Finch remarked that this was the first time 
he h-eard of any payoff situati<>n in Salt Lake City. Mr. 
Erwin sngg&sted that :Mr. Finch resign and Mr. 
Finch said he would resign th-e next day. Mr. Finch 
-asked me how long this had been going on and I said 
it had been going Qn since the l·ast <>f 1937, and it ha;d 
been going on before that but that was the scope of 
my then investigation. I ·suggested that Mr. Finch be al-
lowoo to resign under circumstances such that ia would 
not rappear that it was on account of these charge I made. 
I think it was me who made the suggestion. Nobody 
opposed the idea. (Ab. 146). 
On cross examination this witness testified that 
Mr. Finch ·stated at the Alta Club in •substance and ef-
foot th.a.t he had repeatedly told the mayDr in the last 
number of. months that if his occupying the position of 
chief of police was in any way embarrassing to the 
mayor that he would re-sign. (Ab. 149) 
He also stated that Mr. Finch, in the first con-
ver,sation with the witness in the Felt Building, stat-
ed that he had no knowledge of the payoff. 'That con-
versation was not -ov-er a half hour. 
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He also testified on cross examination as follows: 
''In the matter of who gets the money, I rather think 
I just wrote that down on a piece of pap·er and showed 
i!t to Mr. Fish ~at my lef.t, and that p·aper had on it 
$750.00 in one pla:ce and $500.00 in another.'' (.A!b. 151) 
E. A. HE1DMAN, a eaptain of police in charge of 
the Detective Bureau, ·said that after Christmas 1937, 
he was ;called to .the ·chief's office and Mr. Thooker was 
there .and Mr. Thacker said he wanted to know why 
I ordered a raid1 on a gambling place at an address 
west on 4th South. (1This was apparently under the 4th 
South Street Ry. viaduct). I said I hadn't made it but 
it was made by the Detective Bureau, and Mr. Thacker 
said that he had to know about the.s.e raids and I said 
' 'what do you want me to do ~ '' and he· 'S'aid to write 
it ~down and leave it at my de1sk if it relates to gambl-
ing. I said if it is 'a burglary or robbery going on I 
would want you to .take care of it, and Mr. Thacker 
said that is a different matter. Mr. Finch didn't say amy-
thing at all during the conversation. 
This witness on eros:s examination said that each 
department had ,a s·cope of things it was expected fu 
handle and if one dep·artment is making an inrvestigation 
and another broke in on it there would he som.e pos:silbJe 
resentment and jealously. He .s1a.id Mr. Finch made no 
criticism of h·is having made the arrests. (Ab. 65) 
0. B. REC!ORD, (Ab. 15-22), in:spe·ctor of police, 
testified that around the 25th of August, 1937, he and 
officer Burt made 'an arrest in the bas·ement of the At· 
las Building but he ·di1dn 't know at the time who oper.· 
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ated the place but no"~ kne\\~ it was Bill Browning. The 
arrest was for book-making and he sa\\~ book-1naking 
equipment there, and that he and Sargeant Pierce Inade 
an &rrest in the New Grand Hotel a day or two later 
of some book-makers. That he \\~as next to the chief in 
rank and was in his 'Office a dozen tin1es a day. That 
after these arrests the chief asked him if he had com-
plaints about these particular pl-aces and he said he· 
hadn't. The chief then suggested that he let Thacker 
handle the arrests and not interfere; if they had any 
complaints on gambling to let Thacker know and he 
WQuld see it was taken care of. 
He said the chief did not tell hi-nr to cease making 
arrests. (Ab. 16) Objections and motions to strike this 
conversation were over-ruled and denied. 
0. B. RECORD, s"~orn again, testified that he was 
acquainted with Abe Rosenblum. That he was a bonds.-
man, and that he saw him around the police station sev-
ernl times, maybe a dozen. That he saw him 1Jalking to 
Mr. Finch three or four times he guessed, and that 
he had no idea what he was talking to Mr. Finch about. 
(Ab. 20) 
This covers the mention by state's evidence of Mr. 
Finch in the record. 
With reference to the instructions of Mr. Finch to 
see Harmon or Rosenlblum or any of the parties oper-
ating card rooms or ·similrar places, MR. THACKE·R 
testified that Mr. Finch said: "We are having an epi-
demic of burglaries around the city. I would like you 
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to contact Ben Harmon and BeTt Hays and Joe Vincent 
-'' and I guess he name'<1 over a dozen different places 
where there wer:e ·ca~d ~ames :and beer joints-''and 
see if you -can get them to give you ~any information con-
cerning suspicious chara-cters hanging around and who 
might be pulling these burglaries'' that I might give 
it to the Det:e~ctive Bure·au ~a~d h1elp them out. The sit-
uation was bad and I went to these places as requested. 
(A b. 222) ·The witness :also te·stified that this was in 
£act what he told Mr. Harris. (See ab. 224-225) 
MR. FIN·CH (Ab. 170-·208) testified hy way of 
explanation of some of the·se matters, and under the 
de1cisions of this, court in State vs. Converse, 119 P. 1030, 
at 1033; State v~s. Allen, 189 P. 84, such reasonable 
explanations -cannot lbe ignored in determining the 
wei~ht or effect of the eviden~e. That when I heoame 
poli~ce ~chief I hald no police experience, I had no acquaint-
runce wi,th the officers that werie turned over to me· under 
civil service regulations, (A b. 173). I knew Ben Harmon 
whe-n Mr. Rodgers and I operated our restaurant on 
2nd South ·Street, where we operated for about thirty 
years. For some time- he had a place near us. I never 
had any business or ~social contacts with him. I did not 
bHcome acquainted with Mr. Erwin until about the time 
I was appointed chief. I hald no personal acquaintance 
with Mr. Pear.ee'; I had met him twice, once some year~ 
before when h·e had an acciJdent at the Nibley Park golf 
lcourse and I was· CommiiS'Sioner of P1arks and once ·while 
in office wihen he attempted to get a licens:e f'or a client. 
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A good many y~ar~ prf•Yiou~ly Abe R.o~·enbluiu u~t\.(_1 to 
eat in our re-st~1ura.nt occa:~ionally. I had not ~t\en hin1 
for :a good many year~. I had no a.cqunint.anee or a~soei­
ation with him except as an ot?oos.ional cu~to1ner. I had 
no conversation ''ith Cliff Jennings. Bill Browning, and 
a -Chinaman named \Y. ong. (.A.b. 173). I sa"¥ Bill Cayias 
and Abe Rosenblum a fe\\~ times. They ""'ere bondsmen. 
Ben Harmon talked with me the first thirty days I was 
up there, twiee. X othing ''as eYer said about graft or 
payoff. He wanted to know if he could not keep the 
card room open after midnigilit and I told him no that 
he oould not get ru1y privileges. (A b. 17 4). 
I never did tell Holt to see Abe Rosenblum or take 
or deliver any instructions from him. I did tell them 
to see these and other men and get information to help 
the detective bureau. I did tell Holt that I had infor-
mation that gambl.4Ig was being carried on in Rosen-
blum's place and asked him to check up ·on it closely. 
I took this matter np two or three times 1and told him 
to -see that unlawful acts were not carried on, and with-
ill a week or ten days after the last order Rosenblum '·s 
place was closed. I did take Mr. Holt off and put Mr. 
Record on as head of the anti-vice squad in the spring 
of 1937, ''the newspapers were ril(Ling us over the wom-
en's clubs.'' I put Mr. H. K. Record ~as head -of the 
.anti-vice squad. I· began to have reports from various 
sources. Mr. Early informed me that Mr. H. K. Rec-
ord and another officer were interested in a crap game 
on 4th South. The mayor's :secretary :rn.ade the same 
report. One member of the anti-vice squad gave a sim-
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ilar report, Mr. Hoagland. I removed Mr. Record for 
the reasons above stated and 1\fr. 'Thacker was then 
appointed. I :appointed Mr. Thacker ·after discussing 
rthe matte,r with lnsp·ector Record, who was in charge of 
personnel. ·The instructions I gave were to the effect 
that we wanted the place's run as closely as they could 
regulate them and no infractions of the law that they 
coul~d help. (Ab. 178. Mr. Thacker verified this). 
I took up the matter testified to by Mr. 0. B. Rec-
o:vd booause Mr. Thacker said that these arrests had 
been made in his d·epartment and he thought they ought 
to talk to him, or something to that effect, it aroused 
a little jealousy. (Ah. 178) 
After I removed Mr. Holt the women's organi-
zation, which had taken quite an a·ctive part in vice 
conditions, came to me and they wanted to know why 
I had removed him. 'They felt that he was doing a 
good job. They s~aid they had never made complaints 
of him, or words to that effe-ct, and felt I had made a 
mistake in taking him off the vi·ce sqUJad. That influenced 
me 'vhen I came to put him hack on the squad undfr 
Thacker. 
E.arly in 1937 I S'aid to Mr. Holt in substance "I 
have heard rumors that you have be·en collecting, or 
accepting money from various peop·le'', and he said 
I have never taken a dollar from anybody. I can go 
right out and !arrest ·anyone. No one has rany strings 
on me. ( Ab.181) 
After hearing Judge Ellett, I recall that I had a. 
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conversation "-ith hin1. I Inet hbn in thP hall and we 
went into my room. lly offict.lrs had been tPlling me-
the conversation "-as about fines being levied against 
gamblers and the question had :been raisrd by the judge, 
not in my presence, that they should~ be prosecuted 
on a felony charge. I did tell him that he could fine 
them up to $299.00 and give them six months in j•ail 
and if they were brought in on these charges twice a 
year that probably would answer and 've could get the 
fines in the City Treasur~~. I also told him that we would 
just as soon furnish our evidence at one place ·as an-
other and if the city attorney felt so disposed it was im-
material to us where the cases were tried. 
He brought up the rumors of graft. I told him 
I had been on the street down there for thirty-five year.s 
and heard these rumors ·all my life. I never could get 
to the bottom of them. It w·as not expressed in the con-
versation that I had my hand behind my book that I re-
call-'' not in that way at all''. I had only been there 
a few days. I did not take it that his ·statement applied 
to me. I do not recall that ~any amount was mentioned. 
(.A!b. 182) 
T·he witness denied that he had the conver-sation 
stated by the witn-ess Hays with relation to card game·s. 
(Ab. 182) The witness denied the testimony of Austin 
Smith that they had any conversation at his house, or 
that Austin Smith could have seen Mrs. Finch there 
or be admitted by her because ·she was not up and 
about the house at that time; and t·estified that he nev-
·er ~stated to Austin Smith that there was a payoff of 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
48 
$2000.00 a month in Salt Lake, and I never at any time 
to anyone said in substanee that I guess,ed Abe Ros·en-
blum "would" collect graft in ·Salt Lake City. (Ab.l83) 
This witne1ss testified that he did say something 
albout taking the affairs of the department into the en-
emy eamp, in eonnection with Holt '·s alleged conver-
sations with the newspape·rmen and with Mr. Taggart 
in his offi·ce, ~and what lhe had re.fe.rence to was that he 
13111d Mr. Ttaggart had had words ~a!bout a matter of em-
ployment in the poli(~e dep~artment and that Mr. ·Taggart 
had said ''I will re;member you when the time, comes·.'' 
(Ab. 184) 
Conce·rning the conversations with Fisher Harris, 
Mr. Fish took the ex1amining position anld the discussion 
was be:twe·en him and Harris. Mr. Fish warnted to see 
the slip that Mr. Harris :had taken ·out of his pocket 
and Mr. Harris ·showed it to him. When he brought up 
the proposition that I was getting $500.00 ,a month I 
said that I had n:o knowledge of any payoff and I cer-
tainly had not been a party to it. I did s~ay that any 
time I stood in the way of the mayor in any way I 
would be glad to resign. I had tendereld1 my resignation 
to the mayor once before. As we we-re going out I said 
I had no objection to re,signing but rthat I would not 
resign unde·r fire. 
I never re·ceived any money that was ·collected by 
Mr. Holt or ~anybody else. (Ab. 186) I never gave any 
money to Mr. Erwin, except th~at he told me. that dur-
ing the campaign of 1936, he had ·a certain amount tluwt 
the Democratic Committee had. asked him to rais'e and I 
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gave him two percent of one month's salary. I never 
received any money fron1 any source·, except ~some life 
insurance when Mrs. Finch died and my salary, and 
possibly a couple of small loans paid to me $100.00 
apiece. {Ab. 186) 
On cross exa.mination this defendant said, I did 
not know Bill Browning or Cliff Jennings. 
TESTIMONY AS TO MR. PEARCE: 
Before commenting on the admiss.iblity of por-
tions of this testimony and the effect of it, we will set 
ont the testimony as againBt the defendant Pearce and 
consider them both together. 
The witnesses who testified as to Mr. PearcH were 
H. K. Record, Golden Holt, Jacob Weiler and Fi·sher 
Harris. 
_E. K. RECORD (Ab. 95-97) testified that he had 
been -in the police department fifteen years. ThaJt he was. 
placed on the anti-vice squad about the first o.f March, 
1937, and was there for two months. That he saw Mr. 
Pearce arollillld the middle of April. Mr. Pearce called him 
on the telephone and he went to the office ; that B-en Har-
mon was there. Mr. Pearee said he had been respon-
sible for having me placed head of the vice squad; that 
tke mayor had instructed him to 'YIUllke collections from 
gambling hous-es and other forms of vice. I asked Irim 
how much .they expected to get. He said $1700 a month I 
asked him where; he said $600.00 from lotteries, $600.00 
from book-makers and $400.00 from card game·s. I S'aid I 
wouldn't be a party to it. He ~said, if you will string ailiong 
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with us keep thi!ngs in line you will get $165.00 a month. 
I told him I wouldn't want to be a p1arty to it. He said, 
alright, we will get someone el1se to do it. I related this 
s.ame ·Conversartion in the previous trial of Mr. Pearce, 
case 10785, I never ·did report this matter to the chief 
of poliee. Thi~s was the first conversation I ever had 
with Mr. Pearce· and~ the last one (Ab. 96) I didn't 
report this to the eity attorney or the district attorney 
or the -county attorney. Fi1sher Harris talked with me 
about it about D~e:cember, 19-37. 
GOLDEN H·OLT testified that previously to col-
lectin-g in 1937 he talked with Ben Harmon and Har-
mon said he was going to put him hack on the vice 
s~quad to work under Captain Thacker. (Alb. 101) That 
}Je talked with Harmon later about collecting from the 
i'}l_· 
l{rpis·es of prostitution and-. the amounts they were to 
pay. That he then started ;(l!aking collections in June 
'Of 1937, about the 3rd or 4th. ·That after he had col-
lected he talked with Mr. Harmon and Harmon told him 
c. 
LiO take it ~·. er to Mr. Pe·arce 's office in the Continental 
' l 
B·anir BuildJng. 
''When I got to Mr. Pe1arce's office Mr. Harmon was 
the~re, the doo~ ' J ··open. I ·entered the lobby of his of-
fice ·and .. me- to ·come .in. I laid the money on his 
de:sk. \.._ --~d me if that was all of it and I told him 
it was. He picked the money up and put it in the -drawer 
of his. desk on the left side. Mr. Harmon was sitting to 
the left of the desk, about six fee~t from Mr. Pearce. It 
was ~around $500.00. '' (A b. 103) 
About the liatte~ part of :September ·~r the first of 
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October, 1937, Ben Ha.rmon called me. I oouldn 't give 
the date ~any nearer. I " .. ent and sa.\v hiiu at the Mint. 
"Mr. Harmon told me that Mr. Pearce had told me to 
go to Mr. Pearce's office and see him.'' 
I went. He had a slip of paper with a list of places 
on it and :he asked me the amounts 'Of the different 
places of prostitution I had been oollecting from and he 
had some othe-r addresses. There was no collootion made· 
at thes·e. He 'B.Bked me why. I told him they were resi-
dences and those girls weren't making a living out of 
it and I wouldn't collrot from them. He said it was~ al-
right, thought I was doing a fine job, and I left. (Alb. 
103) 
On cross examination thi-s witness testified that 
when he met Mr. Harmon in Mr. Pearce's office he kne-w-
that Mr. Pearce was an at~orney. He had seen him iu 
court off and on. He couldL. 't say whether he had se·en 
him representing Mr. Harmon. I never had any dealing.s 
wih Mr. Pearce whatsoever before. ''Th( ·;B- was very-
t 
little conversati'On in his office. I took ;so.me .... vney. and 
put it on the desk; they .asked me how I was; I was 
there a minute. Mr. Pearce put the money in his. desk 
'and I left. That is about what happ;;;;;i~.·' ~ (Ab.113) 
, ( : . 
The only other conversation I ever:~ :~;.~·~d':- ·-·-) him 
• , . ,_f·; . - r· 
was m September or October of 1937. I 1ai\va-y·s went 
alone when I was collecting money and I went ~alone 
when I turned the money over to Rosenblum (1936) and 
I was alone when I turned the money over to Harmon 
{1937), except the occasion in June when I s·aid Mr. 
P-earce was there. ( Ab.114} 
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I never had a conversation with Mr. Erwin. I had a 
convel'lsation wi·th Ben Harmon around the middle of 
January, 19·38. (Ab. 104) (This testimony was ob-
j·e:ct.ed to on the general grounl(hs and that it was after 
the .eonspiracy is alleged to have conclulded. The ob-
je·ction at that time was sus:tained.) 
Mr. Holt was reealled (Ab. 121) and this conversa.~ 
tion offered again and objeetion over-ruled. He testi-
fied : Ben Harmon ·called me on the telephone around 
the middle of January of 1938. He -a~sked me to pick 
him up at 1st South and Regent ·Streets. We went out 
along 4th or 5th North, ·down by the U. P. tracks, and 
he said, ' 'For God's. sake don't take any mor:e collec-
tions· whatever because· Mr. Harris and Mr. Lee have 
got hold of Pearce and accused him of being in the pay-
off. For God's s~ake see. t.hat there i1s no more of it. 
Don't take ~anything from anybody, be,eause it may blow 
over.'' (Objections· were ma;de lhy each of the defend-
ants separately and motions to strike as to thi~s con-
velisation all over-ruled.) ( .A!h. 123) 
· The wi tne,ss said, all that I have testified to re.J,a,t-
ing to Mr. Pearce in this ease was testified to by me 
in case 10785. (A b. 124) 
JACOB WEILER testified that he was a deputy 
county ·clerk, and in Judge Thurman's ·court on Ma.roh 
19, 1936, in a ·case ·that consumed ~two or three hours, 
Mr. Pea.:vce was one of the counsel. That he s:aw Mr. 
Erwin there .and he ·took the witne1S·S stand and cou:risel 
for both sides .examined him. He· sat in the spectator's 
se·ction before he went on the witness stand,· and. the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
53 
witness could not reineiuber 'YhPbher he 'vent. hn·ek to ·the 
spectator's section or sat at tht.~ coun~t."l table afteT·., 
wards. It "~a.s stipulated that l\l.r. Poo.re.P put ~Jr. Er-
win on the s-tand and exa1nined hiin, and that any in-
sinuation that Mr. Er"in employe·d Mr. I\~'arce a.s at-
to~ey in the case "~as eliminated. It "~as also stipuJ.ated 
that the civil case was first filed on July :25, 1934, (this 
was in the city court). 
(Objection and motion to strike on the ground that 
there was no folmdation or conspiracy shown were 
over-ruled.) 
FISHER HARRIS (Ab. 142) was allowed to 
testify generally that he had made an investigation 
and ha.d found out that the operations hereinabove re-
ferred to, of card playing ·and licensed card rooms, 
houses of prostitution, lotteries and book-making, were 
carried on in Salt Lake City. He had written thes-e up 
in a letter and the letter was offered and received and 
then the letter was rejected by the court, and then the 
witness took it upon himself to tell, ·and was allowed 
to tell the contents of the letter and kept the contents 
in the record. 
This letter and testimony, in addition to the. state-
ment that he had found out that these vices. were car-
ried on, also contained :statements that he knew there 
was a payoff and that he knew who was in it. Thi~ tes-
timony was 1also entirely inadmissible and pre,judicial. 
It involved conversations with Mr. Thacker, .above re·-
ferred to,. wherein he stated to ·Thacker that ·his oon.; 
nootion with it .and with Ben Harmon was well known,. 
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also a eonversation above referTed to with Mr. Finch, 
a's well as conversations. with Mr. Erwin. 
He later gave the following testimony with relation 
to Mr. P.earce. Before this, ·conV1evsation was given, 
obj·ection was made 'and at1tenti10\ll' was called to the 
·court to the fact that it had been given in c3Jse 10785 
and that the transcript was ·available and the court 'vas 
invit1ed to examine the transcript and see that there 
was no admission contained in it. Overruled. 
The witnes~s testified that he had the conversation 
with Mr. P·ea.rce in Harold B. Lee's office in: January, 
1938. It was t~he day lbefo:r.e or the day after he talked 
with Mr. Thacker and Mr. Finch. He called on the tele--
phone ·and. arranged the convers1ation. 
H·e '81aid, "Mr. Pearce, I have been making an in-
vestigation of the illegal activities in Salt Lake· City 
and the official connection with them and the· paroff 
that I have found exi·st.ed. '' I 'vas just introducing the 
subject to Mr. Pearce, teUing 'vhat I wanted to talk 
to him about, telling him ''I had made an inve~stigation 
and that I had found cert:ain illegal activities. rand pay-
off si tuatio:n' ', and then I told him I kne~w of his rela-
tionship with it and I I~ep·e~ated, as I have before, that 
the princip,al thing I am intere,sted. in is the official oon-
neetion with it. The persons in the official body of the 
city who ~are ~connected with it and I told Mr. Pearce 
that I knew of hi1s r:e~lation with it ~and that hJe is involved 
with Mr. Harmon and othelis, and I think it would be 
to his intere,st to make a full and complete discl10sure of 
all he knew about it. (Ab. 142). 
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\Vhen I first ~aid tl1at, ~fr. P~n ret\ just ~~at thHl~ 
a.nd sajd nothing for t"'"o or thr(le n1inuh\s or morP. He 
then ~aid, "\Y"l1o ~ays that I an1 inYolYe·d in thh;; thing?" 
And I said~ '~Dick, I a1n not a.t libPrty to tell you pre-
cisely, but I will tell you the namP~ of ~tnne of the 
persons who say you are inYolYed. '' I enumerated per-
haps fifteen persons . .Among them "~as the name of H. 
K. Record. Mr. Pearc.e said. \\Tell, Mr. R.ecord might 
say this about me beeause he has it in for me. I S'aid, 
I didn't say Mr. H. K. Reeord \Yas one of them, I 'S1aid 
he was among those. Why did ~~ou pick him out1 He 
said, because ·he has got it in for me. He said, "Well 
maybe I can help you stop this payoff situation. I can 
talk to Ben Harmon. I am his attorney.'' I said, ''I 
don't need anybody to stop the thing, it is probably 
stopped no\\-." '• Rat·her than have J!OU speak to B·en 
Harmon about it I w·ant you to promise you won't 
speak to him or anybody else that I have talked to 
:ou on the subject.'' (A b. 143) 
The next day I called him over the ~lephone aiD.d 
I said, ' 'Dick, I am ·S'Orry you have taken the attitude 
that you have in regard to this thing. You may trunk 
it is clever to say nothlng but I t·hink it is not to your 
interest. I think you ought to make a full and complete 
disclosure.'' He said, Why should I talk to you 1, and 
I said, because if you don't y<>u are going to be indict-
ed as ·sure as hell. He said he would call me in the next 
day or two. That w-as the end of the convHrsation. 
A few days later I called him again and he !said, 
"I told you I would talk to you about it. I will talk 
to you some other time.'' (A b. 144) 
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On ·cros·s examination the witnes·s testified that the 
·oonvers,ation with Mr. Pe·aree was about the lOth or 
15th of J~anuary. He started ~out and made a long 'state-
ment to Mr. Pearce. I said I wanted information from 
him, as .he ·could give it to me, and I was particularly 
interested in the public officials that might be involved. 
At the ·close of the ·conver;sation Mr. Pea,rce told 
me that he didn't knovv anything about it. He told me 
t~hat he was attorney for Ben H·armon and asked if I 
wanted him he would talk to Mr. Harmon and see if he 
could get ~any information. 
I told him twice in the early p·art of the conversa-
tion t[t,a,t what I 'vanted was information. I told him 
that I kne~w the fa!cts ~an:d that what I wanted was co-
operation. I w,ant~ed his inflor1nation to ~corroborate 
what I knew. I did ask lVlr. Pearce f.or information. 
That was what my question was dire~ct'ed to ~and that 
was 'vha.t the conversation was for. (Ab. 153) 
This is all the testimony that refers to Mr. P·e.aroe. 
It may be ·c1aime·d that the f·act that Mr. P·e.arce s,aJid 
1n subst:an·ce that 1\!r. H. K. Record would be· removed 
f1~om the anti-vice ·squad, and that he· was in fact re-
moved thereafter, vvould ·crea~te an inference of a con-
nection between him and Mr. Finch. However, the evi-
dence is positive ~that that all·eged eonve.rs1ation was nev-
~er ·communicated to Mr. F.in:ch, or .any reference to it 
made to him until long after Mr. Record had been re-
moved; and that the testimony is positive that Mr. 
Finch gave as his rea:son for removing him, the connec-
tion of Mr. R-ecord 'vith th·e gambling p1ace and that 
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he had reports. as hert:-inalmYe rited. fron1 different. of-
ficers of that condition. In nny ~v·ent, it \\~-ould have no 
tendency to prove the agrt~em~nt. herP allegPc..t. 
Before applying the law to the foregoing testimony, 
we want to cite a recent case to correct. an ilnp~res­
sion clearly carried 'by the trial court in this case and 
which "W"aS erroneous. 
People rs. Rodrignez. 99, Pac. (2d) 263, (Cal. 1940): 
This was a oonspirae.y case tried to the oourt. It 
was a different kind -of cOJJ.Spiracy in that a .substantive 
crim-e was charged and the appellant was charged with 
being a conspirator to commit the crim.'e of robbery. He 
furnished the car and the guns us·ed. One of the al-
,leged conspirators, Carroll, testified that defendant 
said he ''could bring the car and guns to Los Angeles 
and give them to two guys there who would take them 
and bring him in money." He stated that his reason for 
testifying was because he th.ought the appellant was try-
ing to get the girl they were both interested in and that 
he would like to get rid of him. The court said, ''Thus 
it ;appears that a treacherous influence threatened Car-
roll's veracity.'' 
In the course of his dooisi<m the trial Court said : 
"I always .approach a conspiracy case· with 
·a •searclring attitude of mind, because of the very 
nature of th~e charge and. the presumptive rules 
1Qf evidence-much .testimony is considered which 
would not be considered m a charge of an iSIOlat-
ed offense. '' 
''I merely state that ~as a human situation 
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witih which I reaJize ytou are ·confronted, and I 
·can only ·s1ay in that ·connection that like all emir 
'Spir,acy .cas1e'S the te,stimony may not he as ful-
IS'ome a.nd ·complete· as. is the cas'e in any ·other 
~offen.Be but conspiracy.'' 
Commenting on this the appellate· court said: 
"It appHar.s .tim:ely that 'some conside~atio!IJJ 
be given to the popular but erroneous belief th~t 
1ess ·convincing evidence i·s required to support a 
judgment ·of guilty wher·e the offens'e of conspir-
'acy is ·charged. Such 1a belief is wholly unwarrant-
ed. Mo~eove·r, to ·charge· conspiracy produces nv 
,a;dvaJilltage £or .the' plaintiff, nor does sueh a 
·charge ·Create burden.s for the defendant, any dif-
ferent with regar.d to each than might be ex-
p·e,cted in connect~iorn. with the trial f.or other 
offenses. The crime of ·conspir.acy is no more 
heinous, ill(Or is it fraught with gl'laver conse-
quences, than othe'r offenses. ~ancied handicaps 
inci,dent to the prosecution of other offenses 
cannot be overcome in the trial of ·a criminal HC-
tiOOll by merely ·charging conspiracy.'' 
The ·ca1s'e was reversed :on the ground :1Jhat the evi-
·dence W1as not sufficient to e~stablis.h the ·conspiracy as 
to the 1appellant. 
TE'STIM.ONY UNDER :CLASSlFICATION (2): 
We shall ll'OW ·cite l.aw upon the proposition that 
the testimony here ·cited does m1ot tend to support the 
:allegations of an agre~ement ·to p1ermit and allow the 
operations as. alleged, but that it was itself erroneously 
~dmitted. 'Thes'e 'authorities refer to €vidence of the na-
ture indica ted in ·clas,si:fica tion (2) .aJbove. It includes 
the alleged statements of Early t·o Mr. Finch that there 
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were rumors of a payoff or that there "rere rumors that 
he "~as involYed, which 'vas disclahued; -of Austin SmHn1 
concerning the aUeged statem~nt by Mr. Holt tand him 
~hat 1lhe rumors of a payoff were rampant in 1936 ; 
of Hays that Mr. Finch must know hlu1t gambling was 
going on in card rooms; of EUett, within the first month 
of Mr. Finch's employment, My friends tell me you are 
taking $2500.00 behind you.,- back; of Fisher H·arris, 
that he had investigated and round out that there were 
viee operations and a payoff in regard to v:ioo oand hi1s 
alleged enumeration of payoffs, a:nd nir. Findh 's re ... 
isponse that he had heard such stories for th'e last thirty 
years 18Jld could not get to the bottom 1Qf it, that he did 
n10t know of the condition -stated and that he thougili.t 
11he city was pretty well run; and the further statement 
of Mr. Harris at the Alta Club of the same nature and 
that he, addressing himself, no.t to this defendant, but 
to Mr. Fish, •had noted on a piece of paper that Mr. 
Finch got $500.00 per month ·and Mr. Finch's repeated 
responses, according to Mr. Harri-s, that he did lll!ot know 
of this condition and his question as to how long this 
had been going on and hi.g later denial of any participa-
tion in the affair. 
It also covers as to Mr. P-earce the testimony of 
Fisher Harris that he made a long ·statemeDit to Mr. 
Bearce that he had been making an tinvesti.gation of 
illegal activities and official connection and a payoff, 
and requested Mr. P·earce to give him information, and 
in the course of the statement said, I know of your con-
nection with Ben Harmon and others, and Mr. Pearce's 
hesitation, and Mr. Pearce's response, "who says I 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
60 
am involved'', his ofier to get infonnation, and his later 
denial of any personal knowledge of the payoff. 
It will be recalled that most testimony of this na-
ture ·came from Fisher Harris. H·e i~s 1aa11 'attorney and 
it is n:ot too much, we think, to ,s,ay ·that he was con-
sci•ous of the e:ffiects of his long statements and letter 
in ·crBating ·ervidenee which was very p·rejudicial in this 
eas·e. All of thes1e were after the .conspiracy is alleged 
to 'have ·Ceased and after he said it was stopped. None 
of the.m charge the offense alleged. ·Of .course, :a;s to Mr. 
Finch in ihis official position things weTe ·constantly being 
,s,aid as to rumors of 1aw violati10n, etc., ·or of things 
that the persons had been told or had hear.d from other 
pers~ons about public and police office~s. He was not 
called upon to d.eny, when someone Slaid they had been 
told ·some1thing. 
In 80 A. L. R. commencing at page 1235 there is a 
note ·collecting numeiious cases on the admissibility of 
inculp1atory ·conduct of the accus,ed. At page 1235, after 
diSrcus:sing tihe hroad proposition that failure .to dooy 
aJil. accus,ation rna y he us,ed, the author s:a ys : 
''A s.tatement 1so made, of itself, would be 
ohj·e·ctiona hle ·as hearistay testimony, being oa state-
ment made at .some time other than at a pre1sent 
trial, offered to prove the truth of the matter 
the,rein .asserted, and bas·ed ootirely on the credi-
bility of a ·declarer not tlhen befol"e .tihe court.'' 
H·e then goes ·on to state that such ·st.a.te·ments may 
be us~ed only for the purpose of introducing the re!flction 
to the .charge made in t.he s:tatem,ent, when such is per· 
tinent evidence. 
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..At pa.ge 1250 com1nences a. dis<'.ussa·on ~1nd ci t.a.tion 
of cases on limitation, 'On a.thnissilbility. It would S(\rve 
no purpose to reYie"· all these cases. Herejn are cited, 
some of these in the note and so1ne "·hich are later. 
:These mll sufficientlr indieate the nature of the holdings 
in all this class of cases. 
Tate ~·s. State, 95 Jli~s. 138. ±S So. 13, holds that an 
incriminating statement inmlving accused, addressed 
to bystanders when the a.ooused was present did not 
call for an answer and there was no admission by si-
lence. 
People vs. Bissert, 15 )..1 • lT. S. 630, affirmed 172 N. 
Y. 6±3, 65 "}..~. E. 1120, held that a statement accusing a 
public officer 'Of taking a bribe to protect operation of 
houses of prostitution was not admi,ssible. 
"because a public officer, whil-e ·acting [n the dis-
charge of .his duti€s imposed by law, is not 
bound oo deny accusations th·en made ~against 
him in ·order to rebut inf~rences ·of his -acqui-
escence 1by .silence.'' 
McCormick vs. State, 181 Wis. 261, 194 N. W. 347: 
In this case the facts were somewhat analogous. 
Letters written by a former attorney for ·the accus,ed 's 
murdered wife and f.or the accused were introduced in 
eVidence. These lettens statoo the attorney '.s conviction 
that the ·aoousoo had poisoned his wife and made other 
inculpatory staJtements. The accused, Shaw, attemprtJed 
to employ this attorney in a matter involving the oon-
test ·of his wife's will. When he did that, tihe attorney, 
who had previously written these· letter1s :to ~the di·strict 
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attorne~y, read the, letters to him and the· aroused made 
no 1denilal ·of the ·cJha1rge. He simply ·sai~d that it was not 
n1ecess:ary for the ~a.ttorne~y to consider such thlings 
1since no ·criminal proseeut~on ·had been instituted. The 
~opinion 1Baid: 
''We then ~come to the vital and controlling 
conside~ation ,as t10 whether .run ordinary, pru-
·dent perrson ~srimilarly situated would naturally 
make 1a reply as to his. guilt wi1th respect tD the 
numerous incidents. involving crime contained irn 
thes:e lettens, and particularly whether tlhe de-
f,endant, in re~mairuing 1sile,nt, ·can be deemed t<> 
acquiesce in 'Such insinuations ~so as to constitute 
·thes'e lett.ers ~compe1tent evidemtce against ihim. '' 
The ·court held that they could not and that their ad-
missi·on Wla,s er.voneous, ~and in reve,rs~ing the case Baid: 
''·The very nature of .the information con-
tained in the le:tters w.a.s prejudicial. Numerous 
[neriminating incident'S Wel'\e! referred to rn the 
let:te·rs, none of vvhich \vas bas:ed upon personal 
knowledge of the witness, but on the coiDJtrtary, 
l~epre,sented 1hi1s ·cornclusions from ·all'e~ed inv.esti-
gation mad·e, aniL re·ports and conclus!Uons, of oth-
e~s. The silence :of the, de.femdant unde'r these 
·eircumsta;nees the court hel~d would 1amount wt 
mos1t to 1an ~aequies,cence in the ID'ental ope,1.'1ations 
of the witne,s.s,, S·haw, and of otthefls. rtefe,rred to 
iin rthe letters which he was in no positi'on to oOilli-
trovert. '' 
The error of the court in adm~tting tili.e· l~etters was held 
~sufficient Wla.rr,a.ntt flor a re·v-e~rsal of the ve~Ddiict .. 
State vs. Evans, 189 N. C. 233, 126 S. E. 607, in-
VIolved a homicide, in the trial ·of which iJt became 
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impor1lant to proYe tha.t the de<-Pasr·d t;axi-JdriYl'l' had 
boon .h!iroo by the ·acusPd to n1ake a trip to gP:t somP 
w.hi8key .. A. 'citness te~1ifi~d. t.hat the dece·alsf'd taxi-
driver ilru .the presence of the def~ndant stated t:hn~t he 
bad hired him to make the trip tinYolYed and hlra1t the 
aooused did not deny it. The holding "'"as 1~hat this 
was improperly admitted. because it did not oharge nor 
involve an ·assent to the commission o.f the aotual crime 
eharged. 
Geiger ~·s. State, TO Oh i.o Sf. 400, 71 }..:. E. 721, was 
a case mvolving a conversation' behvoon one of the of-
:fioors present and the infant -son of the aroused, who 
was questioned by urre of t.he officers as oo what oc-
enrred on the day in question. In the courne of the OOIDI-
vel'ISation the son made a statement which aooused the 
the defendant of :havring killed his wife by stabbing ,her. 
It was iestifi:M that the defendant mad~· Il!O reply amd 
was irome<hii8Jtely taken away. ·The court held that by 
reason of the nature of th~ oonversa1Jion and the per-
·sons to whQm the answer of th'e ·son was addressed, 
other than the defundaalt, this did ll!ot naturally induce 
or provoke a deDJial and was improperly admitted. 
The fuUowing tw() cases h<>ld that an accused is. 
not roquiTed to deny ·statements not involVling a &root 
oharge of the offense alleged, and parrticularly whHre 
th~ demal might involve a oontJ'Ioversy. 
People vs. Hartwell, 175 Pac. 21. 
People vs. Countryman, 195 N. Y. S. 728, 49 
N. Y. Crilminal Reports 34. 
This app·ears to· apply to the statements of the· 
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witness'e's Elle·tt and Fi,slher Harisi ·concerning what 
they ·had he,a:vd ror ftound out or, in th~e lratter instance, 
thrut invesrtri.gation had disclos•ed. 
Ha.nna vs. State, (Tex.) 79 S. W. 544 he,ld a state-
moot not m·ade· to the aecusted ·directly, but to a by-
.srtande'l", was. improp,erly admitted. The opinion said: 
"'To e·nttitle' the· st:rut:e to :imltroduce in evi-
·dence the declar.ations of hy.standers:, it must be 
clearly ~slhow.n tha1t def·endant. unde~stood him-
se~lf to be IB.IOOUS·ed of the criminal act committed, 
•and tlue ci.•rcums;tance,s. must have· beren ~such as to 
veqruire of hiln a. l'le,spons~e." 
At page 1272 of 80 A. L. R. the;r·e 1s. a note ad-
dressled dire,clly to the matter of admi's's:ibility of state-
ments. not made dire,ctly to ·the ·accused but in conve·r-
S!ations Wli:th .third p·ersons. The author says: 
"W!hen alll! incriminating statement is mad~ 
i1n a ·conve:r.siat]on beJtween third pel"sons, in which 
~the ~accus,ed is not included, and when the· re-
marks are not spooifi·cally addT,es.s.ed to him, it 
is frequently held that his £ailure: to deny does 
not rendetr evidence of the ~s~tatemetlllt and his si-
lence ·admis-sible agwinst. him, for the retason tiD.at 
thets1e .ffircums,tances neither afford him an op-
portunity to deny, nor .are they such as ·to call 
£or ~a :veply. In ~s~1:ch crustes i:t i:s held ·that it might 
be a ma.nifest irutrusion 1and improp·r~:ety for the 
accused to £orce hims.e:lf imlto the conver.s~tion 
for the purpose of d·enying a remark, while in 
othe~s. it is· held that the r:emark ma.y be ~a mere 
impertinence of ttlhe declarer which might best 
be answe~~ed by silence. ' ' 
This rule would s1eem to apply to t·he· conve]}s&tion 
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ibetween Mr. Fish M.d Mr. Harris at thP Alta Club, 
where th-e latte-r ".,as attl\lllpting to relnttt~ to 1\:fr. F'isih 
maJttel'S of his inv-(ls.tig-ntiffill, and for Mr. Finch to im-
mediately ha.ve intruded 'rould have constit.ut;ed an in-
terruption of tha.t narra.tion. 
The auth'Or cites a number of oases directly ih.olding 
~b®t SltatemenJts made to thlrd persons are not admis-
sible. 80 ~4. L. R. 1272-1273. 
At page 1278 of 80 A. L. R. there is a note citing 
·a number of auth'Orities discusaing the matter of the 
nature of the statement and the nooessrity of it being 
directed to a charge of the offense alleged. w.e will 
cite a few of these cases directly in pocint ihere. 
People vs. Page, 162 N. Y. 272, 56 N. E. 750: 
A few days after the crime of l'lape, for which the 
accused. was being prosecuted, a witness ·stated that 
a fuw dtays afiter the crime was alleged to have oo-
mured, she said to the defendant that the ''pl'losoou-
trix had told her that .the defendant had committed the 
crime of nape on her and that :the defendant did IllOt 
deny it.'' It was held that this testimony should be 
excluded foc the reason that it was not a direct accus(J),-
tion of tke crime, b'Uit was a mere repetition of rwmor or 
gossitp. 
Stach vs. State, (Tex.) ·260 S. W. 569: 
Defefllid!anJt was arrested for violalti!on of the pro-
hibition law. 1The officer who arrested him testified that 
some time before he said to the accused, ''You have /been 
boot-legging. Fmnk, take a fool's OO.VIice and quit or 
you are going to get into trouble.'' ~he officer 1also tes-
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ti:fied that a moment before tlhe arrest he said, ' 'Frank, 
I have warned you about 1this. '' That t!he defenK1ant r~ 
mained s,ilen~t ]n each in.s~tanee. 
The ·court held ~the S'tlatements inadmi~ssible, SJa)1lng 
that 
' ' the ·s:tatemen1 Wlhi·eh 1an ·accused is ·called on to 
deny is such as eontains a direct accusrution re-
lating t~o the particular offense with which the ac-
cused is charged iJn, the indictment'' 
and Slaid that neither statement dive·otly ch1arge1<1 the de-
defendant with t1he present offense. 'There was no such 
·accusati1on in :all the mass of tes:timony here. 
People vs. Figara., 219 N. Y. S. 73: 
In rthis ·case the ·defendant was charged with having 
·stolen bags: of £eed and :an adding machine. Previously, 
when the ·owner 8Jlld poli·ee officefls went to the defend-
ant ''s farm, ·o;ne of the officel"s openEtL the door of the 
barn ~and :slaii·d, ' ' There, tJhat looks. like a Sibo1en car.'' 
T1hat the de,f.endJalllt was sil.en t. J,t was he,ld that suoh 
stBJtement t('harged another crime and not the one ~or 
which the d~e:£enda;nt waS' beiJng tried and was therefore 
incompevent. 
State vs. Ha;milton, 5·5 Mo. 520: 
The def·e~dJarut wws; 1a1CCU!8ed of murder. The ~testi­
mony w~as that the office,rs we-nt ~to his hous-e when he 
was. •Susp,ecte!d, and on eoming out, in the pre~·eiDOO of 
defendant one of them ·SJallid 'thrut he had found a J»s.tol 
up~stai!'ls between ~some bed cloitllle,s.. The defendant did 
not ~deny that he had found the pistot This was held 
im.admi:SISi ble. 
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The foregoing sufficiently illustrate the 'holk:hlng 
that ·the accusation must be a direct charge of tili.e 
offense charged in ·the aoti-on on 'Vhi6h the defend ants 
are being tried. None of the sr.atements inYolved i~n 
tthis ease could be admitted under these limi twtions. 
Their admission W"as error. 
People rs. Ka.zatsky, 63 Pac. (2d) 299, 
(Cal.): 
This is a later case inv-olving a f.aked automobile 
accident. The evidence rec.eived on the trial was that 
of oo officer. He testified that he said to th~ accused, 
''We know that it was no aooideni. ' ' This is a very 
similar .statement to those made by the witnes's Fis:her 
Harris. The opinion says: 
''The statement was not directly aoous'Mlory 
in form; to the contrary, before defendant could 
1have understoOd that he was being accused of 
the commission of a. criminal offense, it would 
!be necessary that he indulge in a cours·e of rea-
soning of facts as he understood them to exist, 
coupled with rthe law as ·applying thereto. As i·s 
ISbaited. in People v. Davis, * * * 293 P. 32: 'Be-
fore the failure of a person to deny a statemoot 
of f:act can be received as evidence of ·an admi~s·­
sion of guilt or of oonsoiousn81&s of guilrt:, it 
must appear fuat he understands that he him-
·Self is accused of the criminal act.' " 
('The- Davis ~case cites after ·this quoiation, 
Wharton on Crim.i!Dal Evidence, lOth Ed., Vol. 
2, ·Sec. 680, p. 1407). 
''l'he introouction of ·sta:tements !allege'dJy calling foT" 
admissions .almost inv:ari~ably result in reversal of the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
68 
casre becaus!e of the .effeCJt of int,roducing a s~tatement 
made by .a witnes~s to the accused. The' statements here 
imvolv:ed we,I'Ie particularly damaging for ~t:he r.easons 
1s,ta1ted in ~the ·cases, that the jury ·does not dis,criminate 
as ·to the offenS>e charged nor differe·ntiJate sufficiently 
to get out of its: mind the allegHd f~cts: ~stated. This 
would be e·speci~.ally true in this. ~cruse, where a major 
portion of the evidem.·ce' was maJde up· of damaging re-
citials of this. ·ohai'Iacter. 
Garner vs. State, 83 So. 83 (Miss.): 
ThiS> wrus: 1a ea1s·e· in which the :accusati001, the court 
·heJ,d, was. in effect ·denied, but it was claimed that the 
e'rror w,as. harmles'S'. The opinion said: 
'' The admis,s1ion of this: ·evi·de.nce was mMla-
fes.t error. Brown vs. ·State, 78 Miss. 637, 29 So., 
519, 84 Am. St. Re·p. 641. The learned at;torney 
gener,aJ,concedes the· Hrror, burt insi.s,ts t1hat it WBJS 
·harmles1s erroT. It may 'he :s1aid, in respons,e to 
1iliis suggestion ·of ·th·e rHpi'Ies:enJtrutive of the state, 
tbhrut it i·s .s10metimes. e~c;e,etdilngly difficult :to ·say, 
wilth ·oonfidemice, jusrt what maiJ influence tili·e 
vei'Idi,ct ·of ~a jury; burt we· think the· e~or was 
not haTm1es:s, ·and besides, the error thus commit· 
ted does not stand alone with an otherwise spot· 
less record to cure the error.'' 
It will be note~d that Mr. H~arris ·adllllitted that in 
the cours-e ·of the eonv.ers.ati10n with bo~th Mr. Finch and 
Mr. P·e~a~ce, ·they ·denied ~any of the intimrutiollliS· of 1lbe 
statement of the witne1sis re·1ating ,fjo them. 
Pinn vs. Commonwealth, 186 8. E. 169: 
In this· OOISie the opinrion says : 
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''It ought not. to be necess,a.ry to note that 
the party's denial of 1ilie third per8'0n 's state-
ment d.estr{)~'":S em.tirely the ground for u~ing it.'' 
\Vigmore on e•vidence ( ~d Ed.), Vol. ~. S.ee. 
l tv":'•) . 5~.f 0 1" •)•) c J •)•)(j,. ' \ ') '}6•) VI -• p. U'±. 0t?E\ 8 ~0, -- • ., p. t.)...; , ~t (' .. .J "'""• 
note 3(a); Com. Y. )lazarella, ~~~l P·a. ·-Hi5, 1:24 A. 
163; People Y. Harrison. ~61 Ill. 517, 104 N. E. 
259; Com. Y. Kosi or. ~SO ~lass. 418, 182 N. E. 
852; State v. D' Adame, 84 N. J. La" .. 386 A. 414, 
Ann. Cas. 1914-B, 1109. 
People t·s. ~7itti, 143 "}..~. E. 448: 
~his case i'S oomewhat ·analogous in that the statte-
mffillts made in ·the presence of defendant were of con-
siderable length and the charges not very well marked 
or pointedly directed. It did c.ontain statements concern-
ing one Qf the defendants present amd also other state .... 
ments a:ffooting the sever.aJ. defendJants present. T:he 
Qpunon says: 
'']ill; order for the acquiescence 1Jo have the 
effect of an atdmission it mnst exhibit some act 
of the man and show that the aool18€d purposely 
remained silent. * * * Furthermore, it must ap-
pear that the aroused not only had an opportu-
nity to speak :for 1himself, but was in a &trualtion 
where it would .have been fitting, suitable rand 
proper for him :to speak, or where he would have 
been likely, according to common experience, to 
deny the imputatioo of guilt. rThe liability of mis-
~apprehension or misrooollootioo or misrepresen-
rtation is such that the authorities uniformly ail-
low that this kind of evidence should be received 
with great caution. (Citing several cases') 
* * * Since the demeanor of :a peTISIOn uptOill 
'hearing statements of others charging them witbh 
crime i:s lia'ble to great mi'SOOiliStruotion, evidence 
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of this dJescrip.tion ought to be regarded with care. 
In discus1s!ing this. que,slt::i!on ·courts of.ten say 
·that silelnce, under!' the oir:cums1tances, may be 
cons;trued a:s ~am. ~admissi:on or 1a confession. Be-
cause of this loose phraseol~ogy confusion has 
tari_,sen, and the ·cil'lcums~tances arising from the 
·conduct of ithe aecus·ed in remaining silent is oft-
·en ·tr·eated ~aJS. though it were ~a -confession. This 
is cle:f!aly an ·erroneous view.'' 
The ~ca1s'eiS .also um~£ormly hold that where a pei\son 
has oDJce d·eni~ed hi'S. guilt of an offense ·charged, he iJs 
not called upon 1-Jo ·deny it ~eveTy rtiime it is mentioned, 
and ~that his fiail ure to do s10 when, the matter is re-
peated is not admi_,s,sible. It will be rel(~;a.ll~ed th~t F~islh­
er Rrur:cis ,and M·r. Finch both tes,tified ~that Mr. Fimcll 
de1nied knowledg·e of any p~a.yoff jus1t prior to this meet-
ing ~t the Alta. Clu!h. 
People vs. Collins, 137 N. E. 753 (N. Y.): 
T:his ,inViolv:ed 1a1gain quite a lengthy statemoot m 
which 1the ~defendant wa.s -charged ~a n;umbeT of ~times 
with guilty eonduot and remained silent. Tihe opinion 
s1a.y;s: 
''Collins had a.lr,e~ady told his ·&tory. He 
,had already ·Contr!adicted the ~s:tat'e,ments made. 
U ndJe,r such a state of facts:, the failul}e· to renew 
his 'Cbenial wHs no indication of 'acquies~oonce in 
1any event. * :!:, * 'Collins may or m~ay not have 
been guilty of the ·crin1e ·charged agains:t him. 
Wih~ther guilty or not, he WlaS· entitled to a fair 
~tri,al. Thi's 1he did not re.c~etive' and the judg-
menrt of ·conviction ~appealed f1rom mus1t be re~ 
veT'S'ed. ' ' 
People vs. Barney, 184, N. E. 612: 
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This ''as simil,~lr to the ea~Q ·n,t bar in tha:t tthc de-
fense ask~l the rourt. to hear tlu} t'e~tin1ony of ·an al-
leged admission firs.t atnd deteiinin~ it~ adnli'~·sibility; 
just as w'as d'One h~re in the <.~l$e of ~[r. P~t~.rce (lnd 
also Mr. Erwin, where transel"ipts of ~the testimony 
were present. The court refuse-d, and ·the testimony 
was given bef-ore the jury. Here the defenst.• \Vlanrted to 
9how that the defendl8n1t had preYiously denied the ac-
cusation that hte bought a g-allon of gasoline from the 
witness.. 'l'he mtness "\YaS allowed to te.&tify that at 
the time in question he identified the man as the one 
-wtho bought a gallon of gasoline from him and thaJt the 
man:L being so identified didn't deny it. ·l'he court did 
afterwards strike out the aceu....~ng portion of the tes-
timony 13Jld the defendant's previous denial of the 
purcha..."-e, but :all-owed the identifiootion to stand. The 
oprmon says : 
''Such statement will never be admissible 
where the accused unequivooally denies the truth 
of the statement or where ihe shows clearly that 
he dl(}es not aequiesce in it." ( CitiiDg 143 N. E. 
448, 113 N. E. 113) * * * Unless the words or 
conduct of the IOOCused under the circumsrtancejs 
are such that there is a nwtural and re,asonable 
infer-ence that he &Thnitted the truth of the 
charge, such stmement is ioodmissibl·e. * * * 
104 N. E. 259. The testimony Df Feldman, was not 
only incompetent 'but highly prejudicial to de-
fendant.'' 
People vs. De Bolt, 256 N. W. 615: 
Is another case holding that the de:£end:ant, having 
previously deni~ that he 1md anything to do with the 
robbery, the foot that he failed to deny a statement 'by 
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a (~o~def,endant accus,~ng him dir<e·ctly of participation in 
the robbery was n01t admiss[ble and the case w~s re-
versed he(,aus·e~ :of i1ts: admi's'ffi,Qin. 
~See Johnson vs. State, 296 8. W. 887, 3JS a later 
cas;e on the ·point thla!t the accll!s;ati1on was not of the 
offe.ns:e· charged. 
Commonwealth vs. Smith, 161 Atl. 418; 
Is :a later ~case involving the question. of hesita-
tion in oanswerilln;g. This W1as rthe only basis :for any clalim 
of alle,ged ·admisiSiiOillSi by Mr. Finch :and Mr. P1earoe. 
In this eas1e one, Fish·er, made a ·con£eS:sion of .setting 
fire to the building tand ~s:t!atedl cfuat the defendJaJillt pro-
'eured him to burn it for $1000.00. ·The confe.ss~on con-
tained other .allegatii~orns ,accusing ilhe ,defendant. This 
was vead to 'the def.en.darut. The witne,s.setS· tesitified tlhat 
the ~defendant remain~ed silen•t fbettwe,en five and fifteen 
minutets aftter ·thes1e accus:ations "r:er<e, re,ad. T:he· defend-
ant them: s1a]d} Fisther w~as ta ''na't" alllJd a liar. 'Th:e court 
[held thaxt it was ,e.rr.or to admit. 'the ~confesiSion because 
the defe.ndant d~d ~deny the truthfuln·e's's' therieof, that 
her ·conduct (~oul~d not be dHs,crihed as an 1as;sent by si-
lence to ·the accunaey of ilie st~a:tements, in the· comfes-
sti.on. ·The case was. reverned. 
Commonwealth vs. Maza.rella, 124 A.tl. 63, is an-
other eas~e 1holding that comp~licity having been p~revi­
ously d:enied, ~s.ubs~equent refusal to de~ny oould not be 
in:tl"odru.ced. 
·T;bJis ratte~mprt to make ad.mistS:iOOlls by the use of 
long ~and damaging recital'S, pal'lti1cu1arly as rbo what 
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persons had been told on an inv·estig.a;tion, <>r had found, 
or a friend ha.d told them, and "~lH:~re the convt'rs.ation8· 
result in a denial ins•tead of an implied admission, 
are usually condemned as the foregmng authorities 
show. 
In 3 Jones' OollllOOntaries on Ev. (2d. Ed.) 1063, 
Mr. Jnstic~ Field is quoted: 
'·Every admission upon \Yhioh a party re-
li~ is to be .taken as an entirety of the f!OOt 
which makes for his side, with the qual.ificatio'DJS 
-which limit, modify, or destroy it.s effect on the 
other side.'' 
In 22 C. J. 41±, relating to admissions it is said: 
"The triers of the faot * * * are not at lib-
erty to disbelieve the self -'servillng paTt capricious-
ly and without any reasonable grounds; and it 
·has boon said 11hat they cannot beliew part and 
d!isbelieve another pari unless suoh pa·l"'ts. are 
distinet and relate tD different matters. or £acts. '' 
The vice 'Of introducing a statement made to a de-
fendant that somebody else lmd said something and 
lbhen trying to claim as an accusation WJhalt the other 
person ·said, is illustrated in Risdon v. Yates, 145 Cal. 
210, 78 Pac. 641, where the .situation is discus;sed, that 
a pu'blisher of the Bible might be cbarge<t f.or printing 
"1.'he fool hath said within hi'S heart, 'there is no God'," 
and by ·selectim.g only the words "iflhere is no God" an 
indietment for b181Sphemy be sustalined thereon. 
Here we have a long recital .to Mr. Fish in the 
ooture of a report of investigation by Fisther Harris, a. 
claim that 3 single item was palSSed over without Mr. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
74 
Finch's ·denying it "·at t~hat time", amd th.a:t he did deny 
it when 11:Jhe- re·cirtal was finished ~and he started to talk. 
In the ·case 10f Mr. P·e:ar:ce, a long reci:tal dJirecledi t~o and 
involvling requested informatiton .and makim;g one or two 
incidental refe:re:nce:s ·to Mr. Pearce. Naturally he 
would hesi.tate, to think about the mrutt,er of infQrma-
ti,on reque~s1ted, and again we have only ·the cLaim thrut 
he ·did mot deny partH 10f this r~ecHJal immedia.te,Jy, but 
~did indicrut~e his ,denilal by asking, "Who says I am in-
volved?'' And ·then ·dlenied being invol~ed. 1T1o intro-
duce these reeitals not ·accusing ei:tJher of rthe of£ense 
·charged, a's well as the other ·srrmilar ~eciltals herein a;g-
stigi11ed .and obj,ected to, is cl,early shown by the forego-
ing authorities. to !be prejudic]al error. 
TESTIM~ONY UNDER CLA·SSIFICATION (3): 
Tlhe following dils~custsion is in ref-erence to ~he 
'above tes1t·imony wi•th reJ,arbion ,to ·diffe.ren·t .acts or irreg-
ul~ar ennduet or eonvne:r.s1a:tiuns- involving ir're·gula.r con-
duct of the illlldividual defe::rudants ·.them·s.elves. It is our 
positiJon :that none of this·, unde~r the rule 1a1S to circum-
'srbanJti,al evidlence', ternds to establish in any degree the 
exiJs,ternce of t;he :agre·ement and eonspira,cy alleged and 
that it was als.o erroneously admitted, and was hi~h­
ly p·rejudieial. 
Tihis include1s t:he· testtimony of D. L. Hays that 
ihe told Mr. Finch that gambling occurred in the li-
censed ~card rooms ~and tha;t Mr. Ftinoh said he knew 
it ~did !and that ·he was not going to dkJ ·anything ~about 
i·t ~and ~ave his- reaS'ons. The tes:timony of Mr. Ellett 
concerning the dis·cussion ·as ~to ~the payment of fines 
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~f book-makers so that the eity could get the bene·fit 
of the fines. The testimony ftS ~to Mr. Fin<ili that he 
didn't particularly objecl to Yice but <li.dn't \\:<tnt them 
to get :bhe best of it, and aloo ~tthat 1001 t"~o or thflee 
oooa.sions he ordered ·some ·opera~tions to close, and 
these later reopen-ed. T.ha1. he told the 'vi tness Holt he 
was making the town too hot, .and the remoV'al of Holt, 
and the -appointment and later removal of Record, and 
11he later appointment of '!'hacker; and also HQl:t 's ~tes-
.................. timony that Mr. Finch told 'him :to ·see Rosenblum and 
some of the othe-rs who operated ·places where there 
were card Tooms, at different times. And also ~the tes'"" 
tiioony of Holt in which he intimated that Mr. Finch 
had told him to quit making oollootions, but wthich sim-
mered down to the testimony that Mr. Fim.cll had told 
him to close some pl;a-ees up. The testimony of Fisher 
Harris that :Jir. Finch had stated, also in 1938, 
on two occasions that he did not believe there 
was a payoff or had not heard of a pay-off, and at 
the Alta Club that ihe said it was the fiD&t that he had 
heard of the payoff situation described and .asked how 
long it had been going on, and also Mr. Finch's willing-
ness to resign. This involves also ·the testimony of Mr. 
Hedman that he and Mr. Finch discussed in Mr. Finch',s 
office the maJtter of an arrest by HedUnan ':s departmoot 
in 1'hacker'•s department, in whidh Mr. Finch listened 
but didn't say anything. Also the testimony of 0. B. 
Record' of a similar character, .and discussion with Mr. 
"11hacker in the pres·eooe of Mr. Foinoh oonoorning ar-
rests made by ;him ·of book-makers. Also the testimony 
of 0. B. Record that he saw Rosenblum, who was a 
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bondsman, ,t,alking wrth Mr. F~inch three or four times 
but that he had no idea what they were talking about. 
T.his, in brief, show.s thiS' cl!ass of 1testimon.y as to 
Finch. 
T.her.e is .also in this ·cl•as,sification witlli relation to 
Mr. Pearce 1Jhe t-e.s:timony of Go1den Holt that in June, 
1937, he p~laeed on Mr. P1ear.ce,'s ·de.sk aprp·roximately 
$500.00 in money whi·ch he 1had collecteru fr.om houses 
of prositituti!on and 1that Mr. P·eta:vce put it im. a drawer of 
hi.H ·desk on the side that Mr. Hiarmon Wi3JS !Seruted and 
~asl{!ed rthe witne•ss Holt if ·that was all of it. Also tlhe 
1at·er testimony .of this. wi·tnes~s thlat in September or 
O·ctober of 1937 that he again wernt io Mr. Pearee'•s of-
fice ~at the instruction of Mr. Harmon .rund the·]}e was 
asl{)ed by Mr. P·eavce why he didn't ·colleCJt from certain 
girlS' 1at ·CBDtain vesid!ence's~ ; ttha t ·the place's mentioned 
by M:r. Peavce were on ·a ~slip· of pap·er which he !had. 
T1his includes also the te,stimony of Mr. Harris 
that in ms rCOnVle.r.s:atioTIJ asking for infonnation ood in 
the following telephone eonversation, Mr. P·e1arce did not 
giv;e him ·the, information he demanded. 
In ·this ·cl,as:s[fi,ootion, as to Mr. P·earce, al·s.o is t·he 
te.stimony of H. K. Reeord that in a conversation in Mr. 
Pe1a:f1ce·':s office around tJhe middle: of Ap·ril, 19·37, wlhen 
Mr. Hannon was: pres.ent, Mr. Pearce s·tated that he 
h18Jd be-en re1sponsiblje for having Re·cord placed on tfue 
vice squad and p:r:opos.ed to him that he ma~e· oolloo· 
tions, not from the hous1e's. of prostitution but from <Df· 
f.eremlt gambling pl!ace1s. 
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From the te-8tjmony here ·a~ againsi ·thes~ defend-
ants one must "~ou .. 1er llo"~,-Rfter N1e t..\xelusion of every 
hypothesis of innocence of the actual offense charged 
and under the lJa,y .as lai(l do",l in Terry YS. United 
States, ( 9 C. C.) I Fed. ( 2d) 28, that it i8 not ~sufficient 
thtat a reasQnable inference ma.y be dra.",l ~supporting 
the charge, but that Hcircumstantial evidence * * *must 
be of ·such character as to exclude eYery hypothesis but 
that of guilt of the offense imputed to ·the defendant''-
this evidence tends in any degree to support the con-
vi.cti'On of the charge of the oonspiracy and agreement 
between the defendants charged, to permit and allow 
the opemtioll!S alleged. 
It may indicate that Mr. Finch did not stop prosti-
tu.-tion, or card gambling in licensed card rooms. Tlu~re 
may be ·a difference of opinion as to whether prostitu-
iiw could or should be stopped, but there is ·certainly 
no evidence tending in the slightest degree to .show an 
agreem~nt by him with the other ~alleged conspirators to 
penmt and allow these opemtions. 
As to Mr. Pearce, if the testimony of H. K. Rec-
ord is believed ii may be inferred that he attempted to 
enter into a ;smaller tamrl different conspiracy, not to 
permit and ~allow operations but to extort money from 
some of ·them. However, this conspivacy never material-
ized, 18.Ild !it is not the one alleged. lt may further be 
claimed ·that if the testimony of Holt be believed}, it may 
he inferred that ·there was some 3J!Toangement betweoo 
him and H:armon ~a.nd Pearce in ·the lafttter part of 1937 
to extort money from thouses of prostitution. We ,s,ay, 
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if Holt's testimony may be believed, because we shall 
contend t:hat Holt was :for thi:s purpos~e 'an admitted 
accomplice and there ·was no corrolbora tion of his tes-
timony. In any ·event, this 'vould be a. smaller and a dif-
f.ere,nt ·con:spiDa1cy fl"om -that all~eged ~and one oot to 
aid pr:osrtit:ution but to ,hamp,e·r it by extortion, involv-
itng an entirely dfi.fferent agreement ·and offens~e. 
We will not ~attempt to ·cite ~all the oas~es bearing 
upon t.he que,stion of the inadmissibility and the in-suf-
ficiency of :this evidence as to ~diffe~~ent intimations 
of varilous wrong doing, but will ·Ci t:e some rece111it au-
thority wihich w·e hope will !help to emphasizH our posi-
tion. 
Wilder· vs. United Stales, 100 Fed. (2d) 
177, (10 C. C.) 
Ls ~a ~cas:e alle~ging 'a. (~onspiracy 1t.o vi·olate the Na-
:tionJaJ. Prohibition Aot. Judge BI"atton revi'e·ws :a lot of 
testimony such as we ha.ve in t~his ~cas·e indicating delfi-
nJite wrolllg doing by th.e defendants, including the sher-
iff, and ·c1ear1y sho,ving extortion of money from peo-
pl'e engaged! in t~he .stale of liquor. The opinion :S:ays:: 
'' I't was no1t. pos,sible under any conceivable 
view of ·the ·evidence for the jury to d~aw the 
im1£erence or deduction tha;t. the convers,ation and 
contacts with them ten:ded remote~y to show 
~concert of 13JCJtion ~to violate the re'Vlenue l~aws· of 
the United S ta:t~es. ' ' 
* * * * * * 
'' Vci!ewed in the light most favor1alb~e to the Gov-
ernment, no substantial ~evidence Wias~ adduced to 
:s1how tha:t ~thes-e .appellants formed a conspiracy 
or ~aided others in ·carrying out one to viol~ate ·tiDe 
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laws of the lTnitoo Statl~~ rt.~la.tiing to tlhl\ 111lall1U-
:Metur~. J><k~OO~Ion, or sale of intoxicBJting 
liqu'Or.'' 
''Laying aside the qu~~tion "·hethe-r they a.crt:ed 
toge-ther in .e~orting money from others f.or p·ro-
tootion against prosecution under the laws of the 
state or otherwU.s~ pa.rtieipa.ted in a concert of 
aoti'On to prevent t~he enforcement nf suclh laws, 
there was no sub:Sta.nti.al evidence from which it 
reasonably could be inferred -or deduced. that 
they formed or furthered am; agreement or unde.r-
standing, express or implied, having- f.or its ob-
joot and purpose th~ TI.olat.ion of the laws of the 
United States.'' 
Weniger t·s. United States, 47 Fed. (2d) 692 
(9 C. C.): 
Is a very pointed case on the point that evidence 
must point to the agreement and the particip~a:tion. wirth 
knowledge of tilie agreement ralleged before a conviction 
can be had thereon. Tllis ease in,olved bootleggers a;nid 
memberrs of the Board of Trustees ·and police office~r of 
the ·town of lrullan, Idaho, and also the County Sheriff 
Weniger 'and hi~ deputy, Blo.om. The sheriff and deputy 
appealed from the conviction. The ·offense ·oharged was 
conspiracy to violate the Kational Prohibition Act. It 
was clearly vliolated and the town ·collected from it. 
lt was shown •that ;the sheriff mingled with, protected 
and patronized the vi·olators and ·aided them against 
raids and on one oooasion arreSJted a Federal agent 
and warood him no keep out of the ·county. The· other:s 
did not appeal. 1Tihe opinion reversed the judgment of 
conviction as against -the Slheriff and his deputy. It says: 
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''The ~crime of col1lspiracy ('titl~e 18 U. S. 
Code, ·SHe. 88 (18 US~CA Sec. 88) consists in the 
~combining ·Or ~cornf:ede:rtasting 'Of two or more per-
ISOI1JS wi,th the· purpos'e of -committing ta; puhlic of-
fense. It ~~s d:tstinct f·vom the offense iDJtended to 
he ;aecomplis1hed as 1a resul:t of ~the conspiracy 
'and is ~complet.e upon the ~orming of the criminal 
agreemelflJt ana the p;erforming o.f '3Jt least one 
ov;ert act in furthe:va.noo of rt:he unlawful de,sign. '' 
(Citing 'authority). 
"THE F~AIL URE ·O·F A PERSON T·O PRE-
VEN·T THE ~CARRYTNG OUT OF A CON.SPIR-
.A!CY, EVEN TH'OUGJH HE HAIS 'THE POW-
ER 180 ·T,O D~O, WILL NO'T MAKE HIM 
GUIL·TY OF ITHE ,O,F'FENSE WITH~OUT 
FURTHER PRO·OF THAT HE HAS IN SOME 
AFFIRMATIVE WAY CO,NSENTE1D 'TO BE 
A PART·Y 'THERET~O.'' 
r.Dhe opinti!on t!hen eomments th~t the United States 
Aitorney '' relie·s l~a.rgely upon a showing of inactiolllJ on 
the p1art of the sheliiff 'Of the eounty and his deputy in 
enfor-cing the liquor Laws .a.s establishing ·Coliln:e~ction of 
these .appell~ants \viith t!he .conspi:rta,cy ~charged", and then 
points out that t:he evidence d:id 1Sihow that the sheriff 
and his deputy kno\vingly p.e,rmitted :the violation of 
both the 1Sita:te and Federal ltaw, arnldl holds that 11Jhis, was 
not suffici,ent ·to ·connect 't'hem with the iagve~ement al-
leged, the~ir m1scond uct did not show :that they we~re 
parties to the agreement all'eged. ·On :the- question of ad-
missibility of ~such evi·dence of wrongdoing, the, opilnli~n 
say;s: 
'' T.he ·cross ex,a.mination of ~appellant Bloom 
resrpecting \hi's knowledge of the prev.alency of 
gambling in Mull~an had no 'reas1onable relation 
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to ·the chta.rge b~ng inYe~tig·a.te-d * * •. The inJti-
mation ·that Bloo1n, ~ an officer, ano,ved orhhter 
form-s of la"'" violation to b~ carried. out without 
interference would tend naturally to e.roote in the 
minds of·the jury a prejudice a.gains~t him ~and his 
superior officer. These fa>e.t·s "·ere not relevant 
to the question ·as to whether •the appell~ant ha.d 
engaged in the conspiracy • • • . '' 
Dono·vam r~. [inited States. 54 Fed. (2d) 193: 
Is a g'OOd case on th:e sufficiency of the evidence and 
of the necessity that it point to the guilt 'Of the· offense 
charged and n'Ot other wrongdoing. 
Previously Wells and Beals were convicted under 
a liquor charge. Defendant Donovan and Wells and 
Beals and R.ossiter, an attorney, and one Pat:r.one were 
here chlarged with ·a OOilliSpiracy to conceal ·a pe~son f!OT 
whose arrest a warront .had been li.ssued, by concealing 
his true identity ·and by obstructing and impeding the, 
United ,State-s. What taciually ·happened was that when 
it came to the sentence on ra plea of guilty of a lesser 
dharge, the defendants substituted Patrone for W·el1s 
and Patrone was sentenced, 'standing up with Beals: who 
knew what the arrangement was. They were all coiit-
victoo 1and: the appeal is by Beals an~ Rossliter, the at-
torney who represented Wells and Beals and who mas 
present and pleaded Beals and Patrone, who were 
sentaooed. The court held that Beals knew of the ·ar-
r.angement; that it was not .s·hown 11hat he was instru-
mental in bringing about the 1agroement ; that he had 
full knowledge and stood mute, and that this was mt 
sufficient. 
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'The main diseus:sion !then turne-d ·to Attorney Ros-
siter. Ros,siter had ·taken Wells and Beals. ·out of jail on 
bail, ~then f·or a peri:od of time was away and did illtot 
repres-ent :them. AttorneJiS in 1a.nother town 1arra.nged 
with the prose~cutors ror ·these two defendants to make 
t:he plea ·of guilty on a lesser ·charge. Rossiter returned 
and me~t W eUs and B:eals rullld Patrone at the court house 
with ~some clients of his in other ·cases. Wells did 
not g~o before the court, but R·ossiter took in Patrone 
~and Beals~ in thi1s cas~e and two 'O'r three other c1i·ents in 
utheT ~cruse's. When this ~ease "W!a.s ealled thes~e defendamrts 
S'tood up and he represented them ·and 'they pleaded and 
were sentenced.. The 'bail money put up by Wells was 
then withdrawn 'and Rossiter went to lunch in a hotel 
room with Wells and Donovan and the other attorneY'S 
and there it was testified that Rossiter s:a.id, "We have 
put it ·over." The bail money wrus the~re divided. The 
opimtion re·versHd the case as ·to Rossiter, holding that 
he undoubtedly knew of this substitution but under t,he 
rule of evi·den~ce it .could not be inferred .that he wa·s a 
party ~to the agreement to make this su bs1titution. The 
Opill10n 1Sa.JIS : 
"BEING AN ATT·ORNEY-AN OFFI~CER 
OF THE C·OURT-IT W AiS UNQUESTION-
ABLY RO·SSITER'S DUIT·Y TO APPRI~SE 
THE C:OURT O:B, THE FRAUD. YET, IN RE-
VIEWIN·G HI·S TRIAL, WE ARE NOT il)EAL-
IN·G WITH OFFI~CIAL D·U·TY, PROFESSION-
AL ET·HI~C~S, OR MORALS. WE ARE COLDLY 
CON·CER.NED WITH IT·HE LAW TO BE AP-
PLIED T10 :THE F ACT:S AND WITH THE 
P·ERMISSIBLE INFERENCES OF GUILT TU 
THE EX!CLUSJON OF EVERYTHING ELSE. 
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IF THE F.A.llTS ,,.ERE EQlT.ALLY ~USCEP­
TIBLE OF INFEREN0ES OF INNOCENCE-
INN{1-CENCE IK R.ESPECT TO THE SPE-
CIFIC OFFENSE FOR. ''THICH HE 'VAS ON 
TRIAL-THAT DISPOSES OF THE ~IAT­
·TER, Graceffo Y. l:nited Statt.~s, (C. C. A.) 46 
Fed. (2d) 852, 853. FINDING IN THIS REC-
·OR.D NO SlTBSTANTIAL EVID-ENCE OF 
FACTS WHICH EXCLUDE EVERY OT'HE•R 
HYPOTHESIS TH.AX THAT OF GUILT, WE 
.ARE COKSTRAIXED TO HOLD THE EVI-
DENCE DOES KOT SUST.A.IN ROSSITER'-S 
CO~TVICTION. '' 
ComJnonzcea.Ztlz ~·s. Benz, 178 Atl. 390, (1935-
Pa-.): 
A oonspira.cy was alleged to defraud the oounty by 
nsing gasoline procured on county orders. for private 
use. The oourt renews the showing in the ·evidence of 
irregularities, some use of publie gas thy individual de-
fendants and their families, failure t·o enter -orders., etc., 
and points out that s-ome of the thirn1gs dlone were im-
proper and irregnJ..ar. The opinion reversing the convic-
tion ·says: 
''The charge of com piracy i1s easily maJde. 
Mere suspicion and possibility of guiliy connec-
tions is rroot to be received as proof in such oases. 
* * * A f-oundation must fiTst be laid by proof 
sufficient to establish the unlawful agreement be-
tween the parties. The connection being thus 
,shown, the subsequent oots in purs113.IOOe of .that 
.agreement are then original evidence against 
them. But the ·subsequent ·acts are immaterial and 
are not compentent until the ~agreemelnlt is -estaro-
lished (citing authorities·.) T'he g:m¥amen of the 
conspi:t"acy all·eged lies in ·the agreement with 
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~criminal intelllt to def:r1aud ~the county; ftailure 
rto p~vove the agree·ment with s.uch imltent defeats 
·the charge (~citing au1Jhoritie1s). * * * The Com-
monwealth thus failed to show any combination, 
certainly failed to prove an unlawful combina-
tion, and such failure defeats the conspiracy 
1alleged. * * * The f,acts and ~civcumstamtees must 
not only be ~consis1tent with and point to ~the guilt 
of the accus~ed; but ~they must b~ inconsis~tent with 
'his innocence. (Citing authorities).'' 
Da~vidson vs. United States, 61 l?ed (2d) 
250, (8 C. C.): 
1Thi,s. caSJe indi~crut·es Wlh·erein the eVidence here is in-
sufficient. ·T;he eonspir~acy ~ooarged was one between Da-
vidson, Brummell and W~eber, d-efendants, and tw<> oth-
~er indti.viduaLs, Gillette a1nd Latimer, to violate the Na-
tiol)!al M1ortoT V·ehicle ·Theft Act and on IS:econd count 
~<to transport the stolen motor vehicle ·and on the third 
'count to knowingly receive and store, etc., a certain car 
knowing it to be stolen. 
Tlhe dris,cus~sion on the ap·p·eal relates to Davidson 
and B·rummell, ~constable and deputy constable in 'a tnwn 
in Missouri. ·The ear was stolen in ~Oklahoma, stored in 
Kansas City, M·o., and afte:nvards delivered by Gillette 
to DaviJdson and Brummell, who sold the car, as the 
opinion isa.ys, knowing that it was a stolen car. They told 
the 'buyer that it had been pieke:d up and held f.or a 
long p~eriod of time and was he·ing s·old unde~r aiilJ order 
of the Jus:tice of the Peace to pay the charges, and ~they 
is,sued a cons,tahle '·s bill of s,ale ,so ilhat the buyer could 
get official ti,tl'e'. They 'a1so tol~d the same story to the 
go¥ernment insp·ector, ~and afterward admitted that it. 
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was false ·and ·tha:t they "'l'\re S(\llin~ the r~1 r f.or them-
selves upon :the solicitation of Gillette "mo ha.d stated 
that it was a hot ca.r s.tolalll from an Indil(Ul. Thfl opin-
lon, reYersing the conviction~ sa~~s: 
''Of coursE\ it is apparent that Davidsom1 a.nd 
Brummell kne"· that they "\Yere :handling 'a so-
ealled '' h()t '' car, and that they adopted this plJan 
-of issuing a constable ',s bill of ·S'ale in order to 
sustiaiD apparent tiJtle in the hands of the pur-
chaser. The oonclusion is irresistible that both 
Davidson and Bummell prosti,tuted their official 
position as offieers in furtherance of a sche-me to 
dispose of a car t.hat they knew to be sfulen.'' 
* * * * * * * 
''One may suspect or conjecture that D!avidson 
and Brummell were :acting as ''fences'' for stol-
en cars transported in interstate commeree in 
pursance to some conspiracy, but the evidence 
will mot justify such a conclusion. The evidence 
1.vould zoarrant the veiw that these defendants, 
Davidson and BrummeU, conspired with Gillette 
to sell a stolen car, but that conspiracy is not 
the one charged in. the indictment.'' 
''The subterfuge employed by these defendants 
in disposing of tbi'S car by issllii,ng a constable's 
bill of 1sale, andi the false statements mad·e rto the 
officens with reference to the matter, strongly in-
fer that they knew that they were handling a 
stolen car; but such circumstances cann<>t sup-
plant the absence ·of testimony or circumstance 
connecting .these defendants· with the conspiracy 
charged in tbi1s indictment.'' 
Young vs. United States, 48 Fed. (2d) 26: 
Is a cas·e in point in the matter of .sepamte mis-
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conduct of ·defendants. in 1a eornspir,a:ey ca·s,e, even thougili. 
their conduct may relate ~to the charge, a.s not prov-
ing the ~agrHement. 
Here s·ix defendants were charged and conveioted 
of a ·conspir'acy to possess and .sell utE~nsils fo-r boot-
legging 1and ralSro substances, including corn ehops, sugar, 
~and -ot1her mate.rials. T:he· Government proved that .h\~o 
of them .sold wholesale these· things and delivered them 
to two other defendants who had 1adjoining stores with 
an ellltra.nee between, and that the·se ·two ~diefendants 
s·old the·m to customers. for us.e, ·the .cus~tomers including 
the orthe·r ~two defendants. eonvri:cted. The ·court points 
out that no connection was shown between the customers 
and the wholes1ale sellevs and no 1agreement as alleged 
shown be~tween any of them. ·T:he opinion s~ays. 
''The conviction of the selleDs ·canmnot be sus-
rbained on the ground :that t!hey had knowledg'e 
of the· intention of ·the purchaHers to use· the ~sugar 
rand other artic.le·s in conne~ction with the uruaw-
ful manufacture ·of liquor. ·One ·cannot be held 
as ·a member of a conspiraey upon proof merely 
that he had knowle·dge of, or nega1tively ac-
quies,ced in, a ·Crime that was a/bout to be oom-
mi·ttedl; but, in orde·r to :ra1s:t·ffill guilt upon one ac-
cused of being a ·coconspirator, it i~s neces~sary to 
prove that he ~aet~ve~ly participated in the con-
·Spir.a~cy ·Charged. Bishop's Criminal Law (9 Ed.) 
Sec. 633; 5 R. :C. L. 106:5; McD~aniel v. United 
States, (C. C. A.) 24 F. (2d) 303. There was no 
evidence that Lee Frankltin and ~Campbell were 
' ' actim1g in ~concert; foT· rail tlhat ~app:ears, ~each \\18S 
acting only for .himserlf. The colllspiracy charged 
w:rus not proved ~against any of the ap~pellants." 
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12 Corpus Juris 5-!3, Pa.ra. ;), Sec. ~: 
·~To constitute ·a. ~onspirnry -t-ht:rP n1nst be 
unity of design and puq)o~e, for the caJu 111on d~­
sig·n is of the esse~u·e of the conspiracy. The con-
federating together is so nece-ssary a!s a. consti-
tuent element of the crime, tha:t it has been held 
that seYeral pers.ons mtay, simultaneously, ac-
tually do, without ineurring liability t·o puni.sh-
ment, that "-hich if it ,yere the object of a pre-
concerted de-siga although m~ot d<>ne or attempt-
ed, would render the participant's Hable to indict-
ment for conspiracy; nor zci.Zl e1.·i.dence that each 
of sereral defendants acted illegally or malici-
ously zcith the sanze end in 1.~ieu: support a charge 
of conspiracy, 1.1;nless it appears that such acts 
zt·ere d_o-ne pursuant to a Jnufual agreement." 
12 Corpus Juris 551: 
"Tthe overt act, when es•sential to a convic-
tion of conspiracy must be a sulbHequent inde-
pendent act following the cOOl!spira.cy and must 
be one committed .to effect the object there:of. '' 
united States vs. Corso, 10 Fed. (2d) 604, 
(9 C. C.): 
It was held that evidence that one .accused} cashed 
a check obtained from the victims by ·other~s who w-ere 
eng.aged in tand convicted of w.hat WJas called an ''eye 
fraud", ·and also deposited checks fior collection in a 
lbank whi-ch forwarded the items :through United States 
mails, was insufficient ,to sustain a convictioo againsrt 
·him for conspiring Wlitili. others ·to use the mails- ~to de-
fraud, in the ''tabsence of evidence that 1accus~ec] hOO 
knowledge of fraudulent scheme at time he ·eashed check 
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or that it was a p!art of .a seheme of other~s that mails 
should be used. '' 
United Sta.tes vs. Gr·ossmatn, 55 Fed. (2d) 408: 
The ~charge was that Gros:sman tas chief of police 
,of the City ·of Long Beach, and other perso!IltS, agreed 
to give protection to violation of the prohibition law. 
·The court, after di1s-cussing the elements of conspiracy, 
~said: 
''However, before the oveTt act can be tak-
en into ·conside:vation, it must be found that the 
defendant·s wefle parties to the •conspiracy. The 
overt act must be entirely imiliependent of the 
conspiracy. It must not be one of a series of acts 
constituting 1the agreement, but it must \be a sub-
s!eque·nt, indep,endent ·act following a complete 
agreement or ·conspirocy :and t.emd .to oarry into 
·effe:ct the obj-ect of the original ~agreement.'' 
Turcott vs. United Sta.tes, 21 Fed .. (2d) 829, 
(7 C. C.): 
Here several persons were eharged with conspiracy 
to viol,ate the F·edeml Prohilbition Law. The opinion 
s.ays: 
'''The law is "\Vell settled tihat active P'artici-
pation mus·t be e~stablis!hed. Mere knowledg·e of 
illegal acts of others· is not ·suffici·ent. '' 
Langer vs. United States, 76 Fed. (2d) 817, 
(8 C. C.): 
ls a ease revevsimg .a convicti·on for .conspiracy to 
·corrupt ·the admini,s.tr.a.tion of certain laws of ·Congress 
rela:ti:ve to relief funds. It was ~claimed .that the defend-
ant politi·cal party workers .agve•ed to a plan to oompel 
•and ooeroe ol·erks and employee1s. engaged in dishurs-
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ing the relief footls to eontribute to tlu'\ political w·orker~s 
and their political funds. The o-pinion n1nkPs a di-sttinc-
tion that we haYe atte1upted to 1nake beh\.,t:\Pn substan-
tive offenses ;and a mere ehargll of eL'n-spi racy. The opin-
ioo s~ys: 
''Th'e gist of the offense is the alleged con-
spiracy to obstruct the adminisf rafi.on of a gov-
ernment fu.nctio·n ... It is not claimed that the overt 
acts charged in thems~lYes eonstitute substan-
tive offenses. U nles.s t-here "\'\'":as such a conspiracy 
the conviction o()f appellant oo.nnot be sustained. 
Whatever "~e may think of the ethics or proprie-
ty of the pl'W}tice employed by appelaJillt to se-
cure f1mds for political purposes, it is not a mat-
ter of concern to the got~ernment unless some 
lawful fu'nCtion was thereby obstructed. * * * 
* * * So far as the direct ewdence of any plan of 
conspira.cy for the collection of fl1'nds is con-
cerned, it was confined to ass:essment of state 
employees.'' 
Tthe government contended that a. conspimcy may 
be inferred from the overt acts 6f the parties~, it being 
shown that one of them solicited cl'erks in the Emergen-
ey Relief office. But the court said, that gra;nting that 
this was done, it was no proof of an agreement to do 
this. 
People vs. Brawn, 88 P(J;C. ( 2d) 728: 
ItS cited h'ere more particularly upon the point that 
the introduction of these alleged matter,s of miscon-
duct by individual defendants separately BJS evidence 
against all, not only did IIlJOi tend t·o sustain :tthe con-
viction but was prejudicial ·error. ·The case has ~a good 
discussion on cor.robo:ration of ·an accomplice·. 
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·On the point now under consideration amd under 
the indli·ctm.ent for roblbery, particip·ation of different 
de:fendant1s in different robberies w'rus im,troduced. Not 
all of the· defendant's partieip1ated in the.se, so that it 
could not he for ·the purpos.e of .showing a~ssociation be-
tween the a;lleg~ed eonsp~ra:tor.s. The ·appellant was shown 
to have p·arti~cipa:ted .imr one. 
''Timely obje-ctions and appropriate motions 
rto ·s,trike were made on behalf ·of app:ell!ant, and 
this testimony should ih.Jave been limited by the 
•cou~t in i~ts appliooti,on to the defendlants who 
p·articipated: in 'the re·spoective robherie'S, amd 
1ilierefore ·should have been -eX!cluded a:s to the ap-
P'e'll!ant, ~ex·ceprt in the Dairy case, in connection 
with whi·ch there. was competent evidence· of ap-
pellant's participation. 
''That ithis line of testimC){lliY was prejudicilal 
to ap'P'ell,ant ·cannot he questioned and is evi-
denced by the fact that Mr:s. Ann Groves, one of 
·the defendant's w.hose participati,on im1 the Beehive 
·Cafe robbery was akin ·to that of .appellant, Wla's 
acquitted, while the lrutter was convieted. M:ore-
OV1er, •and in conneetion with this type of evidJence, 
the eourt if a retrial i1s had should be careful 
to insitruct the· jury that the defemdants are on 
trial solely for the offenses ·Charged in the in-
form~ti·on, to-wit, mu~der .and .attempted murder, 
alleged ·to have be·en .oommi,tted on March 21, 
1938, a,s ·set forth in the inftorm:ation, 1and are not 
.em tri·al for ·conspiracy, nor for ~any offens·es odl-
·er than the ones ·Clharged in the informati,on;" 
TESTIMO·NY UNDER CLASSIFICATION ( 4): 
We come now to the offer of declarations by some 
pef!son with reference to a defendant. It i~s our posi-
I I I I I 
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tion that any ~uch declai"~1 ti.on "-ns inad1ni~~~ilble until 
the conspiracy w·as other"-i~t"\ establishetl, and t.ha:t ·such 
evidence could in no 'Yay be ·adnlit'tt.~i :to establish it . 
.r.Dhiis evidence was introduce-d by "-itne-gs "-ho testi-
fied that one of t.he defendant~, or .a. third peDson, had 
made a statement to the witnes·~ -wi.th rellaJtion to an-
other alleged defendant. ~lr. Hunsaker testified: that 
Mr. Erwin had said, ~ 'I now ·ha Ye my ohlief of poli~ce'' and 
that he might not be getting his full split from the chief 
and that th~y couldal•'t get the chief because he didn~t 
make the collections. Holt testified that Harmon in 
1938 made ta statement to him that Fisher Harris and 
Mr. Lee :had aooused ~r. P·earee of being in-\nolved in 
collecti{)ns. The "Witness Kempner said that Abe Stu-
beck had told him that Harmon was dividirrr.g the money 
collected with Erwin and his crowd. '!'here was also an 
intimation in the testim-ony of H. K. Record thai Mr. 
Pearce claimed he was authorized by Mr. Erwin to ar-
range for making collections from gamblers. 
Assuming that these had related to .the offeiDISe 
charged, Wibich they did not, still,adm.ission of this char-
acter of evidence must rest upon 1ilie theory of agency . 
.A!s stated by the cases, a conspiracy is a pafltne·~ship 
in crime, :and a statement of one caDflllOt be used against 
another until the relation is established. It goes wiilbout 
~&aying that the statements· alleged to have been made 
by Mr. Thacker to Fisher Rarri.s abourt Mr. Fin~h are 
definitely out because Thacker was ,acqui,tted of being 
a COOlJSpirator. 
We will now discus·s this question of f:oundation, 
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and the ·cases go both to the state·ments of alleged con-
sp[ra tor1s ·and also 1t:0 the strutements ·of third peDsons 
about alleged ·eonspirato:Ds, and also to the conduct of 
alleged} ·eoiiJspirators~ .as lbeitllig binding upon other.s. Some 
of the authorities therefore overlap classification (3), 
:above. 
16 Corpus Juris 647, para. 1287: 
''PRO·OF OF C10NSPIR.AlCY- a. NEC-
ES1SlTY. In order that t·he act~s or dec1arations 
~of an ane,ged {~onspir:ator may be admi~s·sible 
ag.ainst an alleged •co~conspi:rtaJtor the existence of 
rthe •Conspiracy must be .s-hown ; it a1s1o must be 
shown that the ·def.endrul1!t 1against whom the evi-
dence is offered was. 'a p~arty to ~such conspioocy. 
the same ru1e app·lies rto acts· and declamtions 
of one ·Charged ·as .an •aider or abetter of de-
fendant. ' ' 
The cas~es on this 1are too numerous to cite in full. 
T~he principle is S10 well established th:at we will colllfine 
oul"selv·e·s. to .some of .the pHrtinent ·authoritie•s. 
Not only ean s.uch .statements not establish the 
agency or the .cons-piracy, but if the sam·e were estab-
lished, such 'S'tatem,ents anet .eonduct o.f alleged conspi-
:vatorrs ·can o~nly ihe introduced as aDe made or done in 
furtheliance of the ~conspiracy. In other 'vords, they 
are not binding unle1s:s. within the scope of the agency 
or authority. 
Witherow vs. Mystic Toilers, 130 Pac. 5S 
( Ut. 1913) : 
' . 
''Of eours.e agency cannot be shown by dec· 
Lar.ations of ·the ·agent. And, before declarations 
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of the ~agent 1nay be rPee-iYL"\,d n·~ ~l~tln1i~·~ions 
against his principal, the ng-enc.y and the author-
ity of the agent nntsf first be sho1cn. Hen\ neith·er 
was shown. Xor is it true, as the eonrt ~t'enl:S. to 
indicate in the charge, that de·elara1ion~ of an 
.a.geD~t to sho"~ •agency, go merely to the question 
t()f sufficiency of the eYidence to sho"T such rela-
tion, ·and hene.e may be considered for such rela-
pose, in connection "~ith other evidence. The au-
thorities, we think, are to the effect that such evi-
dence is inco'lnptent for such purpose, and that 
the fact of agenc11 m u.st be establ i~~h ed by evi-
dence dehors the declaraf-ioJl.S of the agent.'' 
Looney t·s. Bingha,rn Da1:ry, 282 Pac. 1030 
(Ut. 1929): 
Is a case in. which it was held that admissions by 
a1n ·alleged partner were improperly admitted because 
nQt made in. pursuit of any partnership business or 
while he was acting for or on behalf of the partnership. 
the opinion says, at page 1033: 
"We think the contention is well founded. 
Tthe rnle is that th-e admissions of one ·copartner 
:lint respect to :the joint business are competent 
18.g13.illst the firm and its members, but to render 
such admissions competent he must be acting as 
a partner about a partnership matter, or the Hd-
mission must be made in rel·ation to ma;tters with-
in the soope of the partnefiS'hip·. 1 Ency. Evideooe 
p. 579; 22 C. J. 403; 1 Elliott on Evidence 369! 
2 Jones, Comms. Qn Evidence (2d Ed.) 1712. T!he 
rule is w·ell. illustrated .and stated in :the oo.;g,e of 
State v. Salmon, 216 Mo. 466, 115 S. W. 1106. '' 
Smith vs. State, 171 S. E. 578: 
In this conspiracy ·case ·conversatiomis with var1oU1s 
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defendants and others were admitted, and the- case was 
vHve~sed beoa use the eons.piracy had not ibeen otherwise 
·established. It also des~cuss-es the ·point that ·Some of the 
alleged !admissions \vere af!ter the ·conspiracy had Hnded.. 
The op~nion ·s·ay's: 
''declarations and acts of individuals cannot be 
introduced aga.inst the defendant for the pu.rpose 
of proving a conspiracy, but that such 1nust be 
shown aliunde to render such declarations admis-
sible as declarations of co-conspirators, and quot-
]Il!g from Wall v. State, 152 ·Ga. 318, 112 S. E. 
142, 146 : 'No man's connection with a conspiracy 
can be legally established by what the others did 
in his absence arnd without h'is knowledge a1~d 
concurrence.' ('Citing U. S. v. Babcock, 24 Fed. 
:C·as. 1913, No. 14487.) 
The court further .s~tated: 
''The Supreme Court of c~alifonnia .s~aid: 'IT:o 
admit sueh de·clarations 1and such hear~say te·sti-
mony in proof of the conspiracy itself, would in 
civil matters ''put every 1narn to the mercy of 
rogues.'' * * * and in charges of .criminal conspir-
acy, render the innocent am:d helpless victims of 
villainous sche1nes, supported and proved by the 
prearranged arnd ma:nufa.ctured evidence of the 
p1·o1noters thereof.' P.eople v. Irwin, 77 :Cal. 494, 
20 P. 56. Again, it has ibeen said: 'A spe-cies or 
form of evidence \Vhich is in its nature inadmisi-li-
ble, unl~ess s:ome prior or other faet is proved, can-
not be. received to establish the fact proof of which 
i~s an iiilidisp,ensable ·condition of i·ts. own admissi-
bility.' Cuyler v. M·eOartney, 40 N. Y. 221; Id. 
33 Barb. 165. Tthe ~criminal ·conspiracy cannot be 
Slhown by declar~ation.s of alleged con'S'pirators, 
not in the presence of, ~and without the knowl-
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edge of, vtJH.:~:rs sought to :be boumd thereby, but 
must be e~tablished by aliunde proof ·sufficient 
to establish prima facie the faet of ennsph·acy 
between the pa:rties. '~ 
State t·s. Hopkins. ~19 Pac. 1106 (1llon.t.): 
Here the sheriff Hvpkins, \\ilsQn, the chief of pol-
ice, and Bennett. a pool ·hall opera.tor, ""ere involved. 
Bennett oontraeted \Yith a boot-legger, B·arroch, to buy 
$1600.00 w-orth of liquor. The boot-legger, who testi-
fied for the ·state, drQve the liqu-or around back <>f the 
ihotel near the pool hall where he met Bennett. Hopkins 
tand Wilson were there ''ith guns and they took him, 
al~ng with his party, and lookedl·t.hem in jail; they al1so 
took the liquor. The~- kept the liquor ·and turmed the 
prisoners loose and told them to get out of town and 
never issued any eomplaints .against them. Bennett 
went with them to the jail. The sheriff made no re-
turn Oil! the liquor sized. Conversations between Bar-
rooh and Bennett were introduced involving the sheriff 
and chief of police. The opinion said: 
''It is ran elementary general rule that a de-
fendant in a criminal case cannot be bound by 
conversations between -third parties· not in his 
presence, hence the rnlingH permitting Barroch 
to testify to the conversations he ha;d with Ben-
nett were prima facie erroneous. An exception 
to the general rule, as well esta;blished as the rule 
itself, permits evidence of the a·cts and decLara-
tions of a coconspirator done or made in furth-
er31IlJCe of a common design to be .admitted 
against tall the other parties to the conspiracy, 
whether the ~acts or decl:arations. were done or 
made in their pres·enoo or with their knowledge, 
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provi,ded only that they were done or made dur-
ing the life of the -conspiracy (,State v. Allen, 34 
Mont. 403, 87 P~ac. 177), but the evidence of such 
acts of ·de~clara;tions· is admis·sible only after 
·proof of the ~existence of the ·Conspiracy, ( Subdiv. 
6, ·para. 10531, 1and ·para. 11977, Rev. Code's 1921; 
State v. Dotson, 26 Mont. 305, 67 p,ac. 938). 
'' TheTe is not any pretense herH tha.t the 
·exist,ence of a ·conspiracy between Hopkins, Wil-
~s<m and Bennett. had been .shown .a:t the time· the 
objectionable evidence was admitttedJ; and the 
only evi,dence introduced at any tim~e tending to 
P':fiO¥e the exi,S'tenoe ·of such a conspiracy is that 
B·ennett contra:cted to purchase the liquor from 
Barroeh; ·that he was prels·oolt when Hopkins and 
Wilson took the liquor from Barroch; that he ~ac­
companied Wilson, Barroch, an~d Harrold to the 
~city jail, and was pre.s1en t there when Barrooh 
~and H!arrold were released f-rom custody. 
' 'A conspiracy i1s' cons1ti. tut~ed by an agree-
ment, :and is a partnership im1 ~criminal purpo'ses. 
United 'States v. Kiss;el, 218 U. ,s. 601, 31 Sup. 
Ct. 124, 54 L. Ed. 1168. While it is not es,sential 
that the agreement !between the parties· should 
be formal, it is nHces.s:ary ~that their minds. meet 
understandingly, ·so as . .to bring about oo intelli-
gent 'and ~delibe:ria.te agreement: to do the ~acts .. 12 
c. J. 544." 
Thom.as vs. United States, 57 Fed. (2d) 1039: 
Is a eaHe which so ~cle:arly 1s1tates the principl~es ·~re 
·contended for, and ·cite's the authorities. in ·support. there-
of in the followiiillg three paragrap·hs, ~that we quotP 
the opinion ·and ~call the attention of the court specifical-
ly to ·each separate paragraph quoted: 
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(1) ''To rende-r e,~ideiH.•e of thl\ acts or 
declarations of an allege·d conspirator ndtnis,sible 
against an alleged co-conspirator. the existence of 
the consp·ira.cy tnu.st be shou·n and the cofllnec-
tion of the latter there~uith establi~~hed. Pope v. 
United States, (C. ~c . .6.-\.. 3) ~89 F. 31~, 315; Kel-
ton v. United States, (·C. C. A. 3) 2H4 F. 491, 
495; lsenhouer '· United St~tes, (C. C. A. 8) 256 
F. 842; United States '· Goldberg, 7 Biss. 175, 
Fed. Cas. No. 15,223; United States Y. Mcl{ee, 
2 Dill. 551, Fed. Cas. No. 15,686; Burns v. United 
States, (C. C . .6.~. 8) 279 F. 982, 986; Dolan V. 
United States, (C. C. A. 9) 123 F. 52; 
Stager '·United States (C. ·C. A. 2) 233 F. 510. 
(2) "Declarations made by one conspirator 
to anDther are not co 1npetent evidence to esOOJb-
lish the connection Df a third ·person with the COIID-
spiracy. Kuhn v. United States, (C. ·C. A. 9) 26 
F. (2d) 463; L"nited States v. McKee, Supra. 
(3) "The existence of the co'YIASp~racy 
charged cannot be established against an alleged 
conspirator by evidence of the acts or declara-
ti-ons Df ·his alleged eo-conspirator done or made 
in his ab-sence. Hauger v. United States, (C. C. 
A. 4) 173 F. 54, 57; United .states v. Richarill3, 
{D. C. Neb.) 149 F. 443; Uni·ted States v. Gold-
berg, supra, United States v. McKee, ,supra.'' 
Stager v. United States, 233 Fed. 510 (2 
C. C.): 
1s a leading case upon the questions under d]scus ... 
·sion . .Stager was employed ·as an examiner of merchan-
dise at the appraiser's stores in the 'Cust'Oms House 
in New York. He and his clerk were the only ones who 
had access to the invoice Vialuations and the appraisals. 
He WaJS aoous~ed of oollllspiring with certain dealem in 
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~mported quill's 'and: of defrauding the Government by 
colluding with and f,avoring the firm of ·Sciama & Co. 
Evide·nce was introduced that he condemned the quills 
of others .and ·sugges,ted that orders ror such may roo 
filled by th]s particular firm. Silva, who was another 
dJealrer, wrus also alleged to be in the com1spiracy and it 
was found tha;t ·Silva had confidential information from 
the defendant Stager, which Silva di·sclosed to Soiama. 
Another importer of quills, claimed 1Jhat Stager objected 
to him, that he was· bringing in quills too cheap. An-
other deal~er, 'as ·sta;ted, had had his quills condemned. 
When a 'subpoena wag SJerved upon ·Silva to appear 
before the grand jury 1Stager wrus followel<t and he went 
to :Silva ''s. place. The officers p·rocured lett·e-r~s from Silva 
to ·Seiama, w;bich were very damaging, and ,Stager did 
not record his visit to :Silva immediately in a book, as 
was the cus~tom when he visited importers. 
'T'he ~court s1aid .tha,t the ·conduct ·of Stager in comnec-
ti'On with Silva. 'ce~rrt:Jainly arous~ed 1Suspieion. The letter 
of Silva to Sciama was ~admitted and this wa1s very 
dtamaging, reciting .am·ong othBr things tha,t ".the two 
hundrelcb doll:ars to 18 tager are we·ll placed and we will 
have to give ·him more at the ·end of the year, if he 
·contim!lleSr to keep us informed p~roperly. '' 
The opinion says : 
'' Wh,en a rCOilJSp,iracy is once· establis,hed aot.s 
and 1adnrission:s: of iany one of the conspirators 
in pur.suam.oo of the (~onspiracy and while it is 
continuing, are 'admi,s.sihle again's't the others, upon 
the theory 'that the consp[r,atons are agents f()r 
one another in the· common enterpri'S'e. Ooruru. 
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Mutual Life InB. Co. Y. Hilln1an. 188 U. S. :218, 47 
L. Ed. -!-16. * * * 
''But the prelhnina.ry queBtion \vhether suf-
ficient evidence of a. oon~pii'!Rcy has 1been ad-
ducedl m.u'-~t td.zrays be am~stPered by the court in. 
the affirrna,tive, or the general rule of eviJen.ce 
excluB,ing hearsay zcz~U ·re-nder atz. adtnission of 
one of the co1z-spirators inadmissible against the 
others. Inasmuch as we do not think the exis~tence 
of a COOIBpiraey Wlas established these letters were 
wholly incompetent and inadmissible as agaillls.t 
Stager." 
The opinion then recites that the evidence outside 
of the letter was not sufficient to establi'Sh the coll'spir-
,acy, and then with relation to the letter, said: 
"If S'lteh a letter is competent, a conspiracy co'ldd. 
be proved by the mere letter of one man that 
another was iJnplicated. The very object of the 
rule against hea-rsa;y was to prevent a jury from 
bei-ng influenced by statements of persons who 
coUld not be subjected to cross-examination.'' 
~ * * * * * 
''The facl is, the incompetent letters wer~e 
the basis of the judgment of conviction, whieh 
fDr the foregoing reasons must be revertS'eki '' 
State vs. Paden, 202 N. W. 105 (Ia.) : 
This is a good ease where conJduct attributed to 
rsome of the conspirators in the nature of overt -acts was 
admitted over objection without estaJblisfhing the agree-
ment between the three defendants charged, and with-
out connecting the appellant Paden with the overt acts. 
·T.he case arose out of industrial trouble between the 
operators and the :m.tanager of a theatre. A stink bomb 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
100 
was exploded in the theatre and simultaneously in an-
other rthe·a tre electric light rund power wires were cut, 
e'tc. T.his ·evidence after being received was, ·stricken by 
the ·court. The opinion said: 
''A consptiracy ne·ces1sarily :imwolves two per-
sons, and neither the~ nature nor the ess·ence of 
the erimH can be esrba bJi.s:hed hy the acts or doo-
l.al'la·tions of one (~onspir.ator in tthe ahsemce and 
without the knowledge· and ·concurrence of the 
other. * * * The ~comp·etency of .such teistimony i~ 
de~pendent on .a p!rope·r foll'Illdation having been 
laid. In other words, a p·rima facie ·ease of con-
spira~cy mus1t be :estahli,shed. '' 
1Tihe ·court then 1says fhiat .the ·order of evidence to 
.some extent i~s in ·the ·dis~cretion of the trial oou~t, but, 
however, t1he lbetter p·ractice is to require a p~rima facie 
.showing of ·conspiracy befor•e receiv]ng ISUJch eviidlence. 
~citing 35 L. R. A. (NS) 1084). The opinion then says that 
if :such judieial dis:eretion in the order of evidence i·i 
abused, "we will nO't he1sita.te to re-verse". 
The opinion then says that the evidence re•ceived 
.and .strickoo: was ''toxic in ·character'' and it is beyond 
muman pos:s~bilirty that the mind 'Of the jury wa:s not 
influenced the.reby and that the .striking of the ·evidence 
did not .cure the p·r'ejudice resulting from its improper 
rudlmis,sion. 
State vs. Carlson, 22 Pac. (2d) 143 (Ida.): 
The defendrunts were ·charg.ed wi•th ·conspiracy to 
commit forge'ry. In an attempt to p:vove the ~conspiracy, 
.s;tatements of Oarlson, one of the alleged conspir~to~, 
made when the ·other dref·en~dant, Bentley, wtas not pres-
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ent were offered and rPC.eiYed in ~Yidence. ·Th~ r.ourt held 
that it was not admissible. 
"unless the evidence esta.bHshe.s the fnct that 
the appellantJS ""e-re acting in concert in the conl-
mission of the- crime charged. We do not consid-
er the evidence snff'icient to establi-sh such fact . 
... -\.11 of the evideooe tending to connoot B€ntley 
mth the crime is .sufficient to ereate a strong :sus-
picion -of guilt, but ~hat is not •suffici·ent ·to sup--
port conviction. The evidence ",.a.s circumstan-
tial, and, in order .to sustain a conviction basHd 
S{)}ely on circumstantial evidence, 'the cireum-
stance·s must 1be c.onsistent with the guilt -of the 
defendant and inconsistent With his innocence, 
and incapable of explanation on any other reason-
able hypothesis than that of his guilt.' Brosihears 
v. State, 17 Okl. Cr. 19:2, 187 P. 254, 256. 
'If the eviden-ce can be roooneiJ.ed ·either with 
1Jhe theory o.f inarocence or of guilt, the law re-
quires that the theory of innocence be OO'Opted.' 
State v. )larcoe, 33 Idaho 284, 193 P. 80; State 
v. Burke, 11 Ildlaho 420, 83 P. 228; State v. Sor-
enson, 37 Idaho 517, 216 P. 727." 
People vs. Linde, 20 Pac. (2d) 704, (Cal.): 
Here the def·endants were charged .and convicted 
of burglary. Tires and tubes and money were s.tolen and 
found in the possession of .one defendant. Thi's defend-
ant plealdied guilty and implicated the other defendant, 
Linde, as :a participant in the burglary. The question 
arose on his evidence that he wws an aooomplice and 
must be corroborated. 
They then intr.oduced a letteT written by the wit-
ness involving the other defendant, which letter wa:s~ 
not mailed. The ·opinion revel"lsing the case, .said : 
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"
1T!he difficulty which arises in .attempting to 
apply the rule to the proffered evidence is that 
in or.der to make such evidence admissible there 
must be proof of the existence of the conspiracy. 
Marnifestly, the decla.rat~on of co-conspirator may 
not be used to establish the fact of the existence 
of the conspir.a1cy, for the declaration or state-
ment is pure hea.rsa.y wn.samctified by the solem-
nity of an oath a;nd incapable of being subjected 
to the test of cross-examination. People v. Do-
ble, 203 Cal. 510, 265 P. 184; People v. Zimmer-
.man, 3 ·Cap.. App. 84, 84 Pa. 446. Tihe olbvious 
·danger of p·ermitting evidence of this -character 
to be received is that the jury might accept it a.s 
proof of the existence of the conspinacy and then 
use the same evidence to establish a defendant's 
guilt. P·eopJe v. Irwin, 77 Cal. 494, 20 P. 56." 
'T'he op,inion then reViieiWs the evid·ence independent 
of that of ·the, accomplice and the letter 'S:howing that 
the two were in .the company of e~aeh other on the aft-
·ernoon and .evening of the burglary and that thereaft~r 
·the de:fenJdlant who did not te~stify was. looking f:or the 
other defendant, rund ~said that .the·se cir~cumstances fur-
nished no proof of conspil'lacy and ·the ~cas:e was re-
v;ersed. 
State vs . .LllcGonigle, 258 Pac. 16, (Wash.): 
The ·defendant named was charged wtith othe~ 
with ~conspiracy to violate the Alien Land Law by com-
bin~ng with Japanes·e land owneT to p·ermit. the control, 
pos,s:esision, etc., of land ~cont,r,ary to law. It was con-
'tended that the ·evildlence Wlas. ~suffici·ent to ~sustain a con-
vi~ction, and sHv,eral .admi,s'Sions. iand de·clarations made 
by the individual par.ties were reli·ed upon. The opinion 
said: 
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'~It jg true, tl1ere need be no £lYidt\neo of a 
formally express~d Rgreeinent bet,veelll the al~ 
leged conspirators. Conspiracie-s are ~eldon1 sn8-
ceptible to su<?h proof. But if there is e·vidence, 
ciroumstancial even, of a nzeefiJl·g of the mi11Hi~~ 
and ·unity of design and of cooperative conduct 
'Which could ot~ly nrean that there u·as such <m 
agreem.e-nt, that ''ould be sufficient foundation 
for the admission of evidence of suhs·equent inde~ 
pendent acts and declarations of each of the 
parti-es as against any one of them.'' ( Ci!ting au-
thorities) 
The court then quote6 with approval : 
"The et·idence tending to show a conspiracy 
must be outside of and in addition to the declara-
ti.ons of the co-conspirators u.:·hose declarations 
are sought to be introduced.'' 
16 Corpus Juri.s p. 652, Sec. 1291: 
"DEGREE OF PROOF REQUIRED. 
Prima facie proof of .the existence of the con-
spiracy is sufficient to let in evildlence of the 
acts nr declarationS' of a co~onspirator, ·and in-
deed there is authority for the view that slight 
evidenoo of conspiracy i·s sufficient. But in order 
to warrant the consideration of ,such evidence by 
the jury a higher degree of proof is required, 
and it is necessary that the ·existence of the con-
spiracy be established fully, or shown clearly, and 
indeed it h~R~s been held that such evidence can be 
considered only where the conspiracy is estab-
lished beyond a reasonable doubt.'' 
Territory vs. Turner, 37 Pac. 368: 
Defend8ll1ts were charged with conspiracy to eng:age 
in butehering cattle for sale and rn:Ot retaining in p01s-
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session the hides or brands or earmaks contrary to the 
Benal ·Code. Evidenee was introducelru of a conversation 
by one Taylor and Lyall rega.r:ding ·on~e of the defend-
:ants offering to 'SHll the wi,tness an interest in the cat-
tl~e bou~ht by working toge-the:r and bmnding everything 
~they ·could, amd thus making up· ·a herd. !The court sraid 
that ~the )statement was· in the .absence of such defendant 
1and that no evidence hald be:en introduced s.howing that 
a ·conspiracy had taken pl:a,ce of which he was a mem-
ber, 1Mld rthe evidence ·could 01nly ~s-erve to p:ve.judice the 
Jury. 
The court further srbated that it i's a. rul·e of ancient 
~standing that a ·cons:pira,cy 1s:hould fir1st he e.s,tablis~hed 
he·ftore the acts 'and declarations: of ia co-1consp~i~ator can 
be ,admitted in evidence against the other. The court 
ci,ted Loggin1s v. State, 8 Tex . .&pp. 434, anldl quoted as 
foll·ows the~efrom : 
" 'ordim.a.rily ·the mere proof that two or 
more pa·:r.ties wer~e a,ctually eng·aged in the com-
mis,sion of a crime does not lead to the necessary 
infe'rence that, da,ys or w'eeks or months before 
its. commission, they had rnutuaUy undertaken 
and agreed to its commission. * * * It would be 
a doctrine- fraught with mis;chie-vou:S' vHsul>ts if 
the mere p~roof of an actual commis~sion of a 
·cri.minal act by two or more parties, was~ suffici-
'ent, in its·elf, to justify the conclusion that a 
~com.spil'lacy !has been formed, a we~ek or ·a month 
be·f,ore, by .the :s~ame~ p·artie:s, to commit the partic-
ular of£en1s-e in question. ' '' 
State vs. Roach and 0 'Do'YIInell, 57 Pac. 1016, 
(Or.): 
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Defendants were charged jointly \vith ·stealing a 
oow 18Jld a calf 18Jld tried Qn the theory of conspiracy. 
Roooh. had possession of the st'Olen eo\v and calf and 
thereafter sold the calf to the butcher. The co,v, which 
w.as left in ·the pos·sessio11 of 0 'Dom1ell, followed the 
calf and was returned by Ro-ach to his place. 0 'Doillnell 
went to the butcher and told him that Roach wanted ·the 
calf butchoered right away. 0 'Donnell 'vas at Roache's 
place when he drove the calf to the slaughter house. The 
question arose over the ~statement of O'Donnell that 
Roach wanted the calf killed right a"~ay. The opinion 
says: 
· • But iJ is equolly eleme-nttary that a found-
ation must first be laid by proof aliwnde suffici-
ent to establish prima facie the fact of conspir-
acy or common design, and in this case there was 
no such proof. '' 
* * * * * * * 
''It is als'O claimed that the admi·ssion of the 
evidence, if error, was ·harmlese, but the entire 
theory of the prosecution, seems to have beern 
that the defendant anil O'DonneU were acting 
together in the commission of the critne, and the 
ruling of the court in the admission of the evi-
deMe over the objection of the defen.rl,ant, lllftd 
its subsequent refusal to strike it out, or instruct 
the jury to disregard it, was tantarmount to ad-
visimg them that this theory was, at least prima 
facie, supported by the testimony. In this view 
the acts and declarations of O'Donnell were very 
donnagilng evidence as against the defenda/YI)t. It 
fullows that the judgment of the court. below 
must be reversed, and a new trilal ord~ered. '' 
1lli~ following cases indicate the error of the court 
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in admi:ttling evidence under classification ( 4), of state-
ments tC~oncerning the ,alleged conspimtors. here made by 
other alleged· ~conspirators, after the conspiracy is al-
leged to have ·eeas·ed. This re.fers to such statements as 
the one ·claimed to have been made by Mr. Harmon to 
Mr. Holt :concerning M.r. Pearce having heen charged by 
Fis.her Harris. and Mr. Lee, ·and also rto alleged state-
ments by Mr. T1hacker With re~lation to Mr. Finch. 
·The foregoing cas'e's e,stahlish the rul·e· that t<> be 
wit1hin the scop~e of 'agency any act or s-tatement must 
lbe in furthei.,ance of the· alleged .conspiracy. The theory 
with relation, to s~tate·ments made afterwaros is that 
·they l{~ould not be in fur:therance of the cons.piracy and 
there:Dore could not be binding upon any ·other alleged 
·conspi~ator. It is .the .simple rule ex·cluding acts or state-
ments of agents ~after their agen1cy has ce,a.sed. 
State vs. De Angeles, 269 Pac. 515 ( Ut.): 
·This ·cas'e s~eems to 's:ettle tihis question. It wa,s an 
1arson case. The day after the fire the sheriff ha.d a 
~converswtion with two of the defendants in which on~ 
of ·them stated in the presence of the other that "iilie 
reason he and Mike wer.e- ~at ,the !store at the .tim·e of 
the fire was at :the· request of John D·e Angeles'', the oth-
er d·efendant. This court revers·e·d this ·case f.or this 
error, ·and .citing People vs. Farrell, 11 u.tah 414, 40 
P·ac. 703, quoted the following: 
'' ' On ·the- separate trial of one ·of two who 
had beien indicted to-gether for larceny, it i's a 
fiaJtal error to aldrrnit against the one on tri~al the 
acts and ·statements- of the other made iafter tbe 
crime :bad 1be:en ~completely ·committed.' 
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The rule or prineiple of law· there stated 
·ha.s been recognized and applied. by thi~s court in 
·at least three subsequent decisions; S·tate vs. 
Gillies, 40 l:tah 541, 1~~~ P. 93, 43 L. R. A. 
(N. S.) 776: State Y. Inlo"~. 44 lTtah -!85, 1-tl P. 
530, Am. Cas. 1917 .. ..-\ ... , 7 41; State ,~s. B.arretta, 
47 l~tah 479, 155 P. 343. '' 
* * * * • • • 
'· The admission of the she1iff as to the con-
versation bad on the morming following the fire 
with Mike De Angeles and Nick Galanis, under 
the authQrities, must be held to be error. As the 
evidence so erroneously admitted was ·an impor-
tant part of the state's case in its efforts to es-
tablish a conspiracy and in ~this wa.y to COIIllllOOt 
the appellant with the offense charged, the er-
ror must be held to be prejudicial.'' 
Feder t·s. United States, 257 Fed. 694, 5 A. L. 
R. 370: 
Here a conspiracy to defraud the United States by 
procuring the u.niawful ·acceptance in the war depart-
ment of barracks bags which were not properly made 
was charged. The defendant Feder took the stand and 
the prosecutor demanded whether or not sihe had made 
certain admissions to a representa1iive of .the United 
States, which admissions or declarations inv<>lv.ed the 
other defendants !and tended to prove the existence of 
the conspiracy. She denied making some of the state-
ments, whereupon the prosecuti{)n produced 'a .steno-
graphic tl'lanscript of the statements anJd, ·the .statemeDJts 
were admitted in evidence against both ,of the defend-
,ants. The court &aid thaJt at the ~time these staJtements 
were mooe by the witness Feder the conspira-cy had 
ended. 
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The attorney for the defendant Polsky requested the 
·court to ins.trnct the jury that none of these statements 
made by the d·efendant F·ede-r were ·evidence against the 
defendant Pol~sky and must not be so considered. The 
opinion s~aid : 
''It is; true ~that the· ·es:tablis,hed rul-e of Lo-
g.an v. United State's, 144 U. S. 309, 36 L. Ed 
445, 12 ·Sup'. Ct. Rep. 617 (recently reiterated 
by this· ·Court in Erlhe·r v. United .States, 148 
C. C. A. 123, 345 Fed. 228), was not specifically 
bl"ought to the .attention of the triail judge when 
thes~e requests~ were· p·roffered. But that rule, to 
~the ·effteot that onily those 1acts ,and decl,arations-
of ~a co-consp~i~ator are ;admi,s.sibl'H against his 
f,ellows 'which are done arnd made w-hile the con-
spiracy is pending and in furtherance of its ob-
ject', was plainly violated in a way as plainly 
prejudicial to Poi·sky. 'This ·conspiracy had come 
to ~am ·end, and when that occurred, 'whether by 
~succe's's orr by failure, tihe .admis.s[ons· o.f one oon-
~sp~rtator by. way of narrativ.e of past f,acts are 
not ad:rn.issible in evidence against .the others.' '' 
State vs. Goyens, 204 Pac. 704 (Koo.): 
An automobile was. stol·en by a hired man and taken 
to the farm of the def.endan t ·Goyrens., who there aS·Siisted 
in getting a mechani'c to put it into sh~wpe 'and in con-
·Cealing ilt. The hired man was 'arrested in Colorado ~and 
t:here made .s.ta·tement~s~ to the sheTiff that '' hi1s boss 
told him to d·rive the car out there'' and that he drove 
' 
the ·car out :there f.or hii.s. bos.s. The court revers·ed the 
case on account of the admis·sion of this testimony. The 
opinion s~aid : 
'''The Bogue. ·Ciruse followed the case of State 
v. Johnson, 40 Kan. 26-6, 19 P~ac. 7 49, where Mr. 
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Justice J ohnrst-on, speaking for the ennrt, ~aid in 
the opinion : 
'To make the d~lnra.tions of one eonspirator 
evidence against the oth~rs, they must be 1nade in 
furtherance of the common crimil1181 design * * *. 
Wh'en the conspiraey has * * * been consummat-
ed, the admission of one in the absence of the 
other colliSpiMltors that he and others participat-
ed in the crime, is a mere narr.ative of a past 
occurrence, and ean .a.ffe-ct onlY the one who 
makes it.' 
See, also, State v. R.og~rs, 54 Kan. 683, 39 P·ac. 219. 
In the Rogers Case it was urged that the er-
ror was unimportant because there was an abun-
dWlce of competent evidence t<> suS'tain the guilt 
of the defendant. In the opinion it was said : 
'Can we !assume that the jury gave credit to· 
the testimony of one, or of a number of witnes~ses, 
rather than to another' By what process o.f rea-
soning can we reach the conclusion that the con-
viction of the defendant is really based on the 
competent testim'Ony rather than the incompe-
tent 1' Page 695 of 54 Kan., pa.ge 224 of 39 P1ac. '' 
Saunders vs. State, 244 Pac. 55: 
Was a case where evidence of misconduct other 
than that charged was admitted in evidence. It was con-
duct on the part of one of the alleged conspirators.. This 
Wias held error, and the optiniDn says: 
"The evidence of acting together is 9on{ined to 
the offense charged in the information. The· law 
i& well ~settled that, where the guilt of one of 
several defendalllts j·ointly charged with a felony 
is sought ·to be ·established by evide~ce of oon-
,spir.acy between him ~and the others, ·evidence ·as 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
110 
to 1act~s and ~st,a;teme:n:t's of others mus~t be ·Confined 
to such acts and statements done and made at 
times when the proof permits a finding that a 
conspiracy existed. Declarations or ·acts made or 
·done prior to the :formation of a ~conspiracy or 
1after its termination, and not in furtherance of 
any plam between the parties, is not .admissible 
in evidence in t;he s·ep;arat·e trral of one of the 
partiels. The admission of acts of the codefend-
ants at a time prior to a;ny connection of the de-
fendant, under the proof, with his codefern,dants, 
was erroneous.'' 
.A!s.suming that .the alleged st~atlement of Mr. H·ar-
mon relating ~to Mr. P·earce, and testified by Mr. Holt, 
migftlt have ~e~en us:ed as against Harmon in some way, 
and it is impossible to see how this might be done in 
view of the fact that the statement had no tendency 
to prove 'the ·Conspiracy 'alleged, ·and wws :afterward. 
Harmon was dead and was not being tried ancL so this 
statement had absolutely no place in the r·ecord. It was 
:a damaging statement in view that it ·Charged Mr. 
Pearce with having been ·accused by 'the ·city attorney 
and by a prominent ·citiz·en, Mr. Lee, w1ho was then a 
member of the City Commi,s:sion. Its admis.sion was 
without any excuse and it was clearly pre.judici~al un-
·der the :authorities cited. 
People vs. Walther, 81 Pac. (2d) 452: 
Is a recent cas-e somewhat in point here, ·and partie-
ul·arly s·o with relation to the alleged ~statements of Mr. 
IThacker ·concerning other defendants being entirely out 
of the ·CaJS•e. 
'Dhi~s ~case was an alleged conspiracy to violate the 
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Corporate Soouritie-s Aet. The ease depended upon the 
testimony of one of the a.Ileged conspirators. The oourt, 
in discussing the contention of the state that one of the 
conspirators, Vl ebb, might be ,held under one of the 
counts of the indictment, said tha.t to be held under that 
he must be guilty of the sale of the security involved in 
that indictment, and that he could not be so held be-
cause by being acquitted on another count of the indict-
ment "he was formally acquitted of t1hat very charge by 
the same jury at the same trial.'' 
Mr. Thacker was a~uitted of being a conspirator 
by the same jury at the .same trial. This point is also 
involvM in th~ later discussion as to the acquittal of 
Mr. Pearce and Mr. Erwin. 
The case now under conffideration discusses the 
point that 
''It is unsatisfactory that the conviction of 
'()ne of two conspirators to commit a crime should 
depend so completely as does the present oos.e 
upon the testim'Ony of the co-eonspirator, * * * 
:such evidence is open to suspicion lest the temp-
tation to thus escape a threatened penalty of la.w 
may result in irreliable testimony.'' 
This feature of the case involves the later discus-
sion of the testimony ()f Mr. Holt, upon wb:os~e testimony 
the cas·e of the state here largely rests. 
The opiniQn then discusse:s the testimony of W eblb, 
the conspirator who turned .state '·s witness, and partic-
ularly statements made by him with relation to the oth-
er d~fendants, and ·said: 
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''It ils. fundamental that t~he f.act. of the ex_ 
istelllce of a ·conspiracy to commit a crime ·must 
firs•t be estalbli,she.d before the decla:vations of a 
co~cons.pirator with relation thereto be·come com-
p·e:tent or admissible. When .suoh declarations are 
p·rejudi·cial, as they certainly are in the pres.ent 
case, their ad.mis~sion in evidence ne·ce:stsitate'S a 
rev.ers:wl of the judgmenJt. Code~ Civ. Proc. Sec. 
1870, subd. 6; P·eopl·e v. !Doble, 203 Oal. 510, 517, 
26·5 P. 184; Peop.Je v. Linde, 131 Cal. App. 12, 19, 
20 P. (2d) 704; 5 Oa;l. Jur. 517, Sec. 21." 
Before proceeding to attemp·t to show the court that 
principal portions of the ·evidence herein should be elim-
inated on additional .gvounds, we summariz.e briefly as 
to ·classes ( 1 ) , ( 2 ) , ( 3 ) and ( 4) . 
(1) The evidence as to operations under c1ass (1) 
ar·e ·eliminated by the insitrnction of the (~ourt, the law 
of .the cas·e, as w·ell a1s under ·the ~authorities cited on the 
rule that it must point divectly to the guilt of ~he of-
fens-e ·charged and be inconsistent with any other hy-
pothe·si,s. 
(2) ·That ·the evidence under cla.ss (2) as .to al-
leged admissions involves no ·admission of the offense 
charged. and wajs inadmis.sibJ.e. 
( 3) 'Tha.t the evidence of mis·conduct by separate 
defendants under ·clas~s ( 3) did not tend to prove the 
agreement and was inadmissible and •should be ·elimin-
·ated. 
The rule is well settled, and w·e will not go into a 
reci·t,al of 1fue ·cases that even where other offens·es. may 
lbe shown in order to prove a cours-e of conduct to es-
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tablish criminal int~nt, that the other offenses tnust. be 
established at least prima facie. There "~as no question 
of criminal intent here. If an ·agreement \YPre proved it 
would carry its own intent. So that this evidence served 
only the purpose of confusing 18Jld prejudicing the jury 
and preventing the defendants from haYing a fair trial. 
The leading l ... tah ease upon tihe proposition that if 
other offenses are material they .themselves must first 
be established at least prima facie, i.s 
State vs. Judd, 279 Pac. 953: 
( 4) That the authorities ·establish that statements· 
by one defendant, or by third persons as to another de-
fendant, cann-ot be admitted for the purposes of proof 
of the existence of the agreement or of 1ftle connection of 
any person so mentioned with the conspiracy. And again 
these statements did n-ot go to the offense charged. 
The foregoing show the errors in 'admis.sion of evi-
dence under assignments 14 (Ab. 336), and 15(c), (d), 
(e), (f), (g), (h), (i), (j), (k), (1), (m), (n), (o), (p·), 
(q), (Ab. 336-344), ( w), (x), (y), (z ), ( aa), (bb), (oo), 
(dd), (Ab. 347-350), (jj), (kk), (11), (mm), (nn), (oo), 
(pp), (qq), (rr), (ss), (tt), (uu), (vv), (ww), (xx), 
(yy), (zz), (aaa), (bbb), (coo), (ddd), (eee), (fff), 
(ggg), (hhh}, (iii), (jjj), (kkk), (111), (mmm), (nnn), 
(Ab. 353-371), (qqq), (Afb. 374), (uuu), (vvv), (www), 
(xxx) (Ab. 378-379). 
Any reasonable limit on the length of tJhls brief 
would not permit a discussion as to each of the sjepar-
ate assignments of error as to testimony. W~e have 
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attempted by classifieation to p.res.ent this matter within 
reasonable limits. 
None of these assignment·s is w1a.ived. 
Kempner Testimony as to Stubeck's Conduct and 
Statements Erroneously Admitted. 
The te·stimony of this young man Kempner, whose 
name was not on the indictment ·aJs. a witness, but who 
:apparently became attracted by the prospect of pub-
licity and ·contacted the ·district attorney sho.rtly !before 
lhe testified, testifi·ed with relation to nobody ever at-
tempted to he <(~onne-cted with the ·alleged conspiracy 
whatsoever, by any proof" aliunde" or at all. 
The -assignments on this testimony are N o:s. 14 a.nd 
15 (r) to (v) inclusive. (Ab. 345-347). The testimony is 
s:et out fully (A b. 40-64). It ~comes under ~classification 
( 4) .above, as ·conduct and ·statement of a third person, 
which was iilltroduced without limitation over the s·epar-
ate obj·ections of each defendant and was introduced 
as binding up~on all. 
W·e p~articu1arly ~ask the court ~to examine this tes-
timony .and the re·cord that was made in connection 
1fuerewith, !and shall not take the .sp1BJCe here to state it 
at length. It was this· testimony ~concerning which the 
court :s:aid that ''the ·Comp·etency of it hasn't yet been~ 
mrude manifest", but the dis,trict attorney s~aid that he 
would ·Conne.ct it up. (Ab. 42) 
The court also ·s:ai·d that this tes~timony was so im-
portant tha.t if "it should develop tili.1at it isn't pertinent 
I presume it would be a mistrial. I am not saying it 
would, but I presume it would.'' 
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The witness testified to a time whieh he fin1ally 
fixed as "around in March, possibly April" of 1937. 
It will be noticed that this 'vas ·at a thne when even 
Holt was not collecting-he didn't ~tart until June. 
H. K. Record was head of the vice squad and Holt wa;s 
not in it at all. (A b. 95). :The indictment in alleging what 
were termed overt acts alleges that collections were 
mad~ from houses of prostitution from June, 1937, to 
January, 1938, and from operators of lotteries, dice 
games and other games of chance from April 1st, 1936, 
to January 1st, 1938, (Ab. 3), and the Bill of Barticu-
lars recites approximately the same dates (Ab. 11), 
and recites that the collections were made by the de-
fendants with the aid and ·assistance of Golden Holt 
and Ben Harmon. Even Ben Harmon was not connected 
with any collections until June of 1937. 
This testimony very briefly was tha-t Abe Stuheck, 
who operated a billiard hall, met this witness and took 
him to the Ace and Peter Pan Billiard Halls. In the 
Peter Pan, Stubook talked with a man who was racking 
pool balls and asked hlm if he had the money ready. 
The man said something and Stubeck told ·him he had 
better get it in a hurry or -he kntew what tlhe results 
would be. The man said he would be back and he went 
and got some money. At the Ace Billiard Hall he S'aW 
no money collected, but when they got back ont to the 
street Stnbeck took two bunches of bills from different 
pockets and put !them .together. The witness tJhen was 
allowed to testify that Stubeck told him that card games 
were payinJg off and that he· took the money over to Ben 
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Harmon ~and Harmon split it with Erwin and his crowd. 
The witnHS!S then testified that ·Stubeck took the bills 
and l1aid them on the counter in Harmon '·S pl'aoe before 
the cus'tom-ers. and employees, and on1e of the cashiers 
put them under the ·counter, that Harmon was present. 
(Ab. 40-64) 
There was never any foundation by showing any 
agreement as alleged to permit ana ~allow the operatio1lls 
alleged. There was no foundation by .showing that any 
defendant had ~any connection or acquaintan!ce whatso-
ever with Albe Stuheck. This was ·conduct of a person 
not in any way ·connected with the defendants, or any of 
them, in any ·shape, manner or form, and statements 
made by him with reference to the defendants or impli-
cating some ·or all of them, and its intr.oduction is not 
only condemned by all of the foregoing authorities, 
but we believe by a.ny authority that can be found; so 
that its admission giv·es no support to sustain the con-
vi~ction here, although, a1s indi·cated, it was ic1oubtless 
very effective in brin,ging about the convi,ction by the 
jury. That its ·admission was erroneous ·and prejudicial 
requires no further argument and the ~citation of no 
authorities additional to those ·cited under the pre·ceding 
·dis~cussion of ~class ( 4) te·stimony. 
If, as it may lhe con1tended, the ·Op~eration of gam-
bling in licens·ed ~card rooms 1and on licensed, card tables 
is proof of an agreement between the defendants here; 
or if ~as will be ~contended the ~collection of money is the 
' ' 
·offense being tried or is evidence of an agreement by 
and wi~th the parties here to '' pennit, allow, assist and 
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enable" houses of prostitution, ete., to operate, on tJhe 
theory that some of the defendaJl1ts 1night have insti-
tuted an investigation and brought a bout prosecution of 
the operators involYed. then this testimony "~oula point 
first to the guilt of H. K. Record, "~ho 'Va!S head of the 
anti-vice squad, and 'vould point also to the guilt of the 
city attorney and the district attorney, who w·ere so per-
wnally concerned in this prosecution. Because certainly 
they could institute investigations and bring about pros-
ecutions, just as this record sho·ws the district attorney 
did, in connection with this case, prosecute a number 
~f prostitutes and operators of places of prostitution. 
·The fact is that this evidence had no probative val-
ue whah~oover to prove the agreement alleged. 'Tihe sim-
ple collection of money in no way ·assisted the opera-
tioo from which it was collected, and this testimony 
was utterly incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial and 
highly prejudicial. 
Testimony of Golden Holt Erroneously Admitted. 
The assignments as to this· witness are oovered by 
the foregoing authorities, and from 15 (kk) to 15 ( vv) 
inclusive have been referred to above. These as-sign-
ments as to the testimon'Y of this witness require, how-
ever, separate treatment, in view of the admis.sion and 
·claim by the prosecution here that he was an oooom-
plice. This testimony will also be now separ.ately con-
·sidered under the later contention, and later under the 
heading as .to prior adjudication of the matters testified 
to. 
Eliminating, as we clearly must, the te·stimony of 
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Kempner ~as to Stuheck, just oons·idered, the only testi-
mony as to !colleetions of mon1ey was the testimony of 
Hol.t .and, 'Of ·course, the women who paid it to him. 
:Thes·e, as we shall prese·ntly sh10w, were also accom-
plices in this matter, .and in any event had nothing to 
do with the ·charge alleg-ed. The argument to the trial 
.court, based ervoneously upolll the theory that the 
eharge here was ·one of ·collecting money from these 
operations, was grounded upon the· p·roo.f that money 
was coUe~cted lby Holt. This, as stated, depends upon 
the testimony of Holt alone. No knowledge of his col-
le·ction was ever shown to have been communicated to 
anyone eX!cept Mr. Harmon. Unles.s, of ·course, it may 
be .assumed that the testimony of Holt that •some money 
fvom prostitution was paid to Mr. P·ear.ce, who was 
attorney f,or lvlr. H·armon, in Mr. Harmon's presence, 
was proof that he knew where the mon~Hy was collected. 
It was not so testified. 
Mr. Pearce had been previously tried 1and acquitted 
of the charge of reeeiving this money from prostitution 
kno:w-ing that it was so received. This matter will be 
treated sep.ara t.ely h·ereinafter. 
The point "\Ve desire to emphasize now is· that the 
claim of proof of an agreement has been\ rested and 
doubtless will he upon the te~s!timony of ·collection of 
money by Holt and the presumption of knowledge 
thereof, and then the fur.t.her inf.erence ~attempted to be 
!based on this inference, that there must have been an 
agree.ment be·tween these particular d·efendants other-
wise these collections would not have taken place. 
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This involYes also the que~4ion of sPparatl' con-
spiracies, which "~in be hereinafter con~idered, but for 
the present we "ill discuss the tt>stin1ony of thi~ ac-
complice in the lig'ht of the contention. that he is ~an ac-
complice and uncorroborated. 
'llhere was no corroboration of the testimony of 
Holt with relation to any defendant here in the mat-
ter of thes,e oollooti()ns. This question of corroboration 
of an accomplice is difficult to discuss because it i:s im-
possible for us to see any proof as required by the 
rules of evidence hereinalbove supported as to the ex-
istence of the conspiracy alleged or ~as to the connection 
of any defenoont with it.If there is a.ny such testimony, 
the testimony of Holt must be the principal, if not the 
only testimony iu this connection. That he was an ac-
complice may be assumed. That his testimony was not 
oorroborated in any material aspect must be 'admitted. 
We will now point out cases indicating, first, that 
in the absence of corroboration the evidence cannot be 
considered but should have been withdrawn lby the trial 
court as a matter of law, and :also ·caS'es illustrating the 
point that there was no corroboration. 
People vs. Southwell, 152 Pac. 939 (Cal.) : 
Is a case holding directly that where money was 
paid to ·an officer by plooes of prostitution upon 1Jhe 
understanding or coOOition t·hat he would not arrest 
or moles~ such '()peration, that the women paying 
the said money for immunity were a·eeompliees. The 
opinion says: 
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''·The ·COUr't at the request of defendant (of-
fice~r), adviis:eru :the jury rthat ·Coulter was. an ,ac-
oompH!ce, hut refus'e1d instructions advising the 
jury ~that the Martin ~and M~cMonagle women 
were 1such occompli~ce:s. :This W1aJS undoubtedly er-
ror and of a p:rejudiciial kind. ·That this error 
·s~eriously interfe~red witih ~the right of defendant 
to a full and fair hearing is made apparent when 
it is conside·red that the ~corToborative teSitimony 
offered in the. cas~e wa:s not of a p~articularly 
'Strong ~charact·er. ' ' 
State vs. Coroles, 277 Pac. 203, (Ut.): 
Is ·a ca:se squarely holding that whHre .the· ·evide'Illce is 
without dispute the :court •s.hould instruct the jury that 
a witness is :an ~aecomp.lice and that it is the duty of 
the ·Court to d-eci1de whether the~e wa,s sufficient evi-
dence in ~corroboration of the ruccompli~ce to meet the 
requirements of ~the statute, ~and if not, to dire-ct the 
jury. The opinion of this Court says: 
''If 'the £acts. the,.msel¥e:s are. in dli'spute as 
rto wheth·er the witn:ess: did or did not do the 
things whieh, if 1he did do them, would make 
him an a'ceomp~li~ee, then it i:s: £or the jury to de-
~termine whe.the:r he is in :flact an 'a;ooomplice or 
not.. Whe~e- ~the fa~cts. are not in dispute, whe·re 
the acts :and :conduct of the witnes1s. ar-eo admitted, 
then it is a matter of law for the court to say, 
.amd to instruct the jury, whether the witness, 
'UIYWJ,er the circwmstamces, is an accomplice. Peo-
ple. v. Coffey, sup,~a. Upon the· pre~s~eDJt ret(~O~ it 
wa1s the duty of the trial court, aft,e:r determining 
from the undisp·uted evidence that the witness 
Gar.re:tt was: an accomplice, to decide whether 
there was sufficient evidence in corrohora·tion of 
the accomplice to meet the requirements of the 
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stat·u.te, am;d, if it leas ·not, to then di.rect a verdict 
for th.e defendlnlt." 
Staters. Gardner. ~7 Pac. (2d) 51, ([Jt.): 
'.Dhis case, while not particularly in point because 
the corroboration there "~as found in the ~admissions 
of the defendant him5elf, 5ets out the 5tatute in part a:s 
follows: 
"A conviction s.hall not be had on the teosti-
mony of an accomplice, unless he is corroiborated 
by other evidence which in itself, and without 
the aid of the testim-ony of the accomplice, tends 
to connect the defendant mt.h the commission of 
the offense; and the corroboration shall not be 
·sufficient if it m-erely shQws the commi·ssion of 
the offense or the circumstances the-reof.'' 
The opinion then cites apparently all of the UtaJh 
eases at page 52 of the report, prev~ously decided. 
'These cas·es are not particularly enlightening here be-
cause in most, if not all of .them the corpus delicti was 
proved and it was a question merely 'Of connecting the 
defendant with the crime by testimony independent of 
that of the accomplice. 
Of course, the very purpose of this rule and of 
such statutes is to prevoot a conviction wpon the testi-
money of a person inte-rested in absolvimg himself from 
prosecution by implicating someone else. The essence 
of it is that such a witness shall not be believed to the· 
extent of permittmg a convictio11J thereon 'wnJess his 
testimony is corroborated as required by the statute. 
It would seem to follow logically that the testimony of 
Holt carmot be considered here, either as proof of the 
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offoose charged or as connecting any defendant with it, 
unless this testimony is corroborated by other independ-
ent proof of the offense and' other independent proof of 
the connection of these defewdants with it. 
H·ere there i1s nothing that (~;an be considered as an 
admission by an;y defendant that we can find in the 
record, other than that which is involved in the testi-
mony of this same 1acoomplice. 
In the opinion of Justice Str,aup· in the Ga:nc1ner 
cag.e the following statement is made and supported 
and is con1sistent with the p·rineipal opinion therein: 
"'Thus under rthe ·Sfta tute there must be evi-
dence independent and without the aid of the tes-
~timony of the •accomp'li·ce to show the corpus de-
li~cti, that an ofrense was commi tt·ed !and to con-
neot !the defendant with it. Roseoe 's ·Criminal 
Evidence, 122; ·State vs. Geddes, 22 Mont. 68, 55 
P. 919; .State v.s. Lawson, 44 Mont. 488, 120 P. 
808." 
State vs. Laris, 2 Pac. (2d) 243: 
Was another lavceny case involving the point as to 
whethe·r recent pos·session was sufficient corroboration 
of 1an accomplice and holding that undeT the circum-
'stances of that ease it was not. 'There is language and 
'authority in this ease in line with our above· contention 
that the reorr·olborating testimony must tend to sustain 
t!he truthfulness of .the accomplice's. testimony as to the 
very offense involved. The opinrion quotes from Weldon 
vs. State, a T·eX!as ·case, at page 246 as :DoUows: 
'' 'Elimina.te from the cas·e· the evidence of 
the at(~compli·ce, and then examine the evidence 
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of the other \Yitness or "'itnes·ses with a view to 
ascertain if there be inculpatory e\idence ~ • • 
if there be no inculpa!t<>ry evide·nce, there is not 
corrolboration, althoug~h .the aooomplice may be· 
corroborated in regard to any number of facts 
·sworn to by ·him.' '' (Citing als() People vs. Mor-
ton, 73 Pae. 609). 
The opinion in the Laris Case also quotes· with ap-
proval from an Iowa case, on paoooe 248 : 
'~ 'The accomplice may state any number of 
facts, and 1fuese facts may all be corroborated by 
~the evidence of otlher witnesse'S ; stiN, if the facts 
thus corroborated do not tend to oonnoot the de-
fendant with the crime, or if they do not point 
pertinently to the defendant as the guilty party 
or as a participant, this would not be such cor-
roboration as is required by the Code.' Weldon 
v. State, :supra; State v. Cowell, 149 Iowa 460, 
128 N. W. 836. '' 
State vs. Somers, 90 Pac. (2d) 273 (Ut.): 
This is the most recent Utah case that we have 
found. It was an arson case again considering the 
-statute quoted in the Gardner Oase, which is now 105-
32-18 R. S. U. 1933. The opinion held the corroboration 
insufficient, and said : 
''Under the above sootion a conviction can-
not be based on the testimony of an accomplice 
alone. There must be corroboration -of his testi-
mony and t-he corroboration must be as to some 
material matter or fact which ·is inoonsis.tent 
with the defendant's. in'IllOCence." (Citing a num-
ber, of Utah and other cases). 
The opinion also states again the rule quoted from 
the Co roles Case, -supl"'a, as follows: 
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''While it is :a quHstion for the jury to deter-
mine whether the eorrohorative evidence is suf-
fi~ci~ent, in eonnBction with the te:srtimony of an 
~aecomp,lice, to justify a eonviction, yet unless 
tJhere i:s corrofborative evidence of a material 
fact tending to eonne~ct the def,endant with the 
·Conrmis1sion of the !crime, a oour~t ~should direct a 
verdict for the defendant. P·eople v. Viets, 79 
C.atl. App. 576, 250 P. 588, S'twte v. Arhorn:tis, 
:supra.'' 
Stale v-s. Elmer, 161, Pac. 167: 
I~s another Utah case holding the corroboration in-
sufficient .and pointing out that the jury should have been 
instructed that if they found that the witness Curtis 
was an accomplice, that then1 the defendant ·Could not 
be ~convieted. In other words, that the ·cour·t should 
have ~de~c:Uded whether the eorrobol"ation of the evidence 
was sufficient. 
State vs. Thompson, 87 Pac. 709: 
Is a case holding that proof merely that a crime was 
·committed, in that an unmarried wom.an wa.s pregnant 
.a11Jd the charge was adultery, ·could not he considered as 
in any way connecting the defendant with the offense 
charged. 
State vs. Powell, 143 Pac. 588: 
Is ·another Utah case emphasizing that in deter-
mining the question of corroboration\ every item of tes-
timony of the accomplice him·s~elf must be entirely ex· 
eluded. 
State vs. Sheffield, 146, Pac. 306: 
Is another Utah ~cas-e involving the charge of adult.-
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ery, and holds that admi~sion~ or intimations of other 
wrong doing of a laciYious nature cannot be considered 
as corrolboration ~ that it n1ust be eYideuce of the spe-
cific charge laid. 
It w·ould serYe no purpose to cite additional cases 
giving rules so ''ell understood by this Court. Ho,vever, 
we call the court's attention a.g<1.in to two comparatively 
recent Calif.ornia cases: 
People v. Walther, 81 P. (2) 45~. 
People '· Rodriguez, 99 P. (2) 263. 
In these cases the appellate court refused to sustain 
convictions because the court said they depended so 
substantially upon the testimony of an interested aooom-
plice, who, while clearly guilty himself, was securing im-
munity by ginng the testimony involved. This is cl1ear-
ly the cas~ with the witness Holt, who was solely re-
sponsible for the extortion of money from these women 
in prostitution and solely responsible for the collections 
made. He made them and he alone. They were made 
tOnly when he collected and ceased when he ceased col-
lecting, aooording to the record in this case. Yet he had 
and has entire immunity. 
The Testimony of H. K. Record was Inadmissible 
and in any Event Could not be Considered as Sup-
porting the Verdict. 
This matter inv-olves assignments 14, and 15 ( jj). 
It was the conversation ref,erred to in which the wit-
ness said ·he talked with Mr. Pearce in .the presence of 
Mr. Harmon, and Mr. Pearce p·roposed that he make 
·collections from gambling houses, not prostitution, and 
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·offered $165.00, and the witness testifield that he would 
not be 'a p·arty to it. 
·This e¥idence, if believed, indi~cateid, a willingness on 
the part of Mr. Pe:ar.ce to enter into an agreement wi.tlt 
this witness. The discussion w·as in the presence of Mr. 
Harmon a111<1 the term ''we'' was allegedly used, so that 
it may be said that it involved Mr. Harmon ·also. It 
·certainly was illladmissilhle as to Mr. Erwin and the 
other defendants. This attempted ·conspir,a:cy was nQt 
one to p·ermit or allow operations, it w.as one rather to 
extort money from the gambling operations, which 
was pro hably .an offense- but a different offen~s·e entirely, 
and definitely involved different conspirators. 
Thomai/3 vs. United States, 57 Fed. (2d) 1039 
10 C. 0.): 
Is a ease in our own Cificui t ·definitely ho1<1ing that 
under an indietmen t for ·a larger conspiracy involving 
a number of p·eople, evidence ·of a smaller conspiracy 
involving som·e of them to do something similar t·o the 
alleged purpose of the main conspiracy, and which 
.small·er and possibly included a.rr.angement was dis-
·cussed hut never ·carried out, is not evidence of the con· 
spir.acy alleged and cannot be us·e1d to sustain a convio-
tion thereunder. 
A number of d·efendants were indi·cted for conspir-
acy to violate the National Prohibition Act thy roam· 
facture, transpor.tation and .sale of liquor under protec-
tion from F·edera.l officer,s. Gorges, through another per· 
.son, arranged to pay one Madden, ·assistant prohibition 
administrator £or Kansas, $1,000.00 a month, and sent 
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Madd-en was to furnish prote-ction. ThrPl) mQnthly pay-
ments of $1,000.00 'vere made to him ·a.nd the list fur-
nished. Arm~trong, anQther prohibition agent, was sent 
by Madden as a representa.tiYe in the matter of protec-
tion. Most of the defendants carried on the agreed op-
erations on a large se.ale. 
l'he appellant Simons was a brother-in-law of 
Gorges, the principal mover in the conspiracy alleged. 
Simons was frequently in the company of Gorges, knew 
of the arrangement to get protection, was present at con-
versations respecting the buying and selling of liquor. 
The opinion says : 
''The endence established that Simons had 
knowledge of the conspiracy. It further proved 
that Gorges desire-c1 :to extend the conspiracy to 
Oklah-oma, and he and Sim-ons planned that the 
la•tter .sh{)rnd take charge of the business there, 
but there w:as no proof that the conspil'lacy was 
ever oo extended or that Simons -ever entered it. 
Furthermore the indictm-ent charged a conspiracy 
to manufaclure, possess, transport, and sell in-
toxicating liquor in Kansas. 
Mere knowledge or approval of or acqui-
·e:scence in the ·obj-ect and purpose of a conspir-
acy without .agreement to cooperate to :accom-
plish !such -object or purpose is. not enough to-
constitute one a party to the conspiracy. Luca-
damo v. United States (C.C.A. 2) 280 F. 653, 657; 
Miarrash v. United States (C.C.A. 2) 168 F. 225-; 
·Turcott v. Unit-ed State:s (C. ·C. A. 7) 21 F. (2ru) 
829; United States v. Lancaster (C. C. Ga.) 44 
F. 896; 10 L. R. A. 333. 
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The mo:st that ca:n he ·s:aid is that ,simons 
knew of 'and acquie,sced in the :conspiracy and 
was willing· to enter it p-rovided the org~anization 
was !exJt'ended 'to Okla;homa. This was insufficient 
tbo 'COnneet him with the CIOI11Spiracy ·charged." 
This -case also eontains a good statement and cites a 
number of authorities upon the point that. 
''to render !evidence of acts or declarations of 
:an :alleged ·conspirator admissible ,against anal-
leged ·co-·conspirator, the exi'Stence ·of the con-
ispiracy must he ·shown :an:dl :the -connection of the 
latter therHwith esta hlished. '' 
Also the further point: 
''Declarations made by one {~onspirator to an-
other ·are not ·competent evidence to e;s·taJblish 
the ~eonneetion ·of 1a rthird person with the con-
s.piracy. '' 
The que:stion now under dis.cussion is so closely re-
lated to the next topic that we will take that up and 
ask the Court to eonsijder the ap·plication of the cases 
thereunder ·cited to the present matter, of the testimony 
of H. K. Reeo}}d. 
Evidence of Different and Smaller Conspiracies Was 
Not Admissible, and the Failure of the Court Upon 
Request to Instruct on this Matter was Erroneous. 
This involves the assignments .as to evidence with 
relation to alleged ~condu:ct or 'agreement tbetween Holt 
!a.nd Rosenblum in 1936, when Holt was hims·elf head of 
the anti-vice squad. And separately to his alleged ar· 
ra:ngements or agreement with H·armon, or any con· 
neotion by Mr. Pearce in 1937, s·everal months· after the 
alleged 'arrangement with Rosenblum had ended. Of 
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oourse the incident of I~empner and Stubeck and. Ha.r-
mon, if it ha.s any plnce in the case at all, was still an-
other arrangement, at anQther time. 
We have pointed out that the indictment here was 
not for the collection or extortion of money, and of 
course insist that these separate collections by Holt had 
D.Q legal tendency to prove the general :agreement al-
leged tQ permit various operations. \Y e no'' urge the 
further ground that these collections. which a.re mainly 
and almost entirely relied upon. inYolved other dis-
tinct, and substantive offenses, and if they involved 
any conspiracy. involved different and smaller conspir-
acies. 
The dealings between Holt and Rosenblum are 
just as se-parate and distinct from his dealings with 
Harmon in a later year as any two trans•actions could 
be. Mr. Holt was then himself head of the vice squarl. 
11here was never any connection shown between Rosen-
blum and Harmon, or for that matter, any connection 
with any defendants ~at any time by Rosenblum in the 
matter of any agreement, or even any colloot~ons in 
1936 or at all. The only other defendant concerning 
whom any knowledge of collections could be claimed 
was Mr. Pearce, and he was never connected with Rosen-
blum or heard of, in the case, until June, 1937. No de-
fendant was connected in any way with the operatiorns 
of Holt and Rosenblum in 1936. 
Tinsley vs. United States, 43 Fed. (2d) 890: 
·Tinsley and four others were indicted on eight 
counts, the finst seven counts being for larceny of 
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horses in the Indian country and the· eighth being con-
spiracy to commit the larcenies .set for~th in the first 
seven -counts. Two defendants were nolle prossed by 
the U. 18. attorney, thereafter taking the stand £or the 
Government, and the three were convicted on all eight 
counts. 
It appeared that Tinsley, a farmer, had engaged 
two Indians (the one·s testifying) to steal horses from 
the reservation and bring them to him at night; that he 
would then kill the hovses and feea them to his hogs, 
and that one of the two defendants remaining aided 
and abetted him iri the feeding and ·concealing of the 
hi·des, br,ands, etc., and was p-resent when horses were 
delivered by the Indi-ans. 
T1he ~conspiracy :count was based on the proposi-
tion that there were many transactions, and that 
Tinsley hwd made arrangements with each of two In-
dians· to steal the horses ·and pay them for the thefts. 
The reour:t on this point ~s~ays : (page 893) 
' 'W-e are fo reed to the eoncl usion that the 
~evid·ence doe-s. not :show any mutual under-stand-
ing of plan w;hereby app·ellants and Paul \Vidow 
and Phillip· Lone Eagle (the .two Indians dismis-
sed) were to ·coopera1te in the, stealing of horses 
from the In1dti:an res·erv;ation, nor that the minds 
·of the:s:e prarties met understandingly to oa.rry 
out a dHlibe.ra~te agreement to eommit the lar-
·eenies ·eharged in the indi~etment. The evidence 
tellidts to 'show a .conspivacy between Tinsley and 
Widow, and .a rCOnspiracy between Tins~ey and 
Phillip Lone Eagle, hut they are separate and 
distinct conspiracies .and not the conspiracy 
·charged in the indictment. 'Thi~s is not sufficient. 
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Terry v. U. S., 7 F. (~d) ~S; '':ya,tt. et nl v. U. 
S., ~3 F. (~ttt) 791; Stubb~ Y. lT. S. ~-t-~l Fed. ~)71. '' 
r~nited Sta.te8 t'~. Byers, 7~~ Fed. (~d) 419: 
Defendants were indict~d and conYicted for con-
spiracy to defraud the United Sta.tes by obtajning sur-
plus war materials from the Government by false pre-
tenses; the false pretenses •being they "~ould turn the 
materials over to needy persons at e.ost, \vhen defend-
ants intenlded to sell the materials at a profit. The trial 
court instructed : 
''If you find the sale of these goods by de-
fendants was made as claimed by the govern-
ment, knowmgly and wilfully by thes·e defend-
ants, then you will oonvict. '' 
The appellate court said (p. 422): 
"Here the defendants were indicted for con-
spiracy to defraud the United Stat.es lby buying 
goods under false pretenses. By the charge of 
the trial judge the jury was permitted to find 
them guilty of con!Spiracy to -sell goods in vioLa-
tion of their contract not to sell. In n<> way can 
· the latter conspiracy lbe said to be the former. 
While, as the appellee argues, the indictment 
need not be precise in charging the time or place 
of the conspiracy, yet it is necessary that a de-
fendant be found guilty, if at all, only of the. 
crime charged in the indictment. A conviction 
for one conspiracy cannot be 'Sustained under an 
indictment for 'a separate and dlistinot conspir-
acy." 
Lefeo vs. Uwited States, 74 Fed. (2d) 66: 
"'Fhere is nothing new in this defense of 
multiple conspiracy, and nothing uncertain in 
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~the- law ar1·s1ng from such a defense. Of cou~se, 
to :sustain a verdict on an indi~ctmen t charging 
one p1articular conspiracy the evidence must es-
tabli,sh ;the conspiracy eharged. Evidence that es-
tablishe's another oonspiraey ·or serveral other con-
tspiracies will not ·sustain 1the verdict.'' 
Wyatt vs. United States, 23 Fed. (2d) 791: 
Was a ewse where it was alleged ,a -conspiracy ex-
isted over a p·eriod of about four years by a group o.f 
persons, to violate the National Prohibition Act. The 
·court .says the ramifications were many and the inter-
relations of those who participated in furnishing pro-
te,ction and collecting money from boot-leggers was va-
ried. It was ·clear that the officers involved did afford 
prote:etion and did make ~colle·ctions and did on occasion 
·arrest people who ~did not contribute. It was even con-
tended that this p-roved enforcement of the liquor law. 
It was. indieated tha,t some were guilty of extortiDn 
and othHrs might have been guilty of substantive offenses 
:agains,t the N~ational Prohibition Act. 'rhe court re-
fUised t:o revi~ew the testimony, but made two very per-
tinent statements of the law, as follows : 
'' H a.ving a responsibility for the enforce-
ment in this circuit, not only of the N atio1Val Pro-
hib~tion Law, but of federal law·s generally, we 
are strongly of opinion tha1t the conspiracy stat-
ute should not be stretched to cover and be mi.s-
used to convict for offenses lfl).Ot within it terms, 
·OII'ltd that, when resorted to, the conspiracy al-
leged must be proved as charged. When, as here. 
one large conspira.cy is specifically charged proof 
of d.ifferent arnd disconnected smaller ones will 
not sustain conviction; nor will proof of cri,m~) 
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committed by o-ne or n1-ore of the defrndanfs, 
wholly apart [ro1n. a~nd zc·itho·ut relation· to others 
conspiring to do the thinp fo~rbiddr·n. sustain 
convi.cfion. TerrY Y. United StatPs (C. C. A.) 7 
F. (M) ~S. 30; Uniited. Statf'S Y. ~reConnell (D. 
C.) :285 F. 164, 166. 
~ * * * • • 
·'Keeping in nz.i-nd that the one crinze which 
the -ind£ctment cha,rged a.gainsf all defendants is 
conspira.cy to viola.fe a la1c of the [ynited States-
not the substantire crin1e of riolaiing the law it-
self-zce ha-ve dis-corered ·no e-vidence that impli-
aates John Sarnosky, ~ .... a.tha.n Hollander and 
Hymie Cohen. Therefore, zcholly zci.thout rega.rd 
to whether the evide·nce prores these three men 
sparately gui-lty of r·i-olating the '}..T ati.onal Prohi-
bition Act, zce find no evide-nce that sustai-ns the 
verdict find·ing the·m guilty of the conspiracy 
charged. L"nited States '· Heitler (D. C.) 274 F. 
401. '' 
Terry vs. united Sta-tes, 7 Fed. (2d) 28: 
This case is so important here that it has been 
already referred to -and will he cited again on the ques-
tion of instructions. On the ·point now under considera-
tion it has been widely quoted with approval. 
It appeared that Terry and one Frohn agreed to 
transport several barrels of intoxicating liquor from 
Bodega Bay to a ranch in the vicinity of Petaluma, and 
at the s-ame time the defendant Zucker rented a barn in 
that vicinity and that nine barrels of intoxicating 
1iquor were stored therein. About six weeks later Zucker 
and other defendants, not including Terry, landed a ship-
ment of liquor at Allen's Wharf in Monterey 'County. 
All this was in California. This last shipment of liquor 
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was seized, together with the automobiles, by the Fed-
eral authorities. 
The indictment ~charg·ed that the defendants did con-
spire and confederate together to ·commit offenses 
against the United States in violation of the· National 
Prohilb~tion A~ct, and set forth it was claimed ~as an overt 
act the shipment to Allen's W~harf. Nine defendants, in-
·cluding· Terry, were convicted. The trial court took the 
view that the ·conspiracy was one to land, transport, sell 
or poss-ess liquor generally ·and that all the defendants 
'were prop·e·rly convicted there11Il!der. Zucker was con-
ne·cted with both of the shipments, ·six weeks apart, just 
as Holt was ·connected by his testimony with both of 
the collections here in separate ye'ars. The appellate 
court in diseus.sing the indietment says: 
'' ·Tihe charge is limited, however, by the 
terms of the indictment it·self. The indictment 
here charg~es but one combination or conspiracy, 
howeve·r divers its objects, .and no defendant 
·Cou.tJ.d lbe ~convicted ·thereunder unless he was 
,s1hown ·t'O be a member of or a party to that oon-
s.piracy. Fu]}thermore, the seope of the conspir-
:acy n1us.t be gat,he·red from the te:stimony, and 
not frorn the averments of the indictm·ent. T.he 
latter may limit the S(~ope but .cannot extend it." 
Judge Rudkins writing the opinion, then says that 
he found no testimony tending to show any general 
conspiracy reov-ering and including both incidents and 
!Sia.ida that the trial -oourt apparently proceeded upon the 
theory that some of the def·eudan.ts ·could be convicted 
for one conspiracy ·and som·e for another. :The opinion 
proceeds: 
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·~If, h-o"~eyer, the eha.rgl"\ of eon~pi raey in 
the indictment. i~ merelY that all the dlt'fendant~~ 
:had a similar general purpose in Yit~"·, nntl that 
each of four groups of per~on~ "·ere eo-operat i 11g 
without any priYity eacll ''"it.h the other, and not 
towards the same comm-on end, but to,vards sep-
arate ends similar in character, such a combina-
ti<>n would not constitute a sing·le conspiracy but 
several conspiracies "~hich not only could not 
be j-oined in one count. but not eYen in one in.-
dictm:ent. United States Y. McConnell (D. C.) 285 
F. 164. 
''IK OTHER \\~OR.DS, A CONSPIRACY IS 
XOT Al\ O~IXIBl"'".S CHARGE, UNDER 
WHICH YOlT CAN PROVE ANYTHING AND 
EVERYTIDNG. AKD CONVICT OF 1T·HE 
SIXS OF ~ LIFETI~fE. FOR THESE REA-
SOKS THE RULINGS COMPLAINED OF 
ARE ERRONEOUS AND CALL F·OR A RE-
VERSAL. PROOF THAT THE PLAINTIFF 
IN ERROR WAS GilllJTY OF ANOTHER 
CRIME WAS IN lTSELF PREJUDICIAL, 
A1~ .AX IXSTRl;CTION THAT HE :JIIGHT 
BE COK\:riCTED OF A ~CRIME NOT 
CHARGED IX THE INDICTMENIT' CANNOT 
BE ·SU.STAINED.'' 
People vs. Zoffel, 95 Pac. (2d) 160: 
Is a recent California case alleging ·a conspiracy to 
commit abortions. 1The very pertinent holding of the 
court is sufficiently indicated by the following quotation 
from the opinion : 
''M,ay took the stand in his -own defense. He 
denied that he 'had committed .any abortions., but 
admitted that he had entered into a conspiracy 
with his nurne to practice medicine without a li-
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~cense. Obviously, proof of conspiracy to com-
mit tha.t crime is no evidence of conspiracy to 
commit the crime cha.rged, namely, conspiracy to 
commit abortions.'' 
Davidson vs. United States, 61 Fed. (2d) 250, 
Supra.: 
Is also ·cited ~as a. very pertinent case. It will be re-
membered that three of the defendants ·soh:L an ·auto-
mobile in Missouri and whi·ch the opinion says they 
knew was stolen, but it was not the larger conspiracy 
~alleged which ·eonte.mpla.ted taking the ear from Okla-
homa to Missouri and which larger .conspiracy involved 
additional defendants, as in the case at bar. 
Dickerson vs. United States, 18 Fed. (2d) 
887: 
Is. a case illustrating the point that the conduct 
of Mr. Pear:ce in connection with Mr. Holt or Mr. Roo-
·ord is entirely consistent with an arrangement to at-
tempt to .collect money from houses of prostitution in 
the first instance and, from gambJing in the latt·er in-
stance and does not point to any agreement of ~a gen-
eral eonspira:cy to permit and allow all these continuing 
op·erations, as alleged in the indictment. 
In this ·case the court says the existence of the con-
spiracy was cle·arly pr~oved. A consp·iracy to transport, 
receive ~and sell or ·dispos.e of alcohol wa.s. .alleged. The 
objeets of the ·conspira-cy were earried out .and the ap-
pealing defendants p~a.rticip~ated therein in that they 
went to the warehouse where the alcohol was stored aft-
er shipment and were there told that the al~cohol had 
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been shipped from Peoria .. "'"hieh \\'"as pursua.nt to and 
in accordance ''ith the conspiracy, sa\\· that. the drums 
were labeled "complete denaturt"\d alcohol'' "·hen in fact 
they were buying- straig-ht alcohol and knew· it, and 
being druggists, of course they kne"~ that the alcohol 
w·as being illegally handled. 
The opinion says that the evidence 
"'creates some sus-picion or giYe·s rise to :an in-
ference that the plaintiffs in error might have had 
·some knowledge of the conspiracy at the time 
they purchased. the liquor from one or anot.her 
of the conspirators.'' 
The receipt of this alcohol under the circumstances 
here is somewhat analogous to the alleged receipt \by 
Mr. Pearce of money collected from the women. T-here 
is a difference in this, that the charge here is not a 
conspiracy to collect money but a conspiracy -to allow 
operations, which makes the testimony as to Mr. P·earee 
more remote than in the case under consideration. 
The opinion reversing the conviction in the case 
under consideration said: 
"Wherever a circumstance relied on as evi-
dence of criminal guilt is susceptible of two in-
ferences, one of which is in favor of innocence, 
such circumstance is robberli of all probative val-
ue, even though from the other inference guilt 
may be fairly deducible. To warrant a ·conviction 
for conspiracy to violate a criminal statute, 
the evidence must disclose something further than 
participating in the offens·e which is the ·olbdect orf 
the oonspinacy; there must be proof of the un-
lawful agreement either expressed .or implied, 
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·and parti·eipation with knowledge of the agree. 
ment. Linde v. U. S. 13 F. (2d) 59 (C. C. A. 8th 
Cir.); U. S. v. Heitler et .al (D. C.) 274 F. 401· 
Stubbs. v. U. S. ('C. C. A. 9th ·Cir.) 249 F. 571, 
' 161 C. ·C. A. 497; Bell v. U. ·S. (C. C. A. 8th Cir.) 
2 F. (2d) 543; Allen v. U.S. (C. :C. A.) 4 F. (2d) 
688; U. S. v. Cole (.D. ·C.) 153 F. 801, 804; Lu-
eadamo v. U. S. (C. C. A.) 280 F. 653, 657. 
·The mere fact that the plaintiffs in error 
purchwsed liquor from !the 1C01rspir.ators is not 
~sufficient to ·establis,h their guilt as eonspirators. 
The purehas.er may be perfeetly innocent of ~ny 
particip:ation in the consipiracy. The gi~st of the 
,offellls'e is the ~conspiracy, which is nO't to be con-
fuseldl 'vith .the acts done to effect the object of 
1the ·eon:spiracy. Iponm.atsu Ukichi v. U. S. (C. C. 
A.) 281 F. 525." . 
It appears to us that if there was proof of conspir-
~acy here at .all, it was of different ~conspiracies than the 
one alleged ·and smaller conspiDacies by possibly some 
of the defendants here and others at different times 
and the object of which was different from that alleged 
by the indictment. 
FAILURE TIO IN:S.TRU·CT ON THIS WAS ERROR. 
In this ·Connection, and on assignment No. 16 (A b. 
380) Request 3 (Ab. 283); Reque-st 3A (Ab. 284); and 
particularly Requests 4 and 5 (A b. 285-6) as to instruc-
tions, we point out that in. ~any event 'and in view of the 
evidence here and these authorities the defendants were 
'entitled to an instruction upon this question. Such an 
instruction was requested (A b. 285-6) and was refused 
and no instruction was given upon this question. We 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
139 
call attention particularly to Requests 4 and 5 (Alb. 
285-6) and the authorities there cited in ·addition to th~ 
~authorities cited. above, and to the fact that no instruc-
tion was given on this material a-nd vi tal issue. 
Mr. Pearce's Plea and Contention of Prior Adjudica-
tion Should Have Been Considered and the Evi-
dence Relating Thereto not Excluded. 
This issue was presented by the introduction of 
the indictment and Bill of Particulars and verdict of 
acquittal in Case K<>. 10785. (Ex. 26 (a.)-(b)-(c)-(d).) 
(See assignment 15, ·ab. 336). There Mr. P·earoo, to-
gether with E. B. Erwin and Ben Harmon were indict-
ed and tried and acquitted. The indictment charged that 
the three defendants 
"on or about the first day of June, 1937, * * * 
did wilfully, knowingly, and feloniously accep·t, 
receive, levy and appropriate money without con-
·sideration from the proceeds of the earnings of 
women engaged in prostitution.'' 
It was not contended that this necessarily constituted 
~a plea of former jeopardy. It was contended that as to 
the issue there tried, it was an adjudication of that is~ 
sue. That it was thus finally determined that the de-
fendants were not ,guil~y of the offense there charged of 
receiving money from the earnings of prostitution. 
The reoord ·shows that exactly the same evidence 
was introduced by the same witnesse-s as to Mr. P-earce 
here as was introduced in Case 10785. 'The principal 
witnesses, H. K. Record, Golden Holt and Fisher Har-
ris so te-stified. It was so established as to the women'·s 
testimony, and in f.act ·stipulated as to all witnesses. 
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It is argued by the state, that while this evidence 
was introduced in the other case to prove the charge 
of receipt of money from prostitution, that it was in-
troduced here for the purpose of having an inference 
of an ·agreement drawn from this same evidence and 
fa;ct. We insist, as .already pointed out, that it has no 
legal probative value to prove the agreement alleged 
anyway. 
The further difficulty with plaintiff's contention 
is that all this was introduced again to prove that Mr. 
Pearce received money from the earnings of prostitu-
tion, knowing it to be from such earnings. Any infer-
ence of guilt ·Could be dr.awn therefrom, only if the 
claim was true. But it had ;been proved untrue. The ul-
timate f.act relied upon had been tried and disproved 
on t~his 'Same ·evidence. Thus, the main f~act and the very 
£act from which they attempted to make an inference 
of ·conne~ction with the conspiracy or the existence of a 
conspiracy as alleged, had been tried and adjudicated. 
Before ~citing authority it is necessary to point out 
that the.se exhibits were received by the court and was 
the main matter of defense on whi·ch the defendant 
p,eavce introduced any ·evidence whatsoeve·r. 'That aft·er 
Mr. Pearce and all the defendants had rested, the 
court denied him the right to have the exhibits or the 
contention brought before the jury or .considered by 
the jury in any way or manner, and thus he was left 
at that stage of the ·cas·e without any defense so far as 
hi.s evidence was concerned. (.See Ab. 168, 252-25(), 279). 
The defense, as stated, is not stri~ctly one of former 
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jeopardy, but it is one of prior adjudication, or what 
is sometimes call~d by th~ courts estoppel, to re-try the 
some issue by the same ~Yidenct."} against the same de-
fendant. 
Sta-te z·s. Hopkins, :!19 Pa.c. 1106 at 1108: 
Is a leading cas~ upon this question and cites a 
number of authorities thereon. Tllis case has been 
previously referred to on another point. In discussing 
this case previously it was pointed out that the Sher-
iff Hopkins, Wilson, the chief of police, and George 
Bennett, .a pool hall opeT~ator, caused boot-leggers to de-
liver certain liquor, which was seized and the boot-
leggers a.tfer being locked up were run out of town and 
the liquor used without any report thereof. 
In the oose was introduced -evidence of a similar 
transaction involYing the sheriff in the s-eizure and use 
of other liquor. The court discusses the introduction of 
that ·evidence, first fr{)m the standpoint of its proof of 
a cours·e of conduct bearing upon the criminal intent 
~and indicates that for that purpose it was admissible. 
However, the sheriff having been previously tried for 
that offense and on the evidence introduced with relation 
the·reto, this presents ~an analogous situation on the 
question of introduction of an issue already tried. The 
opinion 'Says : 
''But this evidence of the alleged offense 
committed on November 9 was admitted ,s,olely 
f.or the purpose of tending to p:r.ove that defend-
ant acted with a felonious intent in taking the 
liquor tTOOD. B·arroch on November 26. Defendant 
had lbeen compelled to meet and rebut the same 
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tes~timony given by Heath upon the trial ·of cause 
No. 34 7, and this he di~d ~sueces:sfully, with the 
re,sult that the jury trying that eause pronounced 
him not gui1ty, and, when the record of that ac-
quit,tal was introduced by ~defendant upon the 
trial of this ~cause, the ~court advised the jury that 
it eould be eons:iJ<fured only as reflecting on the 
credibility of Heath; in other words, the court 
indicated ~that the jury might find that the testi-
mony given by Heath upon the trial of this cause 
was true, notwithstanding the record of ac-
quittal. The que,stion then aris.e1s : What force 
or effect .should have been given ·to the record in 
.cause No. 347 when introduced upon the tri:al 
of this cause? 
'Important as the su!bje~ct would 'apparently 
appear to be it i:s one whieh has not be,en th{)r-
~oughly exp~lained by the text-writers., and not 
fveqnently passed upon by the eourts, considering 
the va's,t multitude of criminal ·eas:es 'and the va-
rious questions raised in that -class of eases.' 103 
Am .. St. Rep. 20. 
The d1oc.trine of res (adjudi,cata .as .applied in 
civil ·Cases ]s fairly well :settled. It has. its foun-
dation in two fundamental ID'axims of the law. 
'A man s1haH not be tw:i~ce vexed for one and 
·the same .cause' and 'I't is f.or the public good 
that there be an end to litigation.' Broom's Le-
gal Maxims, 247-250. 
Almost ta ~century and a half ago the English 
Hous.e of Lord's ·de,cl:ared 'that the judgment of a 
·court of ·concurrenrt juri1sdi·ction directly upon 
the point i~s, as a plea, a bar, ·or, as evidence, con-
clusive between the same parties upon the same 
matter, directly in question in another coutt.' 
( IDuches,s of Kingston's Cas.e, 20 How:ell ''s State 
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Trials, 353) and the do<.~trine ha~ b(\en ~HlherPll 
to in this country (\Yer since. 
In MarYin Y. Dutcher, ~G :Minn. 391 . ..{. N. vV. 
685, thf:\ court sta.ted the rule n s folio w·~ : 
'It is irresis.tilble that the jud·gment of a 
court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive as 
e-vidence upon parties and privie8- in re~pect to 
every question direc.tly involved in .the issue and 
determined by the judgment.' 
In Freeman Dn Judgments, seetion 318, it i's 
said: 
''The principles applicable to judgments in 
criminal cases are, in geneml, identical, so far as 
the question of estoppel is involved, with the 
principles recognized in civil cases.' 
In 2 \Tan Fleet's Former AdJjudica.tion, sec-
tion 628, the auth-or says : 
'If there is a contest between the state and 
the defendant in a criminal case, over an issue, I 
know of no reason why it is not res judicata in 
Wl:other criminal case. ' 
In Commonwealth v. Evans, 101 Mass. 25, 
the doctrine was appli-ed to the fullest ex:tent. 
Evans was fiflst charged with assaulting Henry 
McKenzie with a knife, ·and was tried and con-
victed. Later McKenzie died as the result of the 
wound, and Evans was then charged with man-
~Slaughter, and upon the .trial of that charge he 
i&ought to prove that he used the knife in neoees-
;sa,ry -self defense. In rebuttal the commonwealth 
introduced the record of his conviction in the as-
sault case, and the .trial court instructed the jury 
that the record was conclusive evidence that the 
use of the knife upon McKenzie was unjustifiable, 
and that the defens.e that the knife had been law-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
144 
fully us·ed by the defendlan t in ~self defense had 
been determined by the judgme,nt, and was not 
·Op·en ·to him. In reviewing that instruction, the 
·Suprem·e Court s1aid: 
'T·he only question is as. to the e:ffiect of that 
judgment, 'as evidence, UJPOn the i1s,sues of fact 
raised in the trial of this ease for manslaughter. 
The ~court lhelow ruled that it establi·shed conclu-
·sively that .the assult was unjustifiable, ·and there-
fore disproved the position of the defendant in 
this .ca:se, th,a;t the knife wa·s useJdi in self-defense. 
Upon general principles, the partie:s being the 
s·ame, the former jurgment must be held to have 
·e!st:abliJshed !all facts whi·ch were involved in the 
issue ~then tried, and es-sential to the judgment 
rendered upon it. The conviction. for as~sult and 
battery therefore neees.sarily ~ex:eludes all justi-
fication which r(~ould :have he·en ·set up under the 
general i1ssue of not guilty. The faets. of the as-
S'ault re-main the ·s:ame ; and whatever would sus-
~tain the ground of self-defense, now relied on, 
woulld1 have been a ·complete defense to the former 
pro:s·e.cution. The verdict and judgment in tha;t 
~case were ,therefore rightly h·eld rto be a oon-
·clusive answer to the attempt a.t jus1tifi·cation 
made in thils ease.' 
In People v. Frank, 28 Cal. 507, the defend-
ant was ~convicted of p·ws~sing a draft wi~th a 
forged endol'lsement upon it, knowing that the 
endorsement ·was a forgery. To prove the feloni-
ous: intent, the :state was p·ermitted ~to show that 
~at !about the s1ame time the defendant h3Jd pas·sed 
two othe-r 1dlrafts, d-esignated 3 and 9, with the 
.'S'ame forged endorsement upon each of .them. In 
~offering this evide-nce, the p·rose,cuting officer ad-
mitted that the defendant had been .charged with 
forging the endorsement on draft 3, and with 
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passing the draft, kno"~ing t hn t the l'ndor~Ptne-n t 
was a forg·erY, and had ibeen tried upon ·the 
charge an~.l. ~quitted. ·Th{\ SnprPlllP t ~on rt held 
·that the ·admission of the eYidenee did not do 
violence to the doctrine of res judicata. under the 
peculiar circumstances there inYolYed., but in the 
course of the opinion said : 
'
1The soundness of the doctrine to the effect 
thaAt .the judgment of a court of competent juris-
diction directly upon the point is as a plea at 
bar, or as evidence conclusive upon the 1Same 
matter coming directly or incidentally in ques-
tion in an-other action between the •same parties, 
cannot be doubted. * * * In order to render 
rtJhe verdict and judgment -of not guilty upon the 
draft offered in evidence conclusive upon the 
facts which the prosecution sought to prove for 
the puJ.l>Ose of &howing guilty knowledge, it mu-st 
appear wi-th certainty from the evidence offered 
in support of ~th-e all-eged estoppel that those 
£acts were diirootly and necessarily found by the 
verdict in that cruse in favor of the defendant ; 
or in other words, 1:ha.t the jury could not have 
found the verdict which ·they did without having 
passed directly upon the racis offered to be 
proved, •and found them against the pros-ecu-
tion.' 
After enumerating the several propositonrs. 
which were neces-sarily involved in the trial of 
the defendant for passing draft 3, the court con-
tinued: 
'Now if all thes·e provisions we-re directly 
.and necessarily decided in favor of the defendant 
by the verdict and judgment in question, then the 
·district attorney was estopped from makifng the 
proof; or if ·either of them was rs-o decided, as rto 
such he was estoppel<t, upon the principle that 
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matte-:rts vvhi·eh h.ave been once· judicially deter-
mined ·eannot he .ag~a.in. drawn into controvensy 
rus !between the pa:rtties and privies to the deter-
mination. ' ' 
And ~concluded: 
' The verdict cannot opHrate as an estoppel, 
exeep.t aS: to the allegation ·that the defendant 
forged the endorse-ment.' 
In Bell v. Sta.te, 57 Md: 108, the defendant 
wa1s ~convieteidi of passing an o:vder for the pay-
ment of money on July 16;· 1880, knowin:g it to be 
forged. Up·on the .tr:Ual the state offered evidence 
to p·:VOV'e that on July 17 defendant had pas,sed 
'a 1similar forged order. In ·de.fens,e the record was 
offered, whi·ch disclosed that the defendant \had 
heen !charge~ with passin.g rthe order on July 17, 
1and had been tried .and aequitted. But ~counsel for 
·defendant offe·r.e,d .the reeord 'for the purp<)'Se of 
,affeeting the weight and ~credibility of the evi-
dence against ~the accused', and it was admitted 
for that limi.te1ct purp·os-e only. Before ·the jury, 
however, counJS:el for defendant undertook to 'ar-
gue that the reeord was conclusive against t,he 
·contention of the state, but were not permitted 
to .continue to argue to that Hffe,ct. In disposing 
~of the ·contention made, the appeUate .court ~aid: 
'At the time thwt reeord wa1s offered, the 
{~ounsel might, if they had thought proper, have 
offered it ge:n:eDally, or as (~onclusive evidence, 
.that ·the ~appellant :had not forged or uttered the 
,che~ek of July 17, and as an ·es1toppel upon t~he 
state, .an1d, if :vej.eeted by the court when ·thus 
offered, or .admitted for the purpog.e- only of af-
feeting the weight ,and credibility of the evidenee 
again:s,t him, .the appellant might have then ex-
cepted to such rulin.g, and ~had it reviewed by 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
147 
this court. But it "·as not ~n offered. ()n the con-
trarY, it "~aB offered expre~~ly on th~ tr•IwyJl~ and 
for ·the pUI1)0SeoB "·hich the c.ou rt had :sta t.l'd it 
would be ad1nissi1ble for: that i~. for the pur-
pose of affecting Uu~ \\~eight and credibility of 
the evidence against the acc.llSt:}.tl. ... \.nd eYPn \Vhen 
the court interposed and stated the purposes for 
which alone the record had been admitted, the ap-
pellant might have excepted to the ruling, limit-
ing the effect of the record to this particular 
purpose, if i.t had not been offered ''under the 
permission of the court as ·SJtated in the first 
exception." Sauerwein Y. Jones, 7 G. & J. 341, 
Inloes '· Am.er. Exchange Bank, 11 Md. 185. 
But he excepte(h, not to the limitation thus put 
upon the effect of the record as evidence, but 
to the court's refusal to permit his counsel to 
argue that the record had a larger and br-oader 
effoot, than that to which it had been limited by 
the court. The court has an und-oubted right to 
state to the jury the legal effect of evidence which 
ihas been introduced and submitted to their con-
tsideration. McHenry v. Marr ·and Emmart, 39 
Md 532, 533; Wheeler v. State, 42 Md. 570. Not 
having excepted .to the statement made by the 
oourt of the legal effect of the record, it hecame 
the law of the case. Hogan v. Hendry, 18 Md. 128 ; 
Davis v. Pratton, 19 Md. 128; Dent v. Hancock, 5 
Gill. 127. Being the law of the -case, counsel were 
not at liberty to argue against it.' 
In MitcheU v. State, 140 Ala. 118, 37 South. 
76, 103 Am. St. Rep. 17, the defendam;t was con-
victed of arso~ in burning a building belonging 
to .Sue Harris. To prove the criminal intent in the 
commission of .that offens-e, tJhe state offered evi-
dence tending to prove that •about the same time 
'and near the :same place, the defendant had set 
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fire to a buil1c1ing belonging to one Murphy. In de-
fense the record was offered whi,ch disclosed 
that ;the defendant had lbe~en ·charged with burn-
inig 1fue Murphy .building, and had been tried and 
acquitted. The trial ~court refused ·to ~admit the 
reeord in ·evidence, and on appeal the Supreme 
Court 1S1aid : 
'·The evidence so offered was admissible un-
de~r the doctrine of res adjudieata, whereof it 
has been well ·said: ''A final judgment on the 
merits determining :any issue of law or fact af·ter 
a eont~e~st ove·r it, forever set:s at rest, and fixes 
it ~asi a faet or .as the l·aw in any other lirtigation 
between ,the parties.'' Van Fleet's Former Ad-
ju<]i,eation, 2 et ·s.eq. * * * For the ·error in re-
jecting the offer above referred to, the judgment 
will be revers.ed, and the eause remanded.' 
The f.ollowing ~casers, though not directly in 
point, illustrate the 1s:ame p·rincip.Je: Common-
wealth v. Ellis, 160 Mas's. 16·5, 35 N. E. 7'73; Cof-
fey v. United Sta,tes, 116 U. S. 436, 6 Sup. Ct. 
437, 29 L. Ed. 684. '' 
H·ere this record was refused ·consideration for 
any purpose. 
This proposition, so well recognized in civil cases, 
has not been passed• upon direetly, ·so far as we have 
found, lby this Court. It has be·en .suggested however. 
Sta.te vs. Cheesemarn, 63 Utah 138, 223 Pac. 
762: 
The opinion 1a:nd authorities .cited in that case are 
summarized accurately, w·e believe, in the second sylla-
bus, as follows : 
''Acquittal of one off·ens'e is no bar to profe-
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some essential elem·ent of the ~l'eond offl\H~l\ w~~ 
necessarily adjudicated nnd ~.leh,nnitH'd in thP 
prQSooution for the first offense.,' 
Authorities are cited along the ~ame line ns t·he author-
ities oited in the case next aboYe. The facts in the case 
did not involYe a close question ·at all, as one case in-
\olved the matter of the report of the aceiden t and the 
other the question of negligence in the accident. The plea 
was one of former jeopardy. 
The language of Russell vs. Place, 94 U. S. 608, 
(24 L. Ed. 21±), as quoted by this Court in that case, 
is applicable here. 
"It is undoubt,e;dly settled la\\"'" that a judg-
ment of a court of competent jurisdioti·on, upon a 
question dire0tly involved in one suit, is conclu-
sive as to that question in another suit hetween 
the same parties. ' ' 
rJnited States 1.:s. Oppenheimer, 242 U. S. 65, 
61 L. Ed. 161, 3 A. L. R. 516: 
Is a later U.S. Case discnssing and directly ·S·ettling 
the proposition that the same rule a.s to adjudication of 
an issue that applies in civil cases, applies in criminal 
cases ; and pointing out the difference between a plea 
of former jeopardy under the 5th Amendment, and a 
pl€a of res judicata. 
The former acquittal on the issue alleged in the 
previous case was under the statute of limitation. The 
question is discussed as to w.hether that amounted to 
an adjudication of the issue there ~cha.rged in the indict-
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ment, and the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice 
Holme's, held that it did, an\d then discussing the ques-
tions here involved, says: 
''Upon the merits the proposition of the 
government is that the doctrine of res judicata 
does not exist for -criminal cases except in the 
modified form of the 5th Amendrnent, that a per-
ISOn shall not be !subject for the same of£ense to 
be twiee put in jeopardy of life or limb; and the 
~conclusion is dra.,vn that a decision upon a plea 
in bar .cannot prevent a se:cond trial when the 
def,enda.nt n:ever has been in jeopa:fldy in the 
1s·ense of being before a jury upon the £acts of 
the offense· dharged. I:t ·seems that the mere iSitate-
m·ent of the ·position ·Should be its own answer. 
It eannot he that the s,afeguards of ~he person, 
,so often an;d so rightfully mentioned with solemn 
:rever~ence, are lHss than t 1 tose that protect from 
;a li·albality in debt. It cannot be that a judgment 
of ~acquittal on ~the ground of the S.tatute of Lim-
it,a;tions is le~s~s a p·rotection against a second 
trial than a judgment upon the ground of inno-
·cence, or that such a judgment is .any more effec-
tive when entered after a verdict than if entered 
by the government's ·Cons·ent before a jury is im-
paneled,; or that it i~s «~onclusive if entered upon 
the general issue. (United States v. IGssel, 218 
U. S. 601, 610, 54 L. Ed. 1168, 1179, 31 Sup. Ct. 
Rep. 124), but if upon a s.p·ecia.l plea. of the :staJt-
ute, ·permits the defendant to be pros·e·cuted 
'again. W·e do not suppose· that it would be doubt-
·ed that a judgment UJPOn a demurrer ,to the mer-
its would be .a bar to a se~eond indictm·en:t in the 
·Same words .. State v. Fields, 106 Iowa 406, 76 
N. W. 802; W:hart. 'Crim. Pl. & Pr. 9th Ed para 
406. 
We may :adopt in its applica.tion to ·this case 
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·th~ statement of a judgP nf g-reat PxpPril'llOe in 
the criminal la"~: "ll .. here a crin1inal cha.rge has 
been adjudicated upon by a court hal'in.g Jnrisdic-
ti.o-n to hear a;nd, deter-nz.ine it, the adju-dica-ti.on, 
whether it f.akes the fornr of a.n. a.cqu.ittal O'r con-
·riction. is final a ... ~ to the ·~natter so adjudicated 
upon, and 1na.y be pleaded in bar to a.ny subse-
quent prosecution .for the sa1ne off'ense. . . . In 
this respect the crimi.nal laze is in unison with 
that which prevails in ci.ril proceed1~ngs.' Haw-
kin~, J., in Reg. '· Mile-s, L. R .. 24 Q. B. Div. 423, 
431. The finality <>f a previous adjudii.caJti<>n as to 
the ·matters deternzined by it, is the ground of 
decision in Com. v. Evans, 101 Mass. 25, ~he crim-
inal and the cinl la-w agreeing, as Mr. Justice 
Hawkins says. Com. '· Ellis, 160 Mass. 165, 35 
K. E. 773; Brifi:tain v. Kinnaird, 1 BrDd. & B. 432, 
129 Eng. R-eprint 789, 4 J. B. Moore, 50, Gow, 
X. P. 164, 21 Revised Rep. 680. Seemingly the 
.same new was taken in FT~ank v. Mangum, 237 
U. S. 309, 59 L. Ed. 969, 983, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
582, as it was also in Coffey v. United States, 
116 U .. S. 436, 445, 29 L. Ed. 684, 687, 6 Sup. Ct. 
Rep. 437. '' 
It will be -noticed that this opinion cites some of the 
'Same authority cited ·supra in the Hopkins Case. 
''The safegUlllrd provided by the· C onstitu-
tion against the gravest abuses has tended to 
give the irnpression that when it did not apply 
in terms, there was no other pri11Jciple that could. 
But the 5th Amendment was not intooded to 
do away with what in the civil law is a fwndamten-
tal primciple of justice. (Jeter v. Hewitt, 22 H<>w. 
352, 364, 16 L. Ed. 345, 348), in order, when a 
man once has been acquitted on the merits, to 
enable the govermnent to prosecute him a sec-
ond time.'' 
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In order to get the full force of this opinion and the 
r.eference~s to the "5th Amendment", this is. the amend-
ment providing that no person may be t.wi~ce put in 
jeopardy. So that Justice Holmes disposes of the ~en­
eral ~contention of the state in this case-, and the posi-
tion taken by t:he -court, that the only question that could 
be rais·ed was one of twice in j·eopa~dy on the same 
.charge. 'The above cas-e~s refutes that position. 
State vs. Creechley, 37 Utah 142, 75 Pac. 384: 
Goes merely to the quegtion that the issue of prior 
adjudication here raised as a defense 'should have been 
considered by the jury even though it were not shown 
that any evidjenee was produced thereupon. As above 
pointed out, this issue was entirely withdrawn from 
the jury. 
It should also he pointed out before leaving this 
discussion, that in a:d~dition to the· allegation of an 
agreement to permit and allow operations, it is charged 
as an overt aet in the indietment that about the first 
of each and every month betwe·en the months of June, 
1937, ~and J·anuary, 1938, defendants colle,cted and ca.used 
to he oolle~cted, money from the operators of house-s of 
ill fame (Ab. 3), and in the Bill of p,arti,culars, that 
between said dates the· defendants, with the .aid and 
assist~ance of Golden Holt and Ben Harmon, collected 
money from such operators. (Ah. 11). 1The· i~s·sue de-
termined in ~ca.s·e 10785 adv-ersely to the st~ate, being 
introduced by the same witnesses, as to such money, is 
the only ·evid_ence connecting any ·defendant with such 
overt act. 
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Oliver rs. Sup. Ct. (Cal.) ~67 Pac. 764: 
\f as a proceeding· to rest.rnin the trial court from 
proceeding with the trial of certain deft.:\ndants \vho 
had been tried under an indictment charging· ·an agree-
ment and conspirac.y to dQ certain things and then alleg-
ing the various overt acts, and also contained counts al-
l~ging the dDing of the things charged as overt acts in 
the eonspirac.y. The petitioners, defendants in the orig-
inal case, had been acquitted of the counts which 
charged them with the offenses which were also pleaded 
as overt acts under the conspiracy. The court held 
that the issue as to these counts having been tried, 
the issue was determined, and these matters could not 
again be tried as overt acts of the conspiracy, and 
since the statute required overt acts to be alleged and 
proved, they could not be tried on a conspiracy charge 
either lbecause that issue was now disposed of. The 
opinion says : 
''But here the conclusion cannot be escaped 
that since each crime, considered and described 
collectively ·as a single entity, is alleged to be an 
·overt act, and as the jury fully acquitted thes·e 
petitioners of ,each overt act thus alleged, the 
portion of the count charging oonspimcy re-
maining unadjudicated is !insufficient to constitute 
criminal conSipiracy. Moreover, considering the 
:vooord here presented, by finding that none of 
the overt acts charged as part of ifue conspiracy 
were committed., the jury, in ·effect, acqlllitted the 
petitioners of the offense Df conspiracy.'' 
'This matter is presented in suppoflt of assignment 
15 see Ab. 336. The issue was seasonably raised and the 
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court was .asked to consider it upon. the recoro then 
available and without denial that the ·evidence would be 
the same. It is also presented upon the ·assignments 9, 
Ab. 317 and 19, Ab. 390, that the defendant P·earce was 
prevented from having a fair trial. 
Improper ~statements and Conduct of the District 
Attorney Committed and Allowed was Prejudicial 
'This involves assignments 11, 12, and 13 (a) to (n) 
inclusive (Ab. 318-335). Also assignments 9 ~and 19, tha.t 
defendants were not ~given a fair trial. 
It is quite apparent that the di.strict attorney was 
·determined to procure a conviction at :all •Costs .. in this 
cas-e. Wthile some of thes-e matters may not have been 
prejudi·cial taken :alone, some of them ·are under the 
authorities prejudicial standing .alone, :and certainly 
taken as a whole they are prejudicial. 
Spa'<~e will not ·permit the discussion of each of 
these s·ep·a:va,tely. A suf:fi.cient number will be given to 
show the import .and nature and then authority will be 
·cited thereon : 
Assuming~ as ·stated in 64 C. J. p. 235, sec. 251, that 
in an opening statement the attorney may define the 
na.tur·e of the issue's, that hH may state what he expects 
to p·rovr.e in a general way, that he cannot state such 
proof as would be incompetent, .and that he cannot make 
the opening 'Statement a medium for arguing the merits, 
''nor will the relation of testimony at length lbe toler-
ated. '' And also assuming that it is not mis,conduct to 
make an error in stating som·ething that he intends to 
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prove and \Yhich he does not la.ter pro,~t\ if ~uch state-
m~nt is made in good faith, but that it is error if a 
statement is not so made. 
We consider first the nature of the opening state-
ment here as contained in the '• V-ol. ,~'' supplement to 
the record and in the assignments (Ab. 318-329). Note 
particularly that this statement departs from the al-
legations of an agreement, recites hearsay statements 
at length, it imputes misconduct not pertinent to the is-
sues to prejudice the jury, and that the whole statement, 
if all that was stated in it were true, would not es-
tablish the offense alleged. The statements with relation 
to investigations by Fisher Harris and what he had 
found were incompetent. The statement that defendants 
each had knowledge of the operations involved was im-
material, as the cases cited hold, that knowledge or 
the failure to prevent the carrying out of the conspir-
acy, even though a person has the power so to do, is not 
proper evidence in this character of case. ( 4 7 Fed. ( 2d) 
692) supra. 
The statements that Early investigated and deter-
mined there was a payoff in January, 1936; the state-
ment that Harmon, Browning, Rosenblum and Jennings 
called and asked what they could do to keep operating, 
which was not only not supported by any evidence but 
clear hearsay; the statement that Early sent these men 
to the chief of police, ·stated in this very connection, 
which was not proved; the statement that Austin Smith 
would testify that there was a number of bills that had 
not been ·paid lby Mr. Erwin and after these were paid 
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the payoff would be reorg,anized. T!here was no testi-
mony of this. The state~m.ents concerning memorandums 
of vice eondi tions and the letter of Fisher Harris, which 
was finally held to be incompetent although actually re-
c:i ted into the record, and the numerous. statements of 
rumors !and the "gist of these· rumors" that vi~ce was 
going on and that there was a payoff. These were not 
only incomp·etent, but the district attorney must have 
known that they were. 
Thi'S violated the rule as stated by this Court in 
State vs. Distefano, 262 Pac. 113 at 114 
Where it is said, in the opening stat·ement the at-
torney may state the material facts which the evidence 
will establish 
''but not fa,cts whi~ch the party is· not able to 
prove and none that cannot be supported by 
legal evidence. Bishop's Criminal Procedur.e, (2d. 
Ed.) Vol. 2, P. 791, p1ara. 969." 
There was refusal to follow the suggestions of the 
court that it ~be confined to competent ·evidence, but a 
s-tatement by the attorney, ''But, Your Honor, there is 
a rHsponsihility and hurd en on the state * * *." 'The 
statement of .conversations between Holt and T~ag.gart; 
the statement that all these operations were· permitted to 
operate unmolested "under the instruction of Chief 
Finch"; which was not prov·ed. The build,.. up· by the use 
of the Federation of Women 's· Clulbs and the incompetent 
statement that they had made an investigation and 
what they had found as to rumors of vi~, and the 
1statement never proved that they read. from a memor-
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andum to the mayor n~unes of n1en vvho \\.l're alleged 
to be taking a payoff. The further ~ta.tenlPnt thnt they 
had discussed this "ith llr. Finch, of \Yhich there \vas 
no proof. The statement of a. conYersa t inn bet,Yeen Gust 
Captain and Holt, and the discus~ion about Captain be-
ing an investigator for the ,,~omen's Clubs, 'vhich was 
never proved. 
There was ·another build-up "-.Jth relation to Fisher 
Harris and Harold B. Lee '• working 'With the ChurCh 
Security plan" and relating to the conversation with 
Mr. P-earce and the false statement that Mr. Harris 
said to Mr. Pearce, "You are collecting from operators 
{)f vice establishments''. which was never .said; and then 
t:he instance in connection with Mr. Lee of the utterly 
incompetent statement of Ben Harmon to Holt after 
the conspiracy had ended, about Mr. Lee accusing Mr. 
Pearce. And again in this connection, when the court 
called attention to statements that counsel was making 
of a hearsay nature, and counsel's statement in the 
presence of the jury, "If we are not permitted to in-
troduce in evidence statements made by defendants 
after. they were apprehended, four or five days after 
the offense, etc.'' Defendants were never shown to 
have been apprehended or to have made any statements 
under :such circumstances. 
We have the extended ;statements 1about houses of 
prostitution here and throughout, as if this attorney, 
who had been in office many times ·as long as Mr. Finch 
with ~hese things always oper:ating, was horrified, and in 
thi~ connection. a statement that the money taken from 
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these girls was ''turned over to the defendants'' which 
was. not proved, and as to Mr. Finch never attempted to 
be proved. 
We have the statement that Chief Finch directed 
Thacker to take orders from Ben Harmon and do what 
Harmon asked ~him to ·do, which was nev.er attempted 
to be proved, and. that Tha,cker said that Mr. Finch 
would not permit Bill Browning to op·en up because 
Bill Browning would not pay Ben Harmon, ~also not 
proved. That Mr. Finch rep·rima.nded Hedman for mak-
ing ~an arrest, ~and similarly with relation to 0. B. 
Record, when lboth of these witnesses testified that Mr. 
Finch did nothing of the kind. Also the damaging state-
ment that Mr. Finch said to Judge Ell·ett, "Why can't 
we let thes·e things run on~' ', whieh was. never proved; 
allld the frequent argumentative appeals, when objec-
tions, were made or statements by the court, to the 
jury, such as ''I have all the ~confidence in the world 
that fui,s jury ·Can determine when that evidence comes 
in whether or not I am telling the truth", and the state-
ment in this ·conne~ction that he had written it down. 
This •cert,ainly left no excus-e for his making statements 
on which there was no -evidence. And the statement with 
reference to Fisher Harris's letter, "I can assure 
you it was not gossip. It was- put down in a letter * * •." 
Also in ·conne,ction with objections made to the court 
that thes·e things were incompetent and .also immaterial, 
the voluntary 1sta tement that the attorney would not be 
able to show "'any written memorandum prepared by 
the ·Conspirators. 'T'hey don't d,o it that way.'' And the 
further statement, ''~Of cours-e we contend that a major-
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ity of this 'Yas not in the prl"\~f'DC(\ ot• the defendants. 
Obviously they would not be there "yhen it wns going 
on, purposely ~ * ~. '' This, and particularly when taken 
in connection with the other remark~, and the asking 
of leading questions to thus introduce objectionable mat-
ter, and the whole eourse of c.onduct of the attorney, 
·was, quite obviously prejudicial. 
Coming now to the evidence, 'Ye will cite some 
more examples. In connection with the testimony of Mr. 
Ellett (Ab. 329), a.n objection that a statement of "~hat 
his ''friend'' had told him did not involve an admission 
or denial of the crime charged, which was entirely prop-
er ·and called for no argument to the jury, whereupon 
the attorney made the two speeches indicated at page 
330 of the abstract, concluding ''I reiterate that the jury 
is the person and institution that will be called upon to 
determine whether or not such a statement as will be 
introduced would be denied by a reasonable person' ' ; 
then after discussing Gust Captain in the opening state-
m€nt and the court having settled that evidence as to 
him was not admissible, this -statement: ''We would 
be pleased to introduce that conver.sation ibu.t we are 
afraid there would be an objection.'' Then, after the 
court's ruling out Gust Captain, and in order to tie him 
in anyway, the next question the attorney asks: "Q. 
Well, after you ·saw Gust Captain, I think you said you 
saw Ben Harmon?'' (Ab. 331) This was asked of Holt. 
Then in discussing the letter written by Fisher Harris 
of hls investigation (Ab. 331) on an objection which the 
court ultimately :sustained as to the doonment, the ar-
gument . ~'Here is the city attorney, the chief enforcing 
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officer of the city, making ·Charges against the mayor." 
Ther.e was no such eharge made in the letter. (Ex. R). 
·This a.rgument, ;as loud !as. he ·could sp·eak it to the jury, 
was objected to and no ruling made hy the court. It was 
in this cohnerction that it was pointed out to the trial 
·court that objection had to be made and the -court was re-
quired to instruct. 
Counsel's repeated instructions and directions to 
the jury as to the law and the duty of the jury there-
under a.s above and hereinafter indicated, was "\vrong. 
It is uniforma.lly held that such instruction is exclus-
ively for the- ·court. 
After reading an ordinance to Mr. Finch (Ab. 332) 
a number of time's- as to the ~duties of the· police, this 
could only relate to the immaterial matter as. to whether 
the ·chief had been lax in his duties, and after the chief 
had s.t~a,ted that he was not a. la:wyer and he hadn't read 
the oDdinance, the prosecuting ·attnrney made the state-
ment that "ignorance of the law is no justification". 
·Then we have the re-cord after the state had put 
in its case 'vith relation to Mr. P.earce, and afte·r H. K. 
Re·eord had stated that he made no repoTt of the al-
leged ·convevsation, 0. B. Re•cord was sworn and asked 
a long leading question (Ab. 333) ·as to the conversa-
tion bet.we,en him and his brother H. K. Re-cord. Ob-
je·ction was made that it was hea~say and not rebuttal. 
Couns·el then made an irrelevant statement about Mr. 
Finch, '\\rho was not involved in the question. It was 
stated· ·that the testimony would lbe prejudi•ci.al on ob-
j~e.ction, and on this occasion, and also on other ooca-
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sions, the prosecuting attorney 8aid, ·'Don't get excit-
ed. We think all these thi.ngs are pt·eju.dichzl to the de-
feMant, yo'ur Hon'()r, ju.st a.s preiud1~cial as indicated 
h.ere ani/, as Mr. Mullin.er th.i'nks it ·is." The objection 
was sustained and there was no occasion for this state-
ment. This will indica.t~ th~ nature of oond.uct. 
We desire to point out now a few matters in con-
nection with the closing statement. In the intr-oduction 
of Dar Kempner's te-stimony (Ab. 40-64) the attorney 
made a determined and misleading effort to have this 
witness testify that the occasion when Abe Stubook 
collected money was after the first of June, 1937, so as 
to bring it within the allegation, and at a time when H. 
K. Record was n{)t head of the vice squad. The wit-
ness clearly did not so testify. The attorney stated in 
his closing argument ( Ab. 334) that he did, and atten-
tion was ealled to the record: 
''·MR. RAWLINGS : I expected. that quib-
ble ; but the jury will remember collections were 
made up until June. * * * Kempner had known 
Stubeck. They were pals together.'' 
·This statement was absolutely untrue. Kempner did not 
!so testify. ~he state's witness Holt testified positively 
that from the end of 1936 there were no collections until 
he .started on the 3rd or 4th of June of 1937. Ther-e w.as 
.no evidence that Kempner and Stubeck were pals, it 
was to the contrary. (Ab. 62, 229) 
There was another .statement (Alb, 334) by the at-
torney that these people wanted to be arrested and want-
to be taken to jail, intimating a laxnes:s, in not arre·st-
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ing the·m. Attention was again -called to the record, and 
Mr. Rawlings said ''They 'vere arrested. That is in 
·evidence.'' It is not p1ain what was. meant by this un-
less this is. another intimation that the defendants were 
arrested. In this ·connHction (A h. 335) there was alsQ 
the s:tatement, objected to, that Ben Harmon was "the 
king pin of the underworld''. This was, not shown. 
We come now to a more ~serious matter. In his clos-
ing .argument, and over o bj·ection, the att·orney stated 
that the defendants "hired Mr. P·e1arce", which is whol-
ly ·contrary to anything in the reeord.. When attention 
was ~called to it, the attorney said: "I am drawing an 
inference. I don't know how mu·ch they paid him but 
Pearce himself said, 'I am instructed by the mayor to 
make these colle·ction 's. I don't know what else you 
need. If that is not hiring, you don't think he W{)uld 
he doing it for nothing.'' Such a statement, particularly 
against these defendants, was clearly impr-oper. 
There was not only no evidenee of hiring fb~ the 
other defendants, but there was no evidence of collec-
tion by Pearce, and such he:arsay statement iaS to Mr. 
Irwin, without foundation, was. maliciously prejudicial. 
And now even a more serious matter. In many in-
stances, as pointed out, evidence was introduced of 
statements or ~conduct by one defendant here sometimes 
involving the mention of another ·defendant. In many of 
the.se instances the ·court ·did not confine it to the defend-
ant making the statement, but also in seve,ral cases the 
court did so limit it. As al:r:eady pointed out, there 
was no foundati·on for the introduction of any of it, 
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but in this particular instance the attorney had con-
sented to the limitation. It "'"as "ith relation to testi-
mony of a conversation with Mr Thacker. Such situa-
tion and ruling of course clearly indicated to the at-
torney that such statements could not be used to prove 
the conspiracy, but oould only be admitted after the 
conspiracy had been proved. Now after the oourt had 
reminded the attorney that he is talking ,and arguing 
that this testimony of '!'hacker proved the conspiracy 
when it was limited to Thacker, 
"THE OOURT: What is your memory! 
MR. RA WLIXGS: That is my memory but 
I say it because it shQws a mutual understanding. 
I say it shows a mutual understanding between 
these parties. '' 
Further objection was made to this statement, lbut no 
ruling by the court. (See next topic on this incident). 
People vs. Grossman, 82 Pac.(2d) 76 at 83: 
Held that where an attorney was trying to connect 
the other attorney with knowledge of a complaint and 
asked the witness if she signed, it under his advice 
and direction, and an objection was made and the pros-
ecuting attorney said, ''It stands to reason she did so ; 
what is the use of quibbling~'', that this was improper. 
It did not result in a reversal because it stood atone 
and the trial oourt then directed the jury not only that 
the remark was improper but that it would be stricken 
out and the jury was directed not to consider it. 
State vs. Solomon, 87 Pac. (2d) 807, (Ut.): 
Of course, is a leading case upon this question, and 
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the .statements there made outside of the record and 
which resulted in reversal, are nowhere near as numer-
ous ·or damaging as the statements of that ·character in 
thi~s ·case. 
State vs. Barone, 70 Pac. (2d) 735 (Ut.): 
'':There is no justification for the prosecution 
inje·cting ·anything into the trial of 1a. case that 
would be unfair. In this .cas·e the distri~ct attor-
ney apparently knew that the ·evidence proffered 
by him was not only incompetent but prejudici,al 
to defendant, lbeing ·calculated, though not re-
~ceived by" the court, to influence the jury against 
defendant.'' 
State vs. Lyte, 284 Pac. 1006: 
Is la ·case where this Court diS:cusses the questi~on of 
previous adjudication, hereinabove d.is~cus~sed, and inti-
mates the correctness of ~our contention here. This court 
could not 1decide the question because of the lack of 
right to have the ·case .appealed, and the point ruled on. 
It also involves the question of ~conduct of an attorney. 
The opinion :says : 
''The rulings thus involve the question not 
of jeopaDdy, but ·of permitting the state to give 
evidence of offenS'es sepaDate and distinct from, 
and not included within the ·charged offense and 
of which the defendant has he·en acquitted. * • • 
The evidence was admitted on the statement of 
the district attorney, more adroit than sound, 
to show the eharacter of the pr·emises on ,vhich 
the liquor ·charged, in this ~a.ction. was. claimed 
to be poss~essed by the defe-ndant and to ~show 
the probability of his possession of it. * * 1 es-
pe~cially since the atC~cus·ed had theretofore been 
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acquitted -of sueh Qther offt:"\nses, may be a.ssu1ned 
to be an erroneous and groundless claim or pur-
pose f<>r whieh the eYidenoo was admissiihle. '' 
~ • * * • * 
''In all criminal ca.ses an undoubted duty ·a.nd 
responsibility rests on the court and the prose-
cuting attorney to see that all rights and. priv-
ileges of the accused are safeguarded and pro-
tected, and that convictions are permitted only 
()D competent and material evidence.'' 
State z·s. Jlartin, 300 Pac. 103-! at 1040 ( Ut.): 
''It is of course improper for the district at-
tl()rney to refer to extraneous matter in his ar-
gument to the jury notwithstanding it had been 
referred to in argument by counsel for the de· 
fense. The district attorney should have object-
ed at the time it was so referred to and moved 
the court to exclud-e it from the consideration 
{)f the jury. '' 
People t·s. Kregewski, 163 N. E~ 438: 
Holds that attempts to elicit hearsay evidence, and 
commenting in that connection that evidence was suffici-
ent to convict, was improper. 
People vs. Reed, 164 N. E. 847: 
Holds that arguments have no place in an opemng 
statement. 
Bolden vs. State, 155 N. E. 824: 
Holds that the charge ·of other matters ·of crime in 
an. opening statement is reversible error: 
Green vs. State, 158 S. E. 285: 
Held that recital of inadmissible matters In an 
opening . statement by the prosecuting attorney was 
error; 
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The Court Erred in Admitting Improper Matters of 
Evidence. 
This gener.al subject has been adverted to and un-
der eaeh Class of Testimony, authorities ·cited sufficient 
to eover each separate assignment under 14 and under 
15 (a) to 15 (nnn) inclusive. (Ab. 336-372). We would 
not be justified in repeating these, or the assignmelft.s 
as recited in these p~ages. The ~Court by looking at them 
will .see the appli~cati~on of the authorities citied as to 
each of them. None of these assignments is waived. 
We ask the ~court, however, to ·consider these as-
signments als·o in supp·ort of the general conduct cl~aimed 
of introducing immaterial, incompetent and improper 
evid,ence by asking leading questions so that the obj·ec-
tion thereto reflects upon the defendants and makes it 
appear that the defendants were trying to ex~clude evi-
dence. We were in fiact often accused of this and have 
already cited some instances. 
In ·connection with the:se assignments also and this 
same general subject, w·e ask the court to note particu-
larly the evidence of Fisher Harris, the city attorney, 
'vorking in connection with the district attorney here, 
to accomplish the same result. The albstract, pages 126 
to 139, show the dis.cussion with rel~ation to Mr. Har-
ris's letter and his persistence in calling f.or that let-
ter and getting the ·Contents of it into the record re-
gardless of the ruling of the ·Court excluding the letter. 
In this ·Conne~ction ·also will be noted at the pages of 
the abstract indicated, and particularly the pages of 
the reco~d therein ·cited, the persistence of the prose-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
167 
ooting attorney in asking irrele,ant leading que~tions 
as to what the witness had heard, and "~hether the de-
fendants asked Harris wh{) was getting the payoff men-
tioned in the letter and other questions of this char-
acter. 
While relying upon the authorities hereinabove 
cited as to each of the single assignments above re-
ferred to, we want to call the court's attention to a note 
in 78 A. L. R. 766 on the subject of counsel implying 
that an adversary was trying to suppress facts. The 
note there says : 
''Gratuitous statem-ents of coun-sel, not war-
ranted by the evidence, are universally frowned 
on and regarded as improper by the courts, for 
t:he reason that the statements thems-elves, or 
th-e inferences which naturally flow from them, 
might tend to mislead or improperly influence 
the jury. In cases where such misconduct of 
counsel has had that result, the courts have held 
it suffieient ground for a reversal of judgment.'' 
Also: 
109 A. L. R. 1089 a note on the subject of offering 
improper evidence {)r asking improper questions as 
ground for reversal: 
''Improper questions may be prejudicial in 
various ways, including the following: They may 
plainly convey information ;excluded by the rules 
of evidence; may hint at the eai'i$tence of signifi-
cam,t though inadmissible facts, with or without a 
suggestion as to their exact nature; may, ibry the 
assumptions therein contained, and notwithstand-
. ing the ~answers being prevented, impress upol). 
·the jury, by a mere .show of proof, matter.s which 
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~are not ·admissible in evi~dence and which per-
haps :could not be proved, as inferred, even if 
opportunity were afforded; and may, by reason 
of the objections m·rude, emphasize the facts sug-
gested more effeetively than might be done by 
answers admitted without obiection.'' 
* * * * * * 
''In almost every instance of such mis-con-
duct, opposing (~ouns~el, if he makes objection, 
is neeessarily pl1aced in the false light of sup-
pressing significant circumstances and attempt-
ing to ~de~ceive the jury into ren,dering an unjust 
v:erd.i~ct. ' ' 
Also: 
116 A. L. R. 1170 and the note there relating to 
comment by attorney on opposing counsel's objection or 
refusal to permit introd~uction of evidence : 
''There are conflicting views as to whether it 
is prop·er for ~couns~el to comment on the exercise 
lby an opposing party of a p~rivilege with respect 
to testimony or the calling of a witness. By what 
seems to be the better rule, it is held improper 
for counsel to make such comments.'' 
This last note refers to the matter involved in as-
signment 15 (;nnn) (Ab. 371), as well as. a numlber of 
other a.ssi·gnmen ts. 
We now call attention ~and sihall ~discus.s only gen-
erally assignments 15 (000) to 15 (xxx) inclusive. This 
refers to improper cross examination and improper re-
buttal and ,comes under a little different classification. 
WH shall discuss 15 (ooo) and 15 (pp·p). (Ab. 372-
4), a.s illustrative. We ask the court to examine the ab-
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stract at 194 to 200 ine. The di~ trict attorney stood with 
copies of the newspapers in his hand and was trying 
to bring out that the Federa.ti'On of \\T omen's Clubs ha.d 
stated to the Telegram that there wa.s vice here in-
cluding gambling in card rooms. If it were admitted that 
they .so stated, it was utterly incompetent and irrele-
vant to the charge of an agreement here. No conversa-
tion was attempted to be :fixed with Mr. Finch and that 
objection was repeatedly made. Mr. Loofbourow pointed 
out to the court (Alb. 200), "It is just an effort to read 
these newspaper stories into the record, without any 
possibility of contradicting them in any legal way.'' It 
was emphasized to the jury and could not have failed 
to have been prejudicial. It was utterly indefensible. 
It was in this discussion that counsel commented that ig-
norance of the law was no excuse. 
Repeated efforts were made to have the court in-
struct the jury to disregard the matters read from the 
newspaper. It had absolutely nothing to do with any 
direct examination of the witness or any matter re-
ferred to by him, or to refute any of his testimony. It 
was another illustration of building up a case by im-
proper gossip and propaganda. 
It is hard to pursue the assignments above referred 
to without thinking that the most ·condemnable con-
spiracy was between the city attorney and the prosecut-
ing attorney to besmirch Mr. Finch, an honest and up-
right citizen, by a show of pretended indignation about 
ope:r:ations here, during his short term of offiee, which 
had gone on under these same prosecuting attorneys for 
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many years before and since. Certainly they knew 
better than he could know how to deal with these prob. 
lems and how to stop the·m if they could be stopped. 
When the city licensed card rooms, charging ~as much 
annually as $150.00 on one table, everybody knows that 
the chief of policB ·could not prevent gambling therein; 
and when the city practically licensed and provided for 
the contvol of p~rostitution by the Boa:r.d of H·ealth every. 
body interested knew and had always known that that 
operation was going on. It was almost plain hypocracy 
to pr.ate about these ''vices'', totally irrelevant as they 
were, :and thus haras•s ~and bring about a conviction of 
Mr. Finch, who had performed his duties just as every 
police ~chief had and does perform them, and undP.r the 
same conditions, and with the same operations during 
the entire memory of thes-e prosecuting attorneys. He 
was- not being trie.d for thi,s .. 
In the group of assignments now under considera· 
tion, w·e eall brief attention to 15 (www), (Ab. 378). It 
will be noticed there that the ·Court ~called the writer 
down for making an obj-ection with relation to an al· 
leged conversation with Mr. Thacker, and the .court 
said: 
''THE C~OURT: Listen, Mr. Mulliner, this 
does not involve anybody but Thacker 'and Mr. 
H.anson 'has. not obj~ected. ' 
·MR. MULLINER: If the failure of Mr. 
Thacker to do anything is an -agre·ement, then it 
is going to affe,ct all of us. '' 
Now after this, as above' pointed out, with relation 
to .the testimony of thiis same witness the prosecuting 
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attorney "~as allowed to argue to the jury that it did 
affect all of the defendants and showed a. ''mutual un-
derstanding'' between these parties. 
It is a matter often commented upon 1by the courts 
as showing prejudice in the cas~s of this kind, that the 
court supported and gave approval to the conduct of the 
attorney, thereby impressing the jury, and even arous-
ing sympathy for the prosecuting attorney, where objec-
tions are made to such conduct. 
State 'V. Trogstad, 100 P. (2) 564 (Ut.): 
This is a recent case discussing the question here so 
vitally involved as to the introduction of other matters 
of ·alleged wrongdQing, or of general vice, both in the 
statements of the attorney and throughout in the evi-
dence, and without actual proof of any other actual 
crime, to show intent, or for any other purpose. 
The opinion in this case says : 
''On the prosecutilm for a particular crime, 
evidence whick tends to show that the accused 
committed 0/Mther crime, im,d,ependent of that for 
which he is on trial, even of the sa;me sort, ~ in-
admissible. There are exceptions to the general 
rule, carnal knowledge eases being one. In re 
Sadlier, Utah, 85, P. 2d 810, on rehearing 94 P. 2d 
161, and cases cited. '' 
The Court Erred in Refusing Requests and in Giving 
Certain Instructions. 
In the matter of instructions, the trial court con-
tinued to con.fuse the issue here with the class of con-
spiracy where a substantive offense is charged and the 
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alleged ·Conspi:r:ators engaged in ·committing the offense 
or, in not as stated 1by the ·court in the Wyatt Case, 23 F. 
( 2d) 791, supra : 
' ' Keep~ing in mind that the on:e crime which 
the indi~ctment ·charged against all defendants is 
~conspiracy * * * not the substantive crime of vio--
lating the law itself-" 
The instructions clearly leave the jury believing 
that they ·could ·convict the ·defendants, or any of them, 
for any mis·conduct or omissions of duty shown in the 
mass of insinuation argument and tHstimony as to 
isolated matters of this kind. 
The instructions do indicate that the mere opera-
tions alleged in the incti:clment in 1936 and 1937 are 
not proof of the ·conspiracy, although this is .somewhat 
nullified by other ~and more gener:al language. The in-
,structions fail to advise the jury at .all wri th reference 
to the matter of alleged admissions by silence, and leave 
the jury to believe that the long recitals: lby the witnes~ses 
of ·conditions that they 1had investigated, or found out, 
or been told about, could be (~o.ns:idered as evidence. 
The instructions also not only lea.ve the jury believ-
ing, but ~advise the jury thrut any kind. of co..Jop-eration 
in any manner related to any of the operations by any 
p·ersons, can be considered as proof of guilt of the 
charge here, making no distinction, notwithstanding the 
requests, as to the parti·cular conspiracy and any other 
:smaller conspiracies or !any omissions to stop any of the 
operations alleged. 
The instructions are entirely mislea:ding upon the 
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point .that conduet, admissions and declarations of a 
single alleged conspirator cannot be used to prove the 
conspiracy. That such matters inYolving .any other 
conspirator could be admitted only if the conspiracy 
was otherwise proved. It is in this connection particular-
ly that the jury are left to 'believe, as indicated by the 
court in the previous quotation herein, that anything 
said by anyone, anywhere, may be used to prove the 
conspiraey or to charge defendants here. 
The instructions also contain a serious misstatement 
of fact by the court. It is these matters only that we 
will discuss. (1) First, wit-h reference to the alleged 
admissions by silence, defendant requested (Ab. 287) 
S€parately with reference to the testimony of Attorney 
Harris a.nd what he had in,estigated and had heard or 
found out, that his recital w.as not to be taken as proof 
of the matters which he recited, and agruin (Ab. 288) 
generally with relation to Attorney Harris and other 
witnesses that their recital of what they had heard or 
been told or f{)und out was not to be considered by the 
jury as proof of the things that they recited. And then 
lby request 10, (A b. 292) asked another proper instruc-
tion on admissions by conduct. Thes~ requests were 
clearly correct and all were refused No instruction was 
given upon this subject, which was ·clearly made an 
issue throughout by o bjeclions ~and motions. 
The only instruction with relation to the subj·ect 
of admissions at all, and this was wholly insufficient and 
did not ·advise the jury on this issue, or even bring to 
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their .attention the matter at ·all, is a short statement, 
subdivision (b) of instruction 23 (A b. 277) : 
' ' (b) The term 'admission' means the act 
of acknowledging something :ass·erted; acquies-
·Cence or ·concurrence in the truth of an allega-
tion or statement; ·conceding that a statement is 
true.'' 
i'his failure violates the rule repeatedly laid down by 
this Court that the defendants were entitled to an in-
.;struction presenting their theory of the evidence and 
instruction upon all .material issues. 
( 2) The ·se·cond matter of S·erious importance, is 
that with relation to separate conspiracies or :s:eparate 
offens.es by different persons here charged, or other 
p-ersons whos-e names were introduced in evidence. We 
have attempted to show under previous subdivisions of 
this brief that that matter "\v.a.s confused and that the 
evidence supported such separate eonspiracies, if any 
conspiracy at all was proved. It appears to us beyond 
question that the proof of conspiracy here that must be 
relied upon rests upon Holt's testimony. It rest·s par-
ticularly upon Holt's testimony that he eollected money 
in 1936 and again in the latter p1art of 1937. We do 
not see that this supports the general eonspiracy. 
W·e ·clHim that under the rule of evidence applicable 
it clearly does not, but it has been and will be relied 
upon by the state as s.upporting the 1agrjeement alleged. 
Now it must lbe clear, we think, ·that Holt's arrange-
ment, when he himself was head of the anti-vice squad, 
with Rosenblum, commencing by his testimony (Ab. 99) 
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about July of 1936, and ending at the close of thnt. yPar, 
and which arrangement in no "~ay in, .. olved anyon~ 
charged a.s a conspirator here, "~ag a ~eparate and dis-
tinct arrangement a.nd tJJ.e testimony proved no n1orP 
than this. It must also appear that the 1natter of his 
alleged arrangement "ith Mr. Harmon about June of 
1937, and his alleged contact with )fr. Pearce a.t that 
time, and then his collecti001 and turning over of money 
to Mr. Harm.{)n indicated another definite setup. These 
may have indicated understandings to collect money 
from pr{)stitution. It in no way involved the larger 
agreement as alleged or the purposes of the general con-
spiracy to permit, allow or a-ssist operations. This mat-
ter has been discussed and authorities cited at length 
on it, and it is submitted to the Court upon the cases 
hereinabove previously cited at length. 
In any event we were entitled to have the jury in-
struct~ on this important issue. 
Requests were made for instructions on this (Ab. 
284) which related particularly to the separate arrange-
ment attempted, according to H. K. Record, between 
him and Mr. Pearce and Mr. Harmon in 1937, when he 
was head of the anti-vice squad. Separately a request 
was made (Ab. 285) directly with relation to the testi-
mony of Mr. Holt and to the testimoo:y of Mr. Kempner 
as to these separate arrangements, the requests being 
that these could not be considered as proof of the con-
spiracy ''unless you believe that such collections were 
made, if you believe they were made, as a result of the 
agreement ·alleged here or that such collections * * "" 
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weor·e made beeause of the .agreement alleged against the 
defendants.'' And further, that such .circumstances 
should only be considered if they were, in the mind 
of the jury, consistent only with the existence of such 
agre·emen t. 
We then made request No. 5 (Ab. 286). direetly on 
this question that if the, jury believed that some one or 
more offenses had been committed lby .one or more al-
leged conspirators, or if they .believed that there were 
some agreements or understandings other than the 
conspiracy eharged, that proof of these smaller offenses 
or ~agreements or conspiracies at different times "if 
they believed they wer:e such'', would not justify convic-
tion of the offense -charged, .and added: 
''·Moreover, where, .as here, a single ~conspiracy, 
general in its nature, is charged, defendants can-
not be· .convicted upon proof merely of other of-
£enses or of other or smaller conspiracies or of 
any conspira.cy different from that .alleged." 
We .cited in this -connection: 
29~5 U. S. 78, 79 L. Ed. 1314, 43 Fed. (2d) 
890. 
We have now eited an abundance of other authority 
showing tha.t this instruction was .correct and fairly 
pres·ented ·the issue. No instruction was given on this 
subject. Instead, the court .confuses the matter through-
out by a number of instruct~ions. indicating to the jury 
that they ·can find these defendants guilty without actu-
al proof of their ·entering into the agreement alleged. 
This they tdd·d. 
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In instruction 7 (..Ab. ~tl-i) tht.'\ r.ourt say~ that the 
agreement may be sh(nvn by \Yhat is tern1ed eiroum-
stantial evidence ''or by infert.~net.~~ deducible and justi-
fiable from other proven fact~ and son1e acts and con-
duet of the defendants, Wtd eaoh of them.'' The court 
then attempts to limit by saying that the circumstantial 
evidence must be sufficient to convince beyond a reaso:n-
able doubt of the guilt of the defendants, ·'or some of 
them, as charged in the indictment, and as having com-
mitted the unlawful acts or some of them in further-
ance and in pursuance of the alleged agreement of con-
spiracy.'' 
Then in 12, the court instructs that if Erwin, Finch 
and Thacker failed to perform their duties ''then you 
may take such fa.cts into consideration in determin~ng 
whether or not they, or any one of them, so failing to 
perform his duties are guilty of conspiracy." 'l'his ap-
pears to indicate that this failure, which the cases defi-
nitely ihold does not support the agreement here, .may be 
considered as proof of conspiracy. 
In 12(a) (Ab. 269) the court ·dDes say that mere 
cognizance of these operations ''in the absence of 
other evidence" would not be sufficient to support the 
ta,greement. He should have said that the mere cogni-
zance of these operations was no proof at all, but adds 
again: 
''In other words, to find said defendants, or 
any of them, guilty as charged in the indictment, 
you are required to find beyond a reasonaJble 
doubt that they were parties to the alleged con-
·~piracy or agreement, or actually particilpated, 
thereim in carrying out the sa;me," 
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In taking the e~ceptions (Ab. 302) it was particu-
larly pointed out and discussed with the court that this 
instruction as to the ·Carrying out of the conspiracy, 
permitted the conviction for any acts in any way con-
nected with any 'Of the operations mentioned in the indict-
ments, and .that in any view of the matter they would 
.!have to participate in acts to carry out the conspiracy 
knowing of the existence of the conspiracy. 1The court 
suggested that he might put in .the word "knowingly". 
It was then suggested that that would be insufficient be-
cause a p·erson might do what ne did knowingly, as 
for example Stu beck's alleged collections, but that he 
must know of the .conspiracy. The court, however, made 
no ·Change in the instruction whatsoever. 'This instruc-
tion as to this character of conspiracy was cle'arly preju-
dicial. 
This kind of instruction shows the misconception 
of t'he court as to this charge. If the commission of sub-
stantive ·crime had been charged, then doing something 
in the commission of that crime may have been some 
evidence of an agreement to ·commit it. But here no 
substantive crime was charged. It ·could not certainly 
be left to the jury to decide that any act committed in 
·connection with the operation of any of these opera-
tions would justify a conviction, and that is what these 
instructions do. 
( 3) The third general matter referred to abow 
is dis·cussed at length under the gubdivision of this 
brief with relation to the admission of declarations and 
co.~duct of alleged conspirators wHJhout a foundation of 
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agency. "\Ye haYe cited numerou~ casl~~ on thi~, includ-
ing the lea'lici.ng· case of Terry rs. [.""n-ited States, 7 Fed.. 
(2d) 28, where the opinion said : 
'• In other "~ords, a conspiracy i~ not an om-
nibus charge under which you can prove any-
thing and e\erytbing and conYict of the sins of 
a lifetime. * ~ ~ Proof that the plaintiff in er-
ror was guilty of another crime ""'as in itself 
prejudicial,' ' 
Again this matter is confused and not covered al-
though requested. There are statements, however, which 
are cl-early misleading and contrary to the authorities 
cited. 
In instruction 13, after stating that if they believe 
that a conspiracy as alleged existed, the instruction 
says: 
"then the court charges you that any statement 
or declaration, if any, made by any or more of 
such conspirators in furthemnce and pursuance 
of said conspiracy or agreement and while carry-
ing out the same and the said common unlawful 
design or purpose and while it still was in prog-
ress, is admissible as against all persons en-
gaged in such conspiracy or agreement, "' * * and 
is admiHsible as against all persons engaged in 
such conspiracy.'' ·This meant any conspiracy. 
There is no instruction that these things cannot be 
used to establish the conspiracy. This demarcation is 
never made. In the requests (A b. 282) this issue was 
asked to be submitted. It w:as requested that in con-
sidering the matter of circumstantial evidence, ''you are 
not to consider as proof of the conspiracy * * * any 
statement or declaration, or alleged admission made by 
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any alleged .conspirator. The existence of the conspiracy 
charged ·cannot lbe established against any alleged con-
spirator :herein by evidence of the acts or declarations of 
any ot:her alleged ·conspirator, done, or made in the 
absence of the .conspirator sought to be ·Charged'', etc. 
All defeilJdants then joined in request No. 11 (Ab. 
292 where the folloWling was submitted, taken directly 
from one of the cases ·cited supra and supported by all 
the cases: 
'' Y.ou are instructed that the offense of con-
spiracy ·Cannot be p·roved by statements or admis-
sions of the defendants, or any of them, out of 
the presence of the !others.'' 
The ·court never ·covered this point. The ·court did, how-
ever, give instru-ction 16, which misled the jury to the 
contrary. 1This instruction also covered matters previ-
ously ·covered in the other instru·ctions and therefore 
served to confuse the whole matter. This instruction 
says that before they :eould find the defendants guilty 
''you must find from facts in evid.ence from which it may 
be reasonably inferred that the offense was committed", 
and then coming to subdivision ( 4) thaJt ''the defendants 
here, or either of them, conspired, agreed and eonfe~r­
ated among themselves or with Ben Harmon, or with 
9-olden Holt, or with Abe Stubeck to permit, allow and 
assist'' houses of prostitution ''or permit, .allow and 
assist'' lotteries, etc. Then ·Coming down to ( 5), that 
''.at least one of the following overt acts was commit-
ted.'' I~t does not sa.y by whom on the overt acts, but 
puts in Abe .stuheck as well as mentioning others (Ab. 
273). 
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The first part of this instruetion, · · .tJOU tnnst find 
from facts in evidence. fronr 1chich it nta.y be rea.so·nably 
inferred", and this applies to all the sulbdiYisions of tha't 
instruction, is direetly contrary to the holding: in Terry 
rs. United Sta.tes. 7 Fed. (:2d) :28, 1chercin the ft·i.al court 
instructed that if they found that the ac.ts of the parties 
and under the circumstances shown in the PYitlt)nce and 
the conditions surrounding them '" giYe rise to a reason-
able and just inference that they were done ns the result 
of a previous agreement, then yon are justified in find-
ing ~that a eonspiraey existed between them to do those 
acts.'' The opinion &ays that the foregoing ''does not 
contain a correct statem.ent of the laze" and adds: 
''The circumstances relied upon by the pros-
ecution must so distinctly indicate the guilt of the 
aooused as to leave no reasonable expl'anation of 
them which is consistent with the prisoner's in-
nocence.'' (Citing authorities). 
And that was a case where a substantive offense was 
charged. 
Now, subdivision (-!) of this instruction 16 above 
quoted just simply tells the jury that they can convict 
here on any kind of a side agreement between -any of 
the defendants or Holt or Stubeck either in connection 
with prostitution ''or'' the gambling operations. This 
~ounts to an instruction contrary to the requests and 
contrary to the law as cited hereinabove at length with 
relation to separate offenses or separate conspiracies. 
: · . Subdivision ( 5) of this instruction 16 tells the jury 
in. ,e.ffoot. that if an. overt act was committed that sa tis-
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fies the statute as to overt acts, whether committed !by 
any of the defendants or by any pe.rson shown by the 
evi1dence to be a party to the agreement ~alleged, and 
without any indica;tion that it must be after such founda-
tion, and by a party actim.g with knowledge of the agree-
ment :and in furtherance thereof. 
( 4) The fourth matter, which is technical but quite 
serious here and to which objeetion w:as taken, is in 
instruction 15 (A b. 271). This instruction in the first 
part reads: 
''You are instructed that if you fbelieve that 
either Officer Holt .or the witness Stubeck, or 
both of them, collected money as they testified~'' 
Mr. Stubeck did not so testify, but testified exactly to the 
contrary, that he had never .gone wit!h Kempner and 
·colle·cted money from these pool halls, as testified, ei1ther 
at the time testified or at any other time. Of course the 
!balance of the instruction should not have been given in 
view of the fact that Stube·ck was never in any way 
conneeted with t:he agreement :here and any conduct of 
his could not pTove the agreement alleged. 
This instruction plainly assumes the fa,ct that Stu-
beck colleeted the money as the court says he testified 
that he did. 
State v. Hwnna, 21 Pac. (2) 537 ( Ut). 
In this case this Court held ag.ain that such an as-
sumption was error. 
T'he Court at 540 says: 
"Tihat it is Hrror for the court in instructing the 
jury to assume as proven any material contro-
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verted fact is held by thi~ eourt in ~tate Y. SPy-
mour, 49 Utah, ~85. 163 P. 7~~l 4H~. wlH\rl\ tht\ 
court, spooking through Chief ,l n~tiel\ Frick, 
savs: 'Courts, in charging juror~. ~hould be vpry 
ca~eful not to assun1e any material faet or fact~. 
Jurors, "~ho a.re lnymen. ·are ah,·ay~ eager to 
follow the opinion or judgment of the court. and 
if the court assumes any material fac.t in the 
charge, the jurors are most likely to folio\\~ the 
assumptions of the c.ourt. Indeed. w·e must as-
sume that such is the case unless the record 
clearly sho-ws the contrary.' '' 
In addition to the authorities heretofore cited 
Weniger vs. ['"nited States. ±7 Fed. (2d) 692, recites: 
'''The crime of conspiracy consists in the 
combining or confederating of two or more per-
sons * =~= * Neither will the commission of an 
overt act. though unlawful in itself, be enough 
to show that the actor was a party to the con-
spiracy. The law requires proof of the common 
.and unlawful design and the knowing participa-
tion therein of the persons charged as conspira-
tors before a conviction is justified.'' 
This recital alone, that Stubook had so testified, re-
quires a reversal here under the authorities. 
Holland v. State, 206 S. W. 89 (Tex.) 
We cite this case :finally as supporting the discus-
sion under No. 3 of this topic and also as having a more 
general bearing upon the question of error here in the 
refusal of our requests. In this case a request was re-
fused and as here, no instruction was given on the 
point. For this error the conviction was reversed . 
. . T~e instruction requested was as follows: 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
184 
'' 'Gentlemen of the Jury: You are instruct-
ed that you cannot ·consider the acts and declara-
tions of Norvin Holland and Hill Holland made 
in the abs-ence of defendant, for the purpose of 
proving a conspiracy; but you must find from 
the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that a 
.conspiracy was formed before you would be per-
m.itted to consider said ·acts and declarations of 
said Norvin H olla;nd a;nd Hill Holland for a'MJ 
purpose whatever.' '' 
The opinion s:ays this request correctly stated the 
law. 
GENERAL ASSIGNMENTS COVERED 
Assignments 7, 8, 9 and 10 (A b. 317) dealing 'vith 
the over-ruling of .defendants' motion for a non-suit, 
and separately for a direeted verdict and in receiving 
and entering a veDd.ict, ~are covered by the preceding dis-
cussion as to the sufficiency of the evidence and also as 
to the nature of and the: ·e1imination of evidence. These 
matters were brought to the Court's attention by these 
general motions and also motio~s to strike. (Ab. 159-168, 
247-252). This was in addition to motions made throug·h-
out the trial. 
Assignments 18, 20, 22 and 31 are covered also by 
the preceding idliscussion. Tlhese relrate to the insuffi-
ciency of the evidence and particularly to its insufficiency 
under the rule as to circumstantial evid.ence, and also 
to the over-ruling and denial of appeUants' motions 
in arrest of judgment and for a new trial. 
AS.SIGNMENTS ~COVERED BY AD,OPTION OF 
ERWIN BRIElF 
Assignments of error 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 (Alb. 316-17), 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
185 
are no"- coyered by the adoption oft la\ brit"\f filPd ht\rein 
in this case on behalf of defendant E. B. Erwin. This 
brief discusses the issues therein contained and the 
matters of over-ruling the n1otions to quash the indiet-
men.t .and objootions to the Bill of Pa.rtirular~, and othlH. 
matters in connection with the pleading·s as therein re-
ferred to. 1The defendants Harry Finch and R. 0. 
Pearce do not waive these :assignments but do adopt 
the argument in the brief of the defendant Erwin filed 
herein in respect to said assignments, "'ithout repeat-
ing the argument and brief on these ma•tters herein. 
POIXTS IX OONCLUSIOX 
The point is made throughout this brief that the 
evidence is insufficient to support the charge actually 
alleged. Defendants are not called upon to meet any 
other charge. It will be noticed in this connection that 
beginning with the Bill of Particulars the charge is de-
parted from. It recites that houses of prostitution oper-
ated, that lotteries operated, that gambling in licensed 
card rooms operated, all in Salt Lake City. These, of 
course, always operated. The Bill of Particulars then 
recites that the defendants permitted and allowed these 
things to operate. T·his was not the charge. It was the 
misconception upon which the case was tried. The Bill of 
ParticuLars proceeds to blame the defendants for !these 
vices. It then alleges collection of money for which it 
attempts to blame defendants. This, again, was not the 
charge. 
We have next the opening statement of the attor-
ney, containing no reference to the agreement or any 
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confed·eration of any kind or any conne-ction between 
the {1efendants, but charging ·the defendants with mis-
cellaneous and isolHted wrongdoing and alleged omis-
'Sions with relation to alleged vice. These recitals were 
very damaging, but again this was not the charge, and 
the whole statement, if true, and if established, did not 
sustain the charge. The principle portions of the state-
ment 'and the most damaging parts w·ere never proved. 
Then w-e come to the testimony, and again we have 
miscellaneous insinuations of separate wrongdoing and 
omissions but no testimony of probative legal proof of 
the agreement. T·his we have ·claS'si:fied under ( 1) tes-
timony as to the operations, which always will Hnd al-
ways have gone on in substantially the s:ame manner 
as shown in the testimony; tas to this their appears 
to be no dispute. Under (2) we have .classified the te~­
timony of alleged admissions and have shown ·the dam-
aging nature of these long ·recitals of vice, of alleged 
payoff at times incidental thereto, and containing in-
·timations of wrongdoing by individuals. The authorities 
cited under this division of tbe brief, w.e believe, estab-
lsh that this tes1timony does not support the conviction 
of the offense charged in the indictment .and. w:as al-
most, if not entirely, erroneously admitted in that it 
involved no admission of the offense charged. This was 
inadmissible for the other reasons and under the author-
ities. ·cited in the division of the brief with relation totes-
timony under classification (2). Error on this was also 
carried into the ins.tructions. 
Under classification ( 3) we have considered the 
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intimations of va.rious matter~ of isolated tnisconduot, 
which it seemed to us "ya~ erroneously adtnitterl. It was 
in line with the Bill of Particulars and "~ith the opPniug 
statement and the general purpose here of blackening 
the defendants in any conooiVI&ble way. The authorities 
cited under the division of the brief "·ith relation to 
testimony under classification ( 3) sho\Y, we believe, that 
this evidence does not serve to support the conviction 
of .the offense charged, and· for the most ~art was er-
roneously admitted. When taken in connection with the 
Bill of Particul-ars, which was read, the opening and 
closing arguments of counsel, and the conduct of counsel 
throughout and the voluntary statements made by him 
with ·referen~ to defendants, this was clearly prejudi-
cial. T-his error also was in the ins trnctions. 
With reference to the testimony under classification 
(4), we lbe1ieve the authorities conclusively prove that 
the conduct and statements of individual defendants re-
ferred to in statements introduced and made out of 
court by other defendants or by other persons, could 
not be used to prove the agreement, that the agreement 
was never proved independently thereof, and that these 
were erroneously admitted, and being incompetent and 
also immaterial to the issue charged here, were in ad-
dition prejudicial. This is especially true when, as 
shown in the later subdivisions, the error .as to .this and 
in fact as to the previous classifications, was carried 
throughout the instructions. 
With relation to the discnssion of the insufficiency 
of the testimony to sustain the charge, the authorities 
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cited elimina:te from ·consideration, substantial portions 
of tha.t discussed generally under these four classifica-
t~ons. In addition we have pointed to re:asons and author-
ity why (a) the tes,timony of Kempner as to Stubeck's 
conduct and s:tatements should he eliminated and its ad-
mission was also prejudicial; (b) why the testimony of 
Golden Holt ·cannot be ·considered as supporting the 
verdiet here- under the authorities ·cited in the division 
of the lbrrief as to his te-s:timony; and (c) that the testi-
mony of H. K. Record does not support the eha.rge but 
rel1ates to a sepa:r:a.te attemptea ~agreement that was by 
his own testimony never entered1 into; and (d) why evi-
dence of different :and smaller conspiracies was not ad-
missible as proof of the general agreement and con-
spiracy alleged; and finally on this matter, that the 
s~a.me testimony as to Mr. Pearce :and Mr. Er,vin, from 
the same witnesses, to establish the same fact as be-
tween the s:ame· parties is not available here as estab-
lishing that fact. This is for the reason that the ultim:a1te 
fact of re-ceipt of earnings from prostitution, knowing 
it to be from such operation, is the very fact from 'v-bicb 
they seek to have an inference of guilt drawn here, and 
that fact was adjudicated and determined in the other 
proceeding. Such prior 1determination, under the authori-
ties cited, is ·conclusive. 
The division of the brief under improper state-
ments and conduct of the district attorney, we believe 
also shows prejudici~al conduct. This is somewha;t in-
volved in the next sulbdivision discussing the improper 
admission of matte-rs of evidence, particularly a·s to the 
specific i terns referred to under this, and incorporating 
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the discussion and· authoritiP~ ritPd under the ela.ssifi-
cation of testimony as discusse..i under t host~ sepa.rate 
headings.· All this goes ·also to the n~sign1nents that 
defendants were not accorded a. fair trial. 
Coming to ~the in~truction~. 'vhile \Vt:~ haYP not dis-
e~s·sM these at great length. "ye hHYe sh<.n,·n, '"e be-
lieve, the error of the court in refusing: (a) the re-
quests as to the alleged admissions by conduct; and (b) 
the requests as to the matter of other and isolated 
misconduct which is so seriously confused in the record, 
and in this connection the matter of t·he request 
with relation to separate conspiracies. On this, the court 
not only refused to instruct on these matters, but gave 
instructions clearly indicating to the jury that the de-
fendants could be found guilty here for misconduct 
in connection with the operations mentioned and for 
separate conspiracies. This was particularly empha-
sized in the quotations from instruction 16. And also 
(c) in the .matter of the request for an instruction that 
the conspir-acy could not be proved, nor could the con-
nection of any defendant therewith be proved by state-
ments of another alleged conspirator or other person 
~entioning or attempting to involve such absent de-
fendant This was another vital issue, and again the in-
structions of the court are misleading to the effect that 
sue~ matters could lbe used to connect. 
Tlhere is· also the add[ tional point made that the 
court -stated. to the jury that Mr. Stubeck had testified 
that he collected money, when in fact· he testified to the 
contrary.:. It. is, of ·course, true that his collection of 
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money would have no tendency to prove the ag~eement, 
but, nevertheless, it was not his testimony that he was 
collecting and that the money was being distributed to 
Erwin and his ·Crowd. None of this was his testimony; 
he denied it; and in view of the fact that defendants 
must have been convi~cted for 'Such matters as this, the 
instruction becomes prejudicial. 
It is quite obvious from the fact that Mr. Thacker, 
who ·was head of the anti-vioe squad, was acquitted, 
that the jury lost ·entire- track of any agreement, 
because if these vices or the allowance of these opera-
tions was proof of an 'agreemen~ by these defendants, 
such .an agreement would have to involve Mr. Thacker, 
as head of the vi,ce squad, as he was the very person 
who could show leniency or could condone any of such 
operations. If he was not a p~a.rty thereto, as the jury 
£ound, no s-uch ;agreement could operate. 
The fact is, that in this case, a very serious InJUS-
tice has been done, particularly to Mr. Finch. He was 
not given a fair trial, that is olbvious. He is not guilty 
on this record of the offense charged here, nor is he 
guilty in fact. He is a man well along in years, selected 
by the Inembers of the City Commission, Wlho personally 
knew his long honest service in the Parks Department of 
the City Commission, and had and have every confidtence 
in his integrity. H·e has been unfairly imposed upon 
and disgraced. He was wJ~hout police ·experience, and 
with a police depar.tm·ent that he had to take as it was 
under the civil service r·egul:ations. He was convicted 
largely upon uncorroborated testimony of this man Holt, 
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who absolutely and clearly betrayed Mr. Finch, nnd 
then ha:s attempted to disgrac.e hi1n to snYt' hi~ ow11 hirlP. 
It is a miscarriage of justice "~hieh oan ne,~t:'r "·hnlly h~ 
rectified. 
. As to Mr. Pearce, there a.re intimations in this rec-
ord of wrongful cond.uct. These intimations he was not. 
ealled upon to refute or ~iefend against, booause he had 
10nce defended thereon and been acquitted, a.nd because 
here this was not the charge. So "·e do not haYe his story 
with relation to these intimations. He is not gwilty, and 
by no stretch of the imagination can it be indicated 
here that there is evidence of his guilt of the offense 
charged of agreeing with these \'arious people to per-
mit or allow or assist the operations alleged. There 
isn't the slightest intimation of such an agreement by 
bim. There is no connection with these operations s·hown 
on his part, and he, as a layman, had no power to per-
mit or allow such operations, and absolutely no control 
over them. The fact attempted to be established here of 
the receipt of money from prostitution, which is the in-
timation of wrongdoing contained in this record, was 
tried and proved to be an untrue charge. 
The admission by the Court here of tJhe record in 
that cas·e 10785 bringing ~t to the attention of the jury 
-and :then the withdrawal of it by the Court .after the 
close of the trial, when it was the only evidence intro-
duced by this defendant, and the refusal to permit the 
matter to be mentioned in argument to the jury and 
then the instruction to the jury (A'b. 79) that they were 
not to consider this af all, was not only erroneous in 
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substance and thus prejudicial, but was. prejudicial 
also beeaus·e of its separate effect upon Mr. P·earce·'s 
pos1irtion with the jury. 
He was not tried, nor was any defendant tried upon 
the charge alleged in the indictment, nor was that charge 
proved ·against any defendant here, nor were the d~ 
f endants here given a £air trial. 
We believe it has been es'tablished that the judg-
ment a.s against these defendants. should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
H. L. MULLINER, 
Attorney for Appellants, 
Harry Finch and R. 0. Pearce. 
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